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Abstract 
THIS THESIS CONSIDERS THE EMERGENCE of the new middle class in 
post-reform China. It argues that Western class categories do not directly apply 
to the Chinese situation and that the Chinese new middle class is distinguished 
more by sociocultural than by economic factors. Based upon qualitative 
interviews, the study looks at entrepreneurs, professionals and regional party 
cadres to show the networks among these different groups and the continuing 
significance of cadres. The study also looks at generational differences. The 
older generations are pragmatic and business-oriented, rather than personally 
oriented in their consumption. They also show strong collective identities, but 
these are based in personal networks rather than in a sense of a common class 
location that they share with others outside their personal networks. In contrast, 
the younger generations appear more flexible and hedonistic. They tend to be 
more individualistic, materialistic and oriented to personal gain. In neither 
older or younger generations is there much evidence that the Chinese middle 
class is taking on a political role in advocating political reform alongside 
market reforms as is suggested by some Western stratification theorists. They 
are in the vanguard of consumption but they are the laggards in politics. 
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Preface 
THIS IS A STORY OF my research journey. And like all research, it begins 
with the researcher and the interviewees. 
A researcher’s interest in a certain phenomenon goes quite a long way in 
shaping the initial conception of what the research study is about. How that 
interest is framed necessarily reflects a particular vantagepoint taken by the 
researcher and reflects his or her interests, destinations and motivations. Steier 
(1991) has been enlightening: “What I describe in my research is in no way 
existent apart from my involvement in it—it is not ‘out there’ ” (Steier 1991:1). 
Since around the 1990s, the ‘Chinese new middle class’ has attracted 
considerable attention. State socialist countries have undergone varying 
degrees of economic and political reform in recent years and these have 
undoubtedly aroused concerns over their formation and their reach, impact and 
consequences in society. Highly visible are the growing numbers of the 
Chinese new middle class, who are seen to have an obvious enthusiasm in 
leading an affluent way of life by way of status symbols such as owning brand-
named products and expensive automobiles. 
My own interest for the purpose of this study is the growing groups of 
increasingly influential people who are viewed as the ‘Chinese new middle 
class’: regional party cadres, entrepreneurs and professionals in today’s post-
reform China. 
Research is “primarily about discovering new knowledge” (Gilbert 1993: 33, 
Kwong 2001) in an unknown territory. The research process involves to a 
greater or lesser degree a continual interaction of ideas and that interaction may 
drive the work in unexpected directions (Roberts 1981, Kwong 2001). On the 
first leg of my research journey, I had crude ideas of the direction and the 
terrain of the research landscape before me. My attention had been drawn to 
the ways of living and consumerist behaviour of newly rich groups generally in 
contemporary China and in Guangdong province in particular. However, I 
would not be able to plan too far ahead. I took my ‘researcher self’ in the 
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research process as seriously as practicable. I wanted to research into 
something that I wanted to know and was going through myself. And this has 
motivated me to settle on my long research journey, despite the sometimes 
clear and present twists and turns in the research process, which should be 
regarded as ‘mistakes’ by design. 
Over the past several years, I had surveyed the body of literature on a wide but 
related range of topics: the indigenisation of the middle class and the 
consumption patterns and lifestyles of the Chinese new middle class. 
Meanwhile, I kept close connections with various members of the Chinese new 
middle class whom I have interviewed. It transpired quite early on that my 
preliminary perspective rested on some research questions and assumptions. 
One preliminary assumption is that cultural differences have been grossly 
amplified to the extent of reinforcing cultural stereotypes by some cultural 
sociologists. Culture and meanings are embodied in the way a person sees, 
thinks, interprets and values. The connection between theories and practice is 
far more complex than I had at first thought. I wanted to take the various 
theories and link them up one way or another with real-world class practices by 
means of interviewing the Chinese new middle class in Guangdong province: 
they should speak for themselves about their own lifestyles and consumption 
habits. The Chinese new middle class had sprung into existence in Chinese 
society and their sudden arrival appears to have important implications (albeit 
yet to be determined) for the new social stratification and social inequality in 
mainland China. Producing a description of the quality of lived experience is 
inadequate and insufficient. Increasingly obvious to me is this: what is most 
important to our understanding is to describe the meanings hidden behind the 
lived experience and the value that they have to the actors. The product, 
therefore, is a constructed text of human actions, behaviours, intentions and 
experiences in the actors’ life-world. 
Theoretical frameworks and empirical data are of paramount importance to me 
since they provide a guiding thread to a more comprehensive framework to 
better understand the empirical setting of the development of China under the 
  iv 
dual influence of economic reform and globalisation. Even so, my own 
experience as a researcher tells me that more concrete practices, unfettered 
access to fieldsites in Guangdong and the personal quality to get along well 
with people are usually more important in the field. These aspects are 
especially important in a place like China where conservatism and reserve are 
still the norm and many of the Chinese new middle class are wary of accepting 
the approach of a researcher to conduct in-depth interviews. Theories and 
practice are complementary partners (or at least they should be) to understand 
the peculiarities and idiosyncrasies of the Chinese new middle class in 
Guangdong province (Kwong 2001). 
Having rethought the aims and focus of the study, I then went on to examine 
the methodological questions for the study. I picked up the ‘story’ metaphor 
from my in-depth interviews and participant observations of people’s 
experiences and the meanings they made of those experiences. I decided to 
‘talk’ to the Chinese new middle class and collect their ‘stories’ of how they 
became the rising stars of the reform era. The people of the Chinese new 
middle class narrated their private lives and revealed to a greater or lesser 
degree the various versions of the Chinese new middle class that they 
apparently subscribed or aspired to at different points in their careers and 
everyday lives. Based on those in-depth interviews, I as the participant 
researcher used my own reflections (Steier 1991), subject knowledge and 
analysis to interpret or reinterpret their meanings. 
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“The everyday social and cultural practices seen in China today exhibit 
heterogeneity rather than homogeneity. Such a heterogeneity 
(fragmentation, if you will) challenges traditional concepts of class. 
Class should now be incorporated into the body of sociocultural 
terminology because the case of China shows that lifestyles and 
consumption patterns play an important role inside the class boundary, 
as is shown by the features of the Chinese new middle class. The 
explanatory power of class structure in general Sociology is set to 
undergo a fundamental change because of the Chinese situation.” 
(Author’s own memorandum) 
 
I STARTED THINKING ABOUT THE Chinese new middle class (中国新中产
阶层 xīnzhōngchǎn jiēcéng, literally, the new medium-asseted stratum) almost 
three years ago. It was a reaction brought on by an acquaintance, who shall go by 
the name of ‘Uncle Wong.’ His story was an impetus for me to think more deeply 
about such people in China today. 
Uncle Wong (pseudonym) is a man of substance: he is about forty years old and 
a party cadre in Guangdong. I first met him in 2008 through an acquaintance in 
Guangdong and since then we have become friends. He is a frequent visitor to 
Hong Kong, with a reputation for generosity and lavish spending, and I often 
accompanied him whenever he was in Hong Kong on his many shopping or 
sightseeing trips. In many ways, Uncle Wong was the one who inspired my 
research into the lifestyle and consumption of the new middle class in 
post-reform China. 
The first time I met Uncle Wong, I thought he (the big spender I have come to 
know him to be) was just practising conspicuous, hedonistic consumption in 
Hong Kong. One time while in Hong Kong, Uncle Wong was buying a large 
amount of jewellery: jade, gold, diamond-studded watches and so on. That one 
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spree apparently cost him RMB¥20,000 (US$2,928 or £2,022)1. 
To me, as the researcher, what was most interesting was not the spree itself but 
that he paid for his purchases in cash, not credit cards or cheques. His behaviour 
quite astonished me, though it should not have done. Indeed, Uncle Wong’s case 
is quite common among the rich in China today. Then piqued by curiosity to 
understand people like Uncle Wong – China’s burgeoning new middle class, 
their attitudes and aspirations – as a guide to contemporary China and the very 
distinctive trajectory of change it is now embarked upon.  
The introduction of market reforms – beginning in a small way in the 1970s, but 
accelerating from the 1990s onwards – and China’s apparent move from an 
economic system of state-planning to a market-based one is a familiar story, but 
before I begin with my outline of the study undertaken for this thesis, I will set 
out some of the significant issues affecting the rise of the Chinese new middle 
class in post-reform China.   
Pre-reform China at a glance 
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) under Mao Zedong2 took power in 1949 
and immediately began a programme of revolutionary change, one of the first 
being a new Marriage Law (based on the Soviet model of the 1920s) that set a 
new charter for women and children (Meisner 1999). From the 1950s to the late 
1970s, the central government exercised authoritative power and all policies 
were buttressed by a command economy and controlled by strict planning 
                                                 
1
 All the exchange rate in this thesis is for RMB ¥1 = US$0.146 and RMB ¥1= £ 0.102 
mid-market spot rates. Retrieved www.xe.com on 25 May 2010. 
2
 All the Chinese terms (with Chinese pinyin) in this thesis,  refer to glossaries and abbreviation 
at the back to the thesis.  
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guidelines. In 1958-60, the regime carried out the Great Leap Forward (大跃进 
Dàyuèjìn), a radical campaign aimed at fast-forwarding to an egalitarian society. 
It abolished private ownership and established a new social formation called ‘the 
rural people’s commune.’ Class became heavily conditional on party political 
affiliation and observance. Property erstwhile in private hands was confiscated 
and evenly distributed among every Chinese person. Central authorities 
manoeuvred industries according to strict central planning guidelines (Lu & 
Perry 1997, Walder 1986, 1989, Pun 2005). 
The two most salient features of Maoist China were the hùkǒu and dānwèi 
systems, both of which continue in modified form to this day. 
The hùkǒu system classifies the entire population into two (and only two) 
categories: agricultural registrants are domiciled in rural areas and 
non-agricultural (i.e. urban) registrants in metropolitan areas. Introduced in the 
1950s, it became quickly entrenched by the early 1960s. The hùkǒu (戶口) is a 
nationwide system of household registration set up under the 1958 Regulations 
on Hùkǒu Registration were issued by the National People’s Congress (NPC)  in 
a bid to safeguard progress towards collectivisation in rural areas and control 
food shortages in urban areas. It was designed chiefly to control internal 
population movement. It created a legal domicile for every person and bound 
each person permanently to that domicile. At the same time, the hùkǒu could 
also in many contexts refer to a family register since hùkǒu is issued per 
household and usually includes details of births, deaths, marriages, divorces and 
movement of all members in the family. Additionally, the hùkǒu also identifies a 
person or household by administrative category (rural vs. urban). A dichotomy 
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of household management thus began to take shape. It is a system that curtails 
geographical mobility of people and also accordingly denotes the salience of 
native-place identity in urban China (Lu & Perry 1997: 43). 
The dānwèi (单位 ‘work unit’) system refers to the place of employment, 
especially in the context of state enterprises during the pre-reform period. The 
dānwèi was the first step and principal channel for implementing party policy in 
the Chinese socialist infrastructure. The work unit once held considerable sway 
on the life of an individual: workers were bound to their work units for life. The 
work unit was almost wholly self-contained and provided an individual with a 
full complement of goods and services for living, such as housing, healthcare 
and education. The same system monitored the behaviour of each individual for 
compliance with implemented party policy. Individuals had to obtain permission 
from their work units for activities like travel, marriage, having children or even 
where to have meals (Walder 1986 & 1995c, Lu & Perry 1997). Job allocation, 
even for university graduates, was the norm in a centrally planned economy such 
as China was then.  
Hùkǒu and dānwèi were the two prominent features of pre-reform China. Cadres 
who had the greatest access to political capital or power became the prominent 
and dominant class. They enjoyed higher status in society. Hùkǒu and dānwèi 
could capture stratification relevant features of the pre-reform system.  
From 1966 to 1976, the leadership under Mao carried out the Cultural 
Revolution (Meisner 1999, Andreas 2009), an even more radical campaign to 
reset the entire Chinese society on the road to socialist utopia. Capitalist assets or 
private ownership were banned. Many intellectuals and ‘political subversives’ 
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were sent to the backwaters of the country ‘to learn from the peasants’ and also 
of ‘educated’ youth. Paradoxically, peasants and workers of that period are 
generally considered to be the best of their generation (Goldman 2005).  
It started with a couple of ‘big-character posters’ on a university display board 
that quickly backfired on the writers and spiralled out of control. Huge rallies 
were organised to work up the emotions of the more politically minded. Broadly 
speaking, Maoist China had been a wholly egalitarian, relatively classless 
society. The concept of a middle class did not exist then because the Communist 
Party brought an end to the propertied classes such as landlords. Maoist China 
had no culture of consumption and no landholdings or private property. Political 
attachment to the party (i.e. political capital) was paramount. When Mao died in 
1976, a series of politico-economic events took place that ultimately led to the 
dismantling of radical Maoist socialism in China. 
Post-reform China at a glance 
The utopian socialist class structure of society as constructed by the Maoists 
rapidly dissolved when Deng Xiaoping and his protégés launched economic 
reforms and modernisation drives in 1978. The Chinese working class, hitherto 
protected by state enterprises and collective communes, was forced to give up its 
‘iron rice bowl’ (tiěfànwǎn 铁饭碗) in the face of urban reforms (Walder 1989, 
Pun 2005, Hughes 1998, BBC 1999). ‘Iron rice bowl’ is a Chinese idiom 
referring to employment that offers very good or guaranteed job security, along 
with a steady income, benefits and sometimes extra perks as well. In China, it 
refers to the system of guaranteed lifetime employment in state enterprises. Job 
security and wage levels are not related to job performance but adherence to 
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organisational rules or party doctrine. The meaning derives from the traditional 
porcelain rice bowl, which breaks when dropped. An iron rice bowl can be 
dropped multiple times without fear of breakage, much like how employees in 
certain positions can make numerous mistakes before being fired. 
Initially, pragmatism took first place and ideology was put in the backburner. 
The so-called open-door policy and economic reforms of 1978 effectively put 
modernisation and economic progress the official ideology of the country, 
though it was obviously not described in that way. The reforms basically put an 
end to most of the more damaging forms of command-and-control restraints in 
the Chinese economy and in general life. 
Enterprises were now able to transact a variety of contracts with local 
governments, which in turn supplied enterprises with production materials and 
so-called bureaucratic services (such as licensing, certification, and tax 
concessions). These practices provided the channels for local government to 
exercise control of property rights, resource allocations and various other 
bureaucratic processes, including investment and credit resources. Whilst 
central government command loosened, “strong local officialdom and public 
enterprises with a thriving market economy” appeared under economic reforms 
(Lin 1995b: 304). Deng’s dictum ‘economics in command’ had effectively 
supplanted Mao’s dictum ‘politics in command’ (Goodman 1999: 6). Even in 
the earliest years of the reforms, China welcomed and encouraged foreign 
enterprises and investment to its shores. Many of the Chinese new middle class 
today used to work for state entities or collectively owned enterprises back in the 
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1970s and 1980s before switching to foreign ventures or private enterprises3. 
Their working stories are recounted later in the thesis. 
Special economic zones and joint ventures with foreign businesses were set up 
to accelerate economic modernisation. The most celebrated of the reforms for 
the industrial sector was the establishment of the ‘Town and Village Enterprise’ 
category of businesses. TVEs were usually small-scale businesses such as 
grocery stores and other establishments that supplied or manufactured daily 
necessities (Park & Shen 2003, Kung & Lin 2007). Many TVEs were located in 
the coastal provinces and are ubiquitous in many cities in Guangdong province, 
which will be the location for my study and will be described in detail in a 
subsequent chapter. 
One of the indicators for the liberalization of economic activities in reform 
China is the dual-track price structure. The same commodity can be priced 
differently between the planned and the marketised portions of the economy 
(Zang 2008 in Goodman 2008). Under the dual-track price structure, one way of 
profitmaking was to increase production using high-priced raw materials. 
However, the far simpler, more profitable way was to pocket the spread (i.e. 
price differences) between the state sector and the market. Pocketing the spread 
became extremely lucrative even in the early 1980s. Pocketing the spread meant 
that the Chinese new middle class were able to purchase state produced 
commodities (such as cooking oil, salt and rice) at a cheaper price, which they 
could then sell at a higher price than the central government did. It was one of 
several means for people to manipulate any ambiguous and incomplete 
                                                 
3
 ‘Collectively owned enterprise’ (jí tǐ suǒ yǒu zhì qǐyè 集体所有制企业) is an economic unit 
(i.e. Business) where the assets are owned collectively by the workers and/or managers of the 
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institutional policies for profit-taking—and it served as a ‘breakout’ point for the 
rise of the Chinese new middle class. 
Despite land and property reforms in China, urban land  remains ‘state-owned,’ 
that is, owned by the state through government administrative or economic units, 
and what is transacted is land-use rights. During the reform years, cadres and 
ex-cadres of land-owning work units sold land-use rights to commercial 
property companies at a steep profit. The result is a loose but active network of 
property dealers across different cities driving up the number of land 
transactions. 
From the post-reform land-leasing system emerge two prominent features. One 
is the privatisation of public housing and the commercialisation of the housing 
market. The other is the ‘spatialisation of class’. In the privatisation of public 
housing and commercialisation of the housing market, the general trend has 
been a move away from dānwèi-based housing provision to a commercial 
housing regime. This is an uneven process, with winners and losers, thereby 
creating class differentiation in urban China4. As with any state of affairs that 
has winners and losers, housing therefore is an important element in the 
production of a new middle class. 
As for the ‘spatialisation of class,’ this feature is still going on in Chinese cities 
today: socioeconomic differences are increasingly inscribed on space, especially 
regionally and between areas designated as ‘rural’ and those designated as 
‘urban’ under the hùkǒu system of registration (Chadha & Husband 2006: 119). 
                                                                                                                                 
unit (China Data Online 2008). Details see glossaries.  
4
 Housing classes in Western sociology is associated with the work of Peter Saunders, ‘Beyond 
Housing Classes: The Sociological Significance of Private Property Rights of Means of 
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Chinese cities have relatively lower degrees of internal inequality for inhabitants 
than do comparable cities in the West or in the developing world (Friedmann 
1985). The greatest inequalities seem to be regional and this seems to follow 
from the operation of the hùkǒu system. The remaking of urban communities 
and the making of the Chinese new middle class are becoming two inseparable 
processes (Chadha & Husband 2006: 496). 
According to Bian et al. (2005) and Zhang (2000), there is a labour force 
currently in China of about 342 million. This includes about 6% classified as 
professional employees and a further 6% as entrepreneurs.  About 12% of the 
labour force is made up of illegal migrant workers, a further 12% unemployed 
and about 25% forming a ‘floating’ population. While many of the consequent 
inequalities are manifested between regions in China, there are significant 
inequalities within cities like Beijing, Shanghai and those that make up the 
special economic zone of Pearl River in Guangdong province. However, it is not 
easy to make a precise assessment because illegal migrant workers to these cities 
are those with rural hùkǒu and will be classified accordingly in much official 
data. An official report for 2004 from the Ministry of Labour and Social Security 
points to a serious situation: 68% of all migrant workers in forty cities across 
China did not receive one rest day in the workweek, and 76% receive no time off 
for legal holidays. In pay, 48% are paid regularly, but 52% experience occasional 
and even frequent non-payment of wages, while 54% have never been paid 
overtime earnings (which the law requires employers to do). As to employment 
protection, only 12½% had employment contracts and only 15% had social 
security scheme coverage (Lee & Shen 2009: 120).  Including overtime 
                                                                                                                                 
Consumption,’ International Journal of Urban and Regional Sciences, 1984 (8). 
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payments the monthly income of illegal migrants is about one quarter that of the 
‘official’ earnings of white collar workers, while ‘legal‘ manual workers earn 
about one third of the monthly earnings of white collar workers. As will become 
clear, the new middle class has access to income considerably in excess of their 
official salaries. 
One crucial institutional change that characterises post-reform China has been 
the partial dissolution of the dānwèi system in urban China. Dānwèi, in 
combination with hùkǒu, has been effective in shaping social space and 
relationships (and therefore identity and class boundary) for the new middle 
class in urban China because dānwèi carries symbolic and functional meanings 
of power, knowledge and discipline in the party-state (Chen & Sun 2006).  
However, even since 1980, the urban hùkǒu holder is still tied to the dānwèi 
(work unit) from which the individual obtains a wide range of goods and 
services. Therefore, the dānwèi, hùkǒu systems and guānxi (or systems of 
personal networks) in urban areas still have an important impact upon class 
relations in post-reform urban China. While the dānwèi system has broken down 
in the countryside, it remains a significant factor in urban areas where one 
member of a household at least may retain an attachment to a dānwèi in order to 
enjoy the wider benefits that would accrue to the household. 
The hùkǒu system of household registration and policy of lifelong employment 
together stabilises (i.e. restricts) the residential mobility of the urban family. 
Provision of public housing is based on length of service, so older employees 
receive priority for larger, better-built accommodation plus the option to have 
their married children to live in with them. Work replacement policy (i.e. 
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‘grandfathering options’) allows retiring employees the chance to secure 
employment in the same work unit for their grown children. These two policies 
and others enable the state to keep adult children dependent on their parents, 
thereby putting senior citizens in a superior position in the family structure and 
so promote family togetherness (Sheng & Settles 2006). 
Professionals and entrepreneurs who are not originally urban hùkǒu holders are 
financially able to afford a hùkǒu transfer. The usual way for them is to do it 
through employment with an international company to affect a transfer from a 
rural hùkǒu to an urban one. Other people have been known to pay as much as 
RMB¥100,0005  (US$14,631 or £10,004) to ‘acquire’ an urban hùkǒu from 
cadres. Therefore, the most distinguishing feature of a member of the Chinese 
new middle class is having an urban hùkǒu as opposed to one who does not (the 
peasant). 
The economic reforms and thriving economy have caused many professionals, 
entrepreneurs and cadres to pour into the newly established industrial or 
development zones predominantly located in Guangdong province, the base for 
much of the global capital in search of a commercial foothold in the Chinese 
market (Pun 2005: 30). The Maoist language of class struggle, being 
permanently abandoned through the economic reforms, have made many of the 
Chinese working in state enterprises switch to doing business (xiàhăi 下海 ‘to 
dive into the sea’) by the 1980s. The privileged position associated with the 
urban Chinese new middle class became progressively prominent throughout the 
reform years (Pun 2005: 30) and is set to become even more so in future. The 
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guānxi circles that ex-state workers have developed during their time with the 
dānwèi remain useable and important even after their switch to the business 
world. 
China is now practising ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics,’ a full-blooded 
capitalism in disguise driving the economic growth of the country. It comes with 
a large grey zone of interconnecting relationships built up by gift-giving, wining 
and dining, collective memories, traditional Chinese values and the need for 
self-improvement. The loophole in the machinery of government and the 
relationship-oriented nature of Chinese society result in the administrative grey 
areas and encourages guānxi networks to arise as a means for ‘getting things 
done.’ (Zhang 1999) 
Guānxi is what oils the cogs of bureaucracy and the wheels of commerce, and is 
the single biggest factor that spurred economic growth in China. The newborn or 
born-again bourgeoisie in present-day China closely overlaps with the 
bureaucrats and is intertwined with kinship networks (Bian 1994, Lin 1999, Oi 
1991, Ong 1999, Pye 1999), so guānxi networks are increasingly important to 
get ahead in post-reform China as the country heads towards a fuller capitalist 
society. 
Economic reforms have brought a greater degree of prosperity for many in 
China. Individuals can now run their lives, flexibly and with maximum 
collaborative potential through institutional improvements and also 
longstanding interpersonal networks that operate on shared backgrounds, 
lifestyles and consumption habits (Chaney 1994 & 1996, Latham & Klein 2006). 
The appearance of the Chinese new middle class demonstrates the importance of 
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class, education, market, political values and the ruling party in the country. In 
looking at the rising new middle class of China today, class analysis in 
transitional China allows us to think of the special nature of the Chinese market 
situation within the context of ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics.’  
The picture of class in post-reform China is also complicated by the operation of 
both the household registration system (hùkǒu), which produces spatially 
distributed inequality among the population, and the work-unit system (dānwèi), 
which helps give rise to regionalism among the bureaucrats. The singular 
supremacy of the ruling party preserves the continued importance of bureaucrats 
(cadres) in Chinese society. The operational ideology of the party requires the 
use of such ‘professional revolutionaries’ to implement policies and operation at 
all levels of government. Significant or even substantial loopholes in the 
machinery of government especially with regard to the marketised portion of the 
economy encourages interpersonal relationship networks (guānxi) to develop 
between bureaucrats and the people in the private sectors including 
entrepreneurs and professionals.  
Overview of the thesis 
Class analysis as applied to post-reform China differs from Western-based 
analytical models in that ‘class’ in China is more of a cultural term than an 
economic one. Institutional changes to hùkǒu, dānwèi and property ownership in 
urban China become important factors in shaping the sociocultural 
characteristics of the new middle class when combined with the social 
pre-eminence of cadres and the importance of guānxi networks. 
Metropolitanisation of urban China is increasingly causing the new middle class 
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and other social distinctions to emerge in Chinese society. New social 
distinctions help shape new identities. Consumption helps to accentuate social 
distinction and differentiation. Aetheticised (or stylised) consumption 
encourages hyper-commodification of both goods and consumption itself and 
help spread symbolic consumption. Increasingly favourable business conditions 
attributable to good public policy have also led to better living standards and 
therefore a higher standard of consumption behaviour, both of which can readily 
be seen in the lifestyle of the Chinese new middle class.  
This thesis interviewed 59 members of the Chinese new middle class in six cities 
in Guangdong province. There are 31 entrepreneurs, 11 cadres and 17 
professionals. My operationalised conceptual framework gives me four 
standards as the basis for selecting my sample and the techniques to deal with 
them. The first standard is a minimum per-capita income of RMB¥5,000 
(US$732 or £505) per month, and this baseline is an average of official statistics 
(Guangdong Provincial Statistical Bureau 2005-7), academic surveys (CASS 
2002 & 2007, Qiao & Jiang 2005) and popular perception (from the media like 
China Daily 2005, 2008). The second standard is a minimum post-secondary 
education (technical or non-technical), based on qualifications obtained. The 
third standard is a managerial-level or managerial-type job position, whether in 
the state or private sector, technical or non-technical. The fourth standard is 
native belonging, i.e. whether our subjects were originally natives of the 
fieldsites or newcomers/immigrants from other regions.   
* * * 
I first met Uncle Wong in early 2008 and I completed my fieldwork in summer 
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2008. Those interviews will be recounted as part of the research process in the 
methodological account in Chapter 3. For now, I am concluding this chapter 
with an account of how I composed this thesis, which is the last leg of my 
research journey. 
While this piece of research writing should speak in the voices of its subjects, I 
decided that it would also speak with mine. It seeks to offer a first-person 
account of the research process and to provide ‘thick descriptions’ (Geertz 1973, 
1983, 1998) and dense interpretations of stories (Miller 2000, Andrle 2001) from 
the Chinese new middle class.  
Chapters 1 and 2 present the literature terrain that has been crossed and explains 
the conceptualisations employed to account for the Chinese new middle class.  
Chapter 1: An intellectual journey: Class theory to class analysis 
This chapter depicts the background of class analysis in its originating western 
context. It will present arguments from the Marxist and neo-Marxist approaches 
and highlight their inherent problems with respect to the Chinese situation. The 
literature review will also show how and why Bourdieu’s cultural sociology 
supports the idea that the Weberian/neo-Weberian approach is more robust (i.e. 
better suited) to depict a fuller, more accurate picture of the Chinese new middle 
class than is a neo-Marxian account. 
Chapter 2: (Re) framing class analysis in post-reform China 
This chapter reviews the application of class analysis to post-reform China. 
More up-to-date information about class analysis in post-reform China will be 
introduced. At the same time, it will highlight how the Chinese new middle class 
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is in fact socioculturally constituted in the context of Chinese society and has 
Chinese-specific characteristics as manifest in lifestyle and a particular 
orientation to consumerism. 
Chapter 3: Mapping the ethnographic terrain 
This chapter is a ‘confessional tale’ (van Maanen 1988) of methodological 
design. It provides a full account of how this study is framed, the methodological 
plan used, the narrative approach taken and the story behind the research process 
(Gergen & Gergen 1988, Usher 2001). It is basically about the methodological 
philosophy behind the study and how the research work was carried out: to give 
concrete information about the reasons for selecting the fieldsites in Guangdong 
province. Importantly, it will also explain how insider research and research 
ethics are done ‘with Chinese characteristics’ and why it does not follow the 
same procedures as are mandated in Western research sites. 
Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 are core chapters of this thesis presenting the findings 
about the Chinese new middle class.  
Chapter 4: Class boundaries of the Chinese new middle class 
This chapter focuses on the older generation of the Chinese new middle class 
and presents information about the class boundaries and culture of that particular 
subset of the new middle class in Guangdong. Excerpts from interviews will be 
used to show the pragmatic and utilitarian inclination of the older generation 
towards consumption matters, collective memories and other aspects. 
Chapter 5: Generational effects in the Chinese new middle class 
Introduction 
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This chapter is about the consumer revolution taking place in post-reform China. 
It also explicates the lifestyles and consumption patterns of the younger 
generation of the Chinese new middle class when compared to the older 
generation.  
Chapter 6: Guānxi networks and the Chinese new middle class 
This chapter is about institutional changes relating to guānxi networks. Cadres 
still play influential roles in collaborating with professionals and entrepreneurs 
in post-reform China. It highlights the ambiguities and incompleteness of 
national and local official policies, and the networks that arise from them as a 
counterbalance. 
Chapter 7: Middle class culture and political development 
This chapter is about the political development, cultural and moral boundaries of 
the new middle class. With the self disclosure and insider information collected 
from the Chinese new middle class, there are ample sources of references to 
explicate the middle classes’ identity and their close relationship with the local 
government in a highly globalizing China (Robertson 1995, Held 2003, Held et 
al. 1999).  
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
This chapter is the conclusion. It ends the research report with an epilogue to 
offer readers a reflexive discussion the study. This final chapter marks the 
conclusion of the research, but also a point of ‘opening’ out to critique and 
comment. 




 Chapter 1 
An intellectual journey: from class theory to class analysis 
 
‘We use ideas in the literature in order to develop perspectives on our 
own data, drawing out comparisons, analogies, and metaphors.’ 
(Coffey & Atkinson 1996: 110) 
 
OVER THIRTY YEARS OF LIBERATION have led to across-the-board 
socioeconomic changes in China, with economic liberalisation leading to the 
rise of a new stratum of socially influential people, popularly dubbed the 
‘Chinese new middle class’. Looking at the Chinese new middle class in any 
sensible, disciplined way requires the construction of a conceptual framework 
that fits in with the current realities in China. A study about the new middle class 
emerging in Chinese society has to cover a sizeable expanse of intellectual 
terrain (Lynch 2002). My first foray into sociological literature included 
cross-cultural and China studies with special emphasis on those that illustrate the 
nature of the so-called new middle class of China.  
Most class studies from the West are not directly useful in the Chinese context 
because they are overly concerned with class dynamics and class structures in 
Western societies and are also based very much on Marxist trajectories of social 
transitions – for example, ‘from feudalism to capitalism’, but not ‘from 
communism to capitalism’. ‘Socialism with Chinese characteristics’, where 
these characteristics derive from a pre-existing and still significant communist 
regime of political economy, has no parallel with anything anywhere else. This 
imparts correspondingly unique characteristics to any social class that emerges 
in that society. In what follows, I seek to build a conceptual framework from 




existing theories, models and knowledge about social class in the West and East 
that fits in with the observed reality in China today. 
This chapter reviews five major areas in the literature.  
1. I shall first examine the Marxist theory on class and how Marxist principles 
deal with questions about stratification orders within a modern society. 
2. I will use cultural capital and ‘party’ (political determinism) from Weberian 
class analysis but I note that political determinism works in different ways in 
China than in the West: political affiliation/support for the CCP (China) vs. 
political parties competing for power in the public realm (West). I will also 
use ‘economic class’ from Weberian class analysis because it seems to work 
in a more refined (or less blunt) way than in Marxist class theory. 
3. I will develop Weberian ‘economic class’ in terms of ‘work situation’ and 
‘market situation’ from neo-Weberians such as John Goldthorpe (1980, 
1982), whose seven-class scheme is more easily modifiable to suit the 
Chinese situation.  
4. I shall also seek to supplement the neo-Weberian approach with the approach 
of Bourdieu and other cultural sociologists’ work to explain some of the 
lifestyle and consumption patterns of the Chinese new middle class. 
5. Finally, I explain how the established theoretical models help me 
operationalise a conceptual framework of class for this study using concrete 
scenarios to depict the actual situation in China, although most of this 
discussion will be reserved for the following chapter. 




Marxist class theories and derivatives 
Classical Marxist class theory is a theory that rests on notions of class 
antagonisms. It involves two dichotomous classes in a state of continual conflict 
because of one class exploiting the other. Class exists in society when there is an 
exploitative relationship in production, which, under capitalism, in Marxist 
theory is between the bourgeoisie and the working class. As capitalism 
progresses, the gulf widens between the bourgeoisie and the working class, 
becoming ever deeper and more distinct with time. Marxist theory bases its 
argument on ownership and lack of ownership of property in the means of 
production as being the essential determinant of class relationships. 
The class debate in the West mostly develops as a debate with Marx’s theories. 
The Marxist analysis of class and society is best able to account for 
socioeconomic phenomena, but even here Marxist concepts break down when 
dealing with modern capitalist societies (Clark & Lipset 2004, Meiksins 1998, 
Migone 2007). 
The weakest point in Marxist6 thinking, even for analysing Western capitalist 
societies, is the conspicuous presence of intermediate classes between workers 
and bourgeois capitalists. In a capitalist society, as the Marxist wisdom goes, the 
bourgeoisie consists of industrialists, financiers, landowners and merchants. 
They are in continual conflict with each other and they as a whole are in 
opposition against workers. The real-life problem for Marxist theory that all 
societies around the world have undergone major transformations since the 
theory first came out over a hundred years ago. Class lines are relatively blurred 
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in China today. The theory is unable to deal with groups like managers, civil 
servants, doctors, computer programmers and many others who are salaried but 
own no means of production, at least not by Marxist definition (Saunders 1990: 
15). Neo-Marxists such as Nicos Poulantzas (1973, 1975, 1978, 1982) and even 
Wright (1979, 1985a, 1985b, 1994, 1997, 1999) tried to compensate for 
theoretical problems by reclassifying the modern middle class as the petty 
bourgeoisie of small-business people, independent farmers and white-collar 
salaried workers. The reclassified middle class is then intermediate between the 
financiers and industrialists on one side and the industrial workers on the other 
(Arbam 1939: 332), but the theory cannot escape the shrinking role of the latter 
and the declining significance of class polarisation, at least in terms of class 
structure. 
Marxist class theory, then, has quite deep-seated problems and reclassification 
sounds like a stopgap measure. Numerous studies confirm no existing 
communist state ever existed in pure communist, classless form (and that the 
only classless societies that have existed, in Marx’s sense, are those of ‘primitive 
communism’, not ‘advanced’ communism). Indeed, Marxist theory could not 
even sustain itself in explaining European feudal societies. In mediaeval Europe, 
the cleavages and conflicts in society were not between owners and non-owners 
of assets or production. They were mostly between the monarch and the nobility 
or the church, or between the crown and the burghers in townships that tried to 
assert autonomy from royal control, or just blood feuds (Saunders 1990: 12). We 
can see the two concepts of exploitation and class structure are already too 
limited to explain feudal societies. The fact is that all societies are always 
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progressing under various degrees or types of transformations. The Marxist 
theory uses class categories like property and means of ownership to classify 
class in society. That makes most Marxist-based class theories of decreasing 
relevance for examining modern-day class structures and class relationships. 
If Marxist theory has lost its usefulness for Western societies, it has even less 
usefulness to explain new patterns of social stratification emerging in China. The 
Chinese case introduces problems—it is the wrong transition, from state 
socialism to market socialism (capitalism). The Chinese transition complicates 
the Marxist analysis by including a trajectory not recognised by Marx. The class 
philosophy, historical materialism and the two-class dichotomy of Marxist 
theory are legacy conceptualisations for China watchers. China today is a 
mixture of socialism and capitalism with spatial characteristics. So, as a theory 
of transition confronted with a problematic transition, Marxist theory is 
generally implausible when applied to China today. 
Weberian class analysis 
Longstanding attempts by sociologists to understand modern capitalism in terms 
of class usually begins with Marxist theories but have moved in a Weberian 
direction because of complications presented by real-life situations. 
Max Weber’s (1946, 1947, 1951) pioneering work in class analysis takes up the 
slack in Marxist thinking on two levels. On one level, Weberian class analysis 
breaks the Marxist materialist link between class and the economic/productive 
process by showing that people are also consumers of goods and services in the 
marketplace and not just sellers of labour (workers) or owners of capital (the 
capitalist elite) (Liechty 2003: 11).  




Weber developed a typology of class, status and party as the three bases of social 
stratification. Weber considered them as important influences in people’s lives, 
as opposed to the Marxist emphasis on property classes alone. That means the 
Weberian approach looks at the underlying structure of class as differential sets 
of life chances for members. Differential demand in the marketplace for capital, 
commodities and labour represent differential property ownership and income 
opportunities. Differential property ownership and income opportunities give 
rise to differential life chances. Differential life chances create differential 
demands for goods and services, and the demands lead to differential access. All 
these make Weberian class analysis more of a consumption-based model of class 
than a production-based one, or at least, allow a production-based account to be 
supplemented by a consumption-oriented one (Wallace & Wolf 2006, Ashley & 
Orenstein 2005). 
If capital accounting predominates in modern Western capitalism, then Weber 
was right in making a distinction between property classes and acquisition 
classes. Property classes are established on the disparity of property holdings, 
whereas acquisition classes are on possession of skills that help secure resources 
in the market, thus enabling the Weberian approach to accommodate 
intermediate divisions. In Weberian thinking, then, social class or group 
formation rests on (1) ownership of the means of production, (2) economic or 
market position of the individual’s skills and other marketable qualifications 
such as education (both of these are usually associated with the Weberian 
definition), (3) social prestige or honour (status) accorded to an individual by 
others, and (4) group belonging (party). 





In Weberian thinking, classes derive their existence from economic situations 
associated with property holdings and positions in the labour market. Currently, 
neo-Weberian class conceptualisations articulate class positions primarily in 
terms of market and work situations. 
Weberians agree with Marxists that all class divisions are property divisions, but 
differ in three important ways. Class is (a) a set of people with a common, actual 
and specific component in their life chances, insofar as (b) the common 
life-chance component is represented exclusively as economic interests by 
possession of goods and income opportunities, and (c) the common life-chance 
component is also represented under the conditions of the commodity or labour 
market (Ashley & Orenstein 2005: 234). 
Let us consider that for a moment. As property divisions, then Weberians 
identify the propertied classes as property-owning entrepreneurial groups and 
the petty bourgeoisie. Groups that are non-propertied but possess formal 
educational credentials are distinguished from manual workers (Breen 1995: 28). 
As a set of people who share common life chances, the market provides the 
common condition for the decisive moment when a life chance appears to the 
individual. Weber says that the market distributes life chances in proportion to 
the resources that individuals bring to it (Weber 1946, 1947; Breen 2005). There 
is market variation in these resources (e.g. property owners vs. non-owners, 
skilled vs. unskilled) in the sense that Weber recognised them (Breen 1995: 29). 
As Weber wrote: 
“.....The factor that creates class is unambiguously economic 




interest with classes stratified according to their relations to the 
production and acquisition of goods.....” (Raynor 1969: 8) 
 
Therefore, class situation is now equivalent to market situation, so the 
redefinition now reckons that people come to the commodity, credit and labour 
markets in unequal fashion (Breen 1995: 28). Class becomes redefined in terms 
of resources held or resources accessible by individuals instead of the relative 
place of the individuals in the production process. 
Status 
Status alludes to prestige or reputation differences between social groups. It also 
concerns the prestige and lifestyle of the individual and the social estimation 
attached to them, which means status distinctions could vary independently of 
class divisions. Social honour may be positive or negative. For example, doctors 
and lawyers are positively privileged status groups in modern capitalist society, 
but Jews were a pariah group in mediaeval Europe and banned from certain 
occupations and official positions. 
Possession of wealth normally confers high status, though there are exceptions. 
The ‘old money’ establishment customarily belittles ‘new money’ and the two 
moneys by the intelligentsia. Weber (1946, 1947) believes that members of a 
status group share a common claim to a certain level of social prestige based on 
lifestyle, education or occupation. Status situation could be a highly important 
factor in that it may have a direct bearing on class situation for individuals. 
On one hand, social status has to do with individual or group lifestyle, education, 
training and socialisation as well as inherited or occupational prestige. On the 
other, class distinctions are linked in various ways with status distinctions. As 




such, property is not necessarily recognised as a status qualification, although in 
the long run it is and with extraordinary regularity (Weber 1946: 186-187, 
Liechty 2003: 14).  
The Weberian analysis provides useful insight about how consumption and 
status could be related to the dynamics of middle-class cultural practices 
(Liechty 2003: 11). The rationale is that sociocultural processes in Weber’s 
intermediate strata (i.e. middle class) revolve around the wide range of cultural 
formations, lifestyles and status claims, and how they compete with one another 
within those strata. For Weber, class is the position of an individual or a group in 
the market as a function both of production (capitalist vs. labour) and of 
capability to consume goods and services. This means the social order of the 
middle class is determined relatively less directly on its relationship to the means 
of production and relatively more on relationship to the market, status, lifestyle 
and consumption (Storey 1999, Pinches 1999). 
Status is relatively underdeveloped in the neo-Weberian approach, which 
usually sees it in terms of the transition from pre-capitalism to capitalism. It is 
useful to link Weberian/neo-Weberian class analysis with the concepts from 
Bourdieu on the subject of sociocultural aspects of class formation in relation to 
field, taste and habitus, and then pick up the issue of political determinism of 
class positions. This chapter will discuss those links in detail later.   
Party 
Weber defines a ‘party’ as an association of individuals who work together 
because they have common backgrounds, aims or interests. Basically, the 
Weberian interest in ‘party’ is in how the formation of groups in ‘civil society’ 




relates to the political arena as they arise from the ‘field,’ which is either in the 
economy (classes) or in society (status groups). Weber emphasises that party 
formation can also influence stratification independently of class and status. In 
short, ‘party’ in the Weberian sense is about the political representation of 
classes or status groups. The concept ultimately relates to the subject of political 
parties and their socioeconomic foundations, and, hence, the entire body of 
Western studies that examines the class basis of voting. 
To what extent is the Weberian concept of party relevant to post-reform China? 
Mutual operation of market economic mechanisms and a single-party 
administration leads to a kind of not-so-completely-capitalist economy and a 
not-so-completely-transparent government (Zhang 2007: 426 & 431). Class and 
status positions in China are politically determined through institutional 
structures operated by the Communist Party (such as hùkōu and dānwèi), but 
also conditional on Confucianism and traditional Chinese cultural norms. 
However, to develop the Weberian idea of ‘party’ further would give us the link 
to party cadres, a group in the Chinese new middle class that do not exist as a 
stratification entity in Western societies (Lu 2002). The political orientations of 
the Chinese new middle class would need to be expressed in terms of support for 
different tendencies within the Chinese Communist Party rather than on the idea 
of voting intentions that Western studies tend to indicate. Therefore, the concept 
of party fits quite nicely with the continuing importance of political determinism 
in the Chinese new middle class in addition to that of market and work 
situations. 
 




Neo-Weberian class model: John Goldthorpe 
The original Weberian class model is multidimensional and emphasises status, 
class and party as life chances in property- and labour-related economic 
situations. Neo-Weberians extend the model further and set class within market 
and work situations, and that is the current Weberian/neo-Weberian approach 
today. 
Broadly speaking, from a Marxist perspective intermediate classes are 
considered as ‘fractions’ (factions) between the two polarised classes as argued 
by Poulantzas and E.O. Wright. However, in the neo-Weberian position such as 
that propounded by John Goldthorpe (1980 & 1982), the expanded scheme of 
seven class categories does not need a primary framing of intermediate classes 
‘within’ the core, ‘polar’ classes. The Goldthorpe model seems to be a more 
robust form of class analysis to explain the concrete situations observed in this 
study, and this chapter later will set out the reasons why it follows the 
Goldthorpe model (Goldthorpe et al. 1968, Goldthorpe et al. 1969). 
Goldthorpe (1980, 1982) is particularly relevant in our search to understand the 
Chinese new middle class because his class framework is primarily divided into 
those who exercise “delegated authority or specialised knowledge and 
expertise” (Goldthorpe 1980 & 1982) and those who do not. The authority factor 
is the one most likely to give rise to differences in working conditions and 
market capacity, even if status and party tend to be residual terms for 
Goldthorpe. 
Goldthorpe’s initial approach to class is grounded in Lockwood’s concepts of 
market situation and work situation, both defined in terms of production units 




and employment relations in labour markets (Scott 1994: 93). Market situation 
refers to an occupation and its income source and level, associated conditions of 
employment, the degree of economic security and the extent of economic 
advancement. Market situation also refers to categories of occupations whose 
members are known and have connections in the job market. Work situation 
refers to where an occupation is located in the systems of authority and control 
within the production process (Goldthorpe 1980: 40). Occupations typically 
have common market and work situations within the boundary of the same class. 
Educational credentials and marketable skills are primary class classifiers in 
Goldthorpe’s seven-class scheme. His scheme is concerned with the 
relationships between class structures, mainly work and market situations, 
which determine class stratification and social mobility in society. Cultural 
capital, even at the most basic level that Goldthorpe conceptualised it, is 
applicable to developments seen in Chinese society today. It also allows the 
Goldthorpean analysis with respect to work and market situations to be 
applicable in the case of the Chinese new middle class.  
Therefore, I could use a modified version of the Goldthorpean classification 
(Bian et al. 2005) to explain the Chinese case (see Table 1). The Chinese new 













classification Features (modified) 




Holds supervisory positions above 
the level of ‘section chief’ in the 
public sector (government/party 
agencies, industrial enterprises) or in 
the private sector (industrial or other 
profit-making enterprises). 
II Lower service class Middle level of 
professionals and 
managers 
Holds specialised secondary or 
post-secondary education and either 
(a) white-collar, non-routine, 
non-supervisory positions higher 
than a ‘section chief’ or (b) 
white-collar office employees 




Private owners and the 
self-employed 
Either (a) those who employ others 
and also have substantial capital 
assets, or (b) service or production 
workers who do not employ others 
and have a small amount of capital 
assets (gètǐhù 个体户). 
IV Petty bourgeoisie Skilled manual 
labourers or 
production workers 
Blue-collar manual labourers 
directly involved in production. 
V Lower-grade 
technicians 
Semi-skilled or routine 
manual/non-manual 
labourers 
Skilled or unskilled employees who 
provide direct services, including 
retail cleaners, repairers, cooks, 
janitors and drivers. 
VI Skilled manual 
workers 
Migrant workers Those deemed to be the majority in 
the lower/lowest rungs of society. 
VII Semi-skilled or 
unskilled workers 
Peasant — 
Source: Bian et al. (2005) 
 
Goldthorpe (1982: 171) suggests the class formation process itself could be a 
crucial intervening variable in the reproduction of social classes. There are two 
aspects: demographic identity and sociocultural identity. Demographic identity 
is the ability and extent of individuals to occupy the same class from generation 
to generation. Sociocultural identity is the ability and extent of individuals to 
share distinctive lifestyles and patterns of preferred associations of a class. The 




degree of relationship between class and distinctive lifestyles is sometimes 
called sociocultural continuity (Lau 2002). Class formation at its normative level 
is how extensive individuals in the same class positions share common values 
and beliefs, and that shows the degree of class cohesiveness and homogeneity 
(Lau 2002). 
Class and distinctive lifestyles of a class are interdependent and they are core 
concepts in the Goldthorpe analysis of modern stratification. The main weakness 
is that it does not incorporate political capital, a factor that would otherwise 
explain the membership of regional cadres in the Chinese new middle class. 
What has been observed of the Chinese new middle class generally concurs with 
the Goldthorpe conceptual framework, especially with respect to distinctive 
lifestyles. Even discounting the absence of political capital in the theory, the 
Goldthorpe model still allows us to develop it further with input from Bourdieu 
and other cultural sociologists such as Featherstone (1991) to operationalise an 
alternative to the more usual Weberian/ neo-Weberian method. 
Bourdieu and the Sociology of culture 
Economic progress has helped foster a new consumer society in post-reform 
China based on mass markets in production and consumption. As mentioned 
earlier, the rise of a new middle class reflects a realignment of social order: this 
reflects a need to construct new social identities (i.e. new classes) more around 
goods and property than on the work they do (Liechty 2003: 15). Consumption 
has emerged as one of the many defining characteristics of middle-class cultural 
life. 
Bourdieu provides the latest version of conceptualisations on class that help 




bring work and market situations from Weber into a culturally oriented analysis. 
His culturally reflective conceptualisations have now replaced the traditional 
‘materialist’ concept of class (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992, Bourdieu 1977, 1984, 
1986, 1989, 1992, Bourdieu et al. 1999, Jacksons 2008, Webb et al. 2002). In 
Bourdieu’s theory, cultural distinctions are the foundations of class distinctions, 
and taste is a deeply ideological category and functions as a marker of class 
(Bourdieu 1977, 1989, 1992, Acciaioli 1981, Jacksons 2008, Webb et al. 2002). 
His theory draws a basic distinction between the bourgeoisie and the 
intellectuals among the dominant classes in a given society (Bourdieu 1977, 
1979, 1984, 1986, 1989). The bourgeoisie has higher economic capital but lower 
cultural capital, whereas the intellectual has the reverse. (Younger generations 
within the bourgeoisie tend to have higher economic and cultural capital.) Tastes 
within these two groups are different. The bourgeoisie tends towards the baroque 
and flamboyant, whereas the intellectual shows a preference for aesthetic 
modernism. 
Bourdieu’s theory, although drawing on Marxian rhetoric, opposes the Marxist 
view that society is analysable purely in terms of classes and class-determined 
interests and ideologies. Income differentials signify class differences under 
very specific societal conditions, but the extent of class structuring in modern 
societies is determined on more than just income differentials (Bourdieu 1977, 
1979, 1982, 1989, 1992). Therefore, the bourgeoisie draws its power and profits 
from the economy, and its functioning depends as much on the production of 
consumer needs as on the production of the goods themselves. 
Bourdieu’s theories on cultural capital, tastes, habitus and cultural practices have 




become influential indicators in the investigation of middle classes anywhere. 
He is perhaps a more comprehensive sociologist than quite a few others are 
mainly because of his detailed descriptions of daily practices. For Bourdieu 
(1989), class formation is deeply rooted in the formation of habitus. Habitus 
forms a vital part of the everyday life of individuals, thereby giving rise to 
lifestyles for each social group. 
Habitus can be defined as “a system of durably acquired schemes of perception, 
thought and action, engendered by objective conditions but tending to persist 
even after an alteration of those conditions” (Bourdieu & Passeron 1979:12).  
Habitus is an embodied internalisation of objective social relations, which is a 
generative grammar of practices (Bourdieu 1977, 1982, 1986, 1989). In other 
words, habitus is a set of subjective dispositions that reflect a class-based social 
grammar of taste, knowledge and behaviour permanently inscribed in each 
developing person (Bourdieu 1977, 1989, 1999, Bourdieu et al.1999). 
Bourdieu sees the habitus as the key to reproduction because perception, thought 
and action are what actually generate the regular, repeated practices that 
constitute social life. In that sense, habitus is “the product of social 
conditionings” (Acciaioli 1981: 116) and links actual behaviour to class 
structure (Acciaioli 1981: 86). 
Bourdieu’s (1977, 1989) concept of class habitus indicates that cultural capital is 
the pivotal determinant of values, instincts and lifestyles. Cultural capital comes 
in various institutionalised forms, but most readily as education and skills.  
Bourdieu (1989, 1992) emphasises the leading function of education to 
predispose an individual or group to engage in certain cultural practices. The 




inference is that education brings out differential cultural patterns. A dominant 
economic class able to access superior culture (e.g. good taste) legitimises its 
position of superordination relative to other classes. Education enables the class 
to progressively capture the means of cultural reproduction as a way of 
increasing its chance of social reproduction (Bourdieu 1977, 1989). In short, 
education is a crucial capital to keep high social station from generation to 
generation. 
If education is important in influencing cultural practices (Bourdieu 1984), then 
it is education in Western societies that ultimately services to reproduce 
differentiated cultural patterns (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992). Education level is 
already a measure of the competitive position of an individual in society. If 
education influences cultural practices and if that influences social positions, 
then education seems attractive, not for what it offers educationally, but what it 
could give socially. The class habitus theory tells me that I could predict a low 
likelihood of friendships between (say) professionals and manual workers: the 
two types of people differ so sharply in their cultural capital. The more culturally 
similar the persons are, the more likely they will become close associates (Silver 
1990, Zang 2006). Real life bears this out: professionals are mostly university 
graduates trained in critical thinking and they develop a tendency to exchange 
views only with their equivalents (Zhang 2000). 
Bourdieu’s concept of habitus (along with his concept of field) provides a useful 
way to understand what culture is and how it shapes local interaction at the 
individual and group level right through to the institutional or state level. 
Habitus guides individuals in social life by supplying them with an implicit 




grasp of ‘the rules of the game.’ Class habitus therefore indicates that people 
follow instincts when making important life decisions like friendship choices. 
Bourdieu’s line of thinking closely aligns with the idea that prospering groups 
like the Chinese new middle class possess a distinctive habitus and taste in 
everyday life because of its higher-than-average cultural capital. 
Taste is a deeply ideological category and it functions as an indicator of class 
(Bourdieu 1977, 1979, 1989, 1994). Bourdieu points out that: 
“Taste is the practical operator in the transmutation of things into 
distinct and distinctive signs, of continuous distributions into 
discontinuous oppositions; it raises the difference inscribed into the 
physical order to bodies to the symbolic order of significant 
distinction. It transforms objectively classified practice, in which a 
class condition signifies itself (through taste), into classifying 
practice, that is, into a symbolic expression of class position…” 
(Bourdieu 1984: 174-175) 
 
Bourdieu believes that taste is one of the main battlefields of the cultural 
reproduction and legitimisation of power (Bourdieu & Passeron 1979). Certain 
constellations of taste, consumption preferences and lifestyle practices are 
associated with certain social groupings (Bourdieu 1989). That implies that 
certain goods could be used in certain ways as instruments for making social 
distinctions. For example, Bourdieu describes how the French upper class 
prefers rich courses, desserts, vintage champagnes and truffles. Since each social 
group has a different habitus, it follows that different taste structures would 
emerge from different social groupings (Bourdieu 1977, 1982, 1986, 1989; 
Calhoun 2007, Bourdieu & Passeron 1979). In other words, different ‘objective 
conditions’ are internalised via habitus as expressed in taste. For example, taste 
in food is based on knowledge of proper methods of preparation and 
presentation, as well as on the ‘correct’ foodstuffs for a well-balanced diet. 




Bourdieu distinguishes three kinds of taste. Pure or legitimate taste is the first 
kind and it is the taste whose cultural objects are legitimate. It is the kind of taste 
usually found in parts of the dominant class with the highest educational capital. 
The second kind is average taste: that which is directed to less-valuable and 
more common objects. Popular or vulgar taste is the third kind and refers to the 
value that has been inflated by its proliferation, for instance, pop music. 
Demarcation lines in taste run from the good and the bad to the ‘barbarian.’ 
From a practical standpoint, Bourdieu’s concept of taste means that a more 
highly educated person with more pure or legitimate tastes can legitimise his or 
her status in society. The more highly educated you are, the more able you are to 
distinguish yourself from the status of those less so. The implication from 
Bourdieu is that taste is a means of power, an instrument for domination that 
could be used by the dominant class to distinguish itself from other classes that 
are represented by other taste categories. 
The taste that a person shows in goods is an indicator of his or her social class in 
a commodity-oriented (i.e. consumption) culture (Featherstone 1991: 88). That 
makes consumption culture the ‘field’ to create, preserve and replicate social 
differentiation and social disparities (Bourdieu 1977, 1989, 1992). If, as already 
mentioned, a dominant class uses education to keep its culture and to keep its 
class position, then that is saying that education shapes taste that shapes 
consumption behaviour to shape social differentiation and class boundaries, 
which in turn shape the characteristics of the consumption culture. This is the 
way Bourdieu interprets class in cultural terms (lifestyle and consumption 
patterns), which is similar to how Featherstone (1991) interprets it except that 




the latter focuses on consumption rather than production. 
Consumption of commodities in Featherstone’s interpretation (1991) is 
effectively a means of self-expression and source of identity for an individual. If 
the identity of the individual consumer is expressed through consumption of 
commodities, and if an item (commodity) has a symbolic value beyond its 
material value, then consumption of commodities is actually a consumption of 
values. If consumption of values is captured by such terms as ‘taste,’ ‘fashion’ 
and ‘lifestyle,’ the implication is that consumption itself is being commodified: 
the value of a commodity is judged in terms of symbolism in addition to 
exchange, production and utility. In other words, consumption itself is 
reflexively consumed. If consumption is differentiated into individualised tastes, 
the family or the community ceases to be the principal unit of consumption. This 
suggests the formation of status acts through the sharing of symbols in lifestyle 
and consumption patterns. Therefore, taste, fashion and lifestyle could be used 
in place of class and political affiliation as terms to show social differentiation. If 
Featherstone is right (and he seems to be in the Chinese case), the shared 
structures of class positions would help people form into social groups like the 
Chinese new middle class and, once formed into them, goes on to help them look 
for economic interests to maintain social status.  
Applying Bourdieu’s concepts to post-reform China, we can see a new logic 
appearing. The Chinese economy requires hedonism (consumption based on 
credit and gratification) at the expense of an aesthetic ethos (production and 
accumulation based on sobriety, abstinence, calculation, saving) (Bourdieu 1986: 
310). Two major implications follow from this. The first is that the factors 




influencing or determining class positions are even more complex than at first 
sight. The second is that income differentials are no longer of sole relevance for 
examining the lifestyles and consumption behaviour in advanced industrial 
societies (Bourdieu 1977, 1982, 1986, 1989). In the Chinese case, a new 
economy needs new flexibility in values, and the new middle class is the initiator 
of such values (Bourdieu 1977, 1982, 1986, 1989). 
Summary 
The foremost reason for reusing traditional class concepts in new ways is that 
post-reform China completely alters traditional trajectories of transitions of 
society and, therefore, traditional class categorisations. Instead of transitioning 
to a pure communist society as Marxist theory would predict, China has evolved 
into something in between socialism and capitalism called market socialism, or 
what the Chinese leadership calls ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics.’ 
Another reason is that, broadly speaking, sociologists are still overly 
preoccupied with class processes of Western countries and rely on class models 
derived from them (Scott 1994 & 1996, Devine et al. 2005, Skeggs 2004). They 
have yet to work out an adequate picture of class formation in post-reform China 
that converges with the observable reality there. 
Class analysis currently from the literature is mostly in traditional form, and that 
form is only narrowly applicable for the Chinese situation. Current class analysis 
needs to expand on several fronts if it is to have any usefulness in the case of 
China. The first step to make up for the shortfall in traditional class 
categorisations is to let the term ‘Chinese new middle class’ denote the rising 
social groups of regional cadres, entrepreneurs and professional people in 




post-reform Chinese society. A definition for that term is then operationalised 
from analogous definitions of middle class in Weberian and neo-Weberian class 
theorists as well as from cultural sociologists like Bourdieu. Using the vantage 
point of such an operationalised definition, I can then consider those rising social 
groups have different and heterogeneous features emerged in post-reform China 
as a major class in society (Xu 2007).  
Why do it this way and not any other? Replicating or shoehorning conventional 
class theories into the Chinese situation is problematic. Enough ethnographic 
evidence comes from the general literature to show that complex changes have 
taken place in China and are still going on. The Chinese new middle class is 
probably a historic development in the post-reform socialist transition of 
Chinese society. It needs defining with a more flexible approach. Defining that 
class might also be an equally important development in sociological conceptual 
thinking. I will discuss these issues further in the following chapter. 
The Chinese new middle class as observed in the field does not seem to be a 
straightforward or distinct social stratum. In fact, it is more diversified and 
heterogeneous than it first appears. Class distinctions in China today also seem 
to involve highly differentiated consumer behaviour and lifestyles than on more 
rigidly bound, Eurocentric social stratification processes (Goodman 1999 & 
2008, Brookings 2009, Li 2010). The deduction I could make from that is, unlike 
the middle class of the West, the social identity of the Chinese new middle class 
operates mainly through cultural practices and consumption patterns. Since 
wealth, political orientation/affiliation, education, lifestyle and social 
networking are tied to class positions, it follows that consumption modes must 




be acting as a normative mechanism to demarcate the tastes shared by the same 
group within a class boundary (Southerton 2001). 
The Western literature in its current state does not let me explain post-reform 
Chinese class dynamics without recourse to some lateral thinking. The cultural 
sociological perspective gives the necessary but as-yet-unexplored conceptual 
space to do the lateral thinking. Such a perspective must necessarily draw and 
combine several schools of thought. Weberian class concepts might help to 
explain the economic origins of the Chinese new middle class. 
Weberian/neo-Weberian concepts should help articulate sociocultural factors 
perform central functions to organise social and political experience in the 
formation of the new class (Goodman 2008: 78). The work of Bourdieu (1977, 
1989, Bourdieu & Passeron 1979, Bourdieu et al. 1999) and Featherstone (1991) 
could be used to further elaborate on the dimensions of status and party. 
Bourdieuan concepts on taste, habitus and field lend support to the contention 
that wealth, cultural capital and social networking predispose some social 
groups to consume in particular ways. 
In Chapter 2, I will explore and explicate the class analysis in China with the real 
situation in post-reform China. The justification for using Guangdong province 
from a conceptual standpoint is to create a window for class conceptualisations 
to develop further so that future studies into the nature of the Chinese new 
middle class in that province could be extended to other parts of China. 





(Re) Framing class analysis in post-reform China 
  
‘…China’s new middle class is a term without a single identifiable 
social interest or propensity to action. It encompasses not only the 
owners of capital, but also the managers and bureaucrats, as well as 
the professionals who service and support capitalist entrepreneurs and 
the modernizing state…’ 
(Robinson & Goodman 1996: 40) 
 
IN THE PREVIOUS CHAPTER, I presented how the middle class is 
conceptualised in the literature from a Western perspective, identifying some 
difficulties in applying class analysis in post-reform China. Sociologists in the 
West on the whole are still overly preoccupied with class models that are deeply 
based on social dynamics in Western societies. The received wisdom contained 
in established class theories is not entirely appropriate for the purposes of 
representing and theorising Chinese society. Indeed, sociologists have yet to 
work out even a passable picture of class formation in post-reform China. This 
chapter addresses the application of class analysis in post-reform China and 
brings to the fore issues of the Chinese new middle class.   
The Chinese new middle class is emerging in ways that depart from the standard 
development pathways proposed by mainstream theories about the middle class. 
The political and economic realities of ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ 
are so unique that they have no direct parallel elsewhere, so they impart 
correspondingly unique characteristics to the Chinese new middle class. The 
advent of a new class in a modern, part-socialist/part-capitalist society like that 
of China is a sign that market, class and political intervention are important, but 
their forms are different from those in the West (Anagnost 2008). 




 I will begin by enumerating some special considerations that pertain to the 
Chinese case: 
1. Generational stratification, family norms, value changes, parent-child 
relationships and marriage patterns detected in Chinese society today are  
markedly different from those in Western societies. 
2. Occupational types in the Chinese case also tend to overlap one another or 
even encompass all possible categories, especially in the case of those 
categories associated with the new middle class. For example, a single 
individual may straddle two or even all three of what I shall argue are the 
primary categories of cadre, entrepreneur and professional. 
3. Some institutional systems of China have no parallel in the West. For 
example, workers outside the hùkǒu and dānwèi systems do not have the 
same or even comparable contractual positions as those inside them. 
4. The culture and social identification of the Chinese new middle class 
operates mainly through cultural practices and consumption patterns. This is 
unlike the Western middle class, which operates through patterns of social 
stratification (Goodman 1999 & 2008, Li 2010). 
Conceptualising class: China vs. the West 
Broadly speaking, the middle class of the West is expected to have at least a 
university degree (or some form of post-secondary education), a professional or 
managerial-level/type job and a relatively high income. Middle-class people 
should also probably have shared tastes in clothing, live similar lifestyles and 
show similar class distinctions in everyday life practices. 




China paints a different picture. It has yet to establish a middle class culture 
comparable to the Western model because of its history and economic 
development. Furthermore, there are different, potentially opposing groups even 
within the Chinese new middle class itself, and that suggests latent sociocultural 
differences among its members—for example, those associated with being a 
cadre. 
Basically, class analysis of post-reform China could be distinguished from that 
of Western countries in a number of major aspects of the prevailing body of class 
theories and crucial aspects of the Chinese institutional structure. First, current 
class theories place a high emphasis on a societal transition from feudalism to 
capitalism. Absent in that theoretical architecture is a category that remotely 
matches the reality seen in China, that is, of socialism transforming into market 
socialism. Certain occupations in China are mostly, if not totally absent in 
Western countries (cadres, for instance). Yet current class theories are often 
based on features of Western European or North American societies but are not 
adapted to the nuances of Chinese society. This leads to an inability to explain 
what is happening and observable in China. Again, that provides little if any 
practical usefulness, and therefore raises questions about their appropriateness 
for understanding China. 
Second, certain old and new institutions in China (hùkǒu, dānwèi, employment 
laws, medical insurance coverage and land reforms being the most prominent of 
them) modify the contractual positions of the whole Chinese workforce in ways 
that are not explainable by traditional class theories. Globalisation and 
marketisation of capital introduced by economic reforms has altered the 




meaning of ownership and management of the productive process in China. 
Today, much of the ‘production’ resides in a blend of state-sector establishments 
and private-sector shareholding companies with no definable ‘owner’ of the 
same kind found in traditional class theories developed over a hundred years ago 
in Western and Central Europe. Today, ‘production’ is largely instigated, planned, 
budgeted, controlled, directed, operated, exercised or otherwise realised by 
professional managers or specialists who are only employees even at the highest 
levels of the organisation. Again, this fact of modern organisations introduces 
problems for many class theories in that they are still locked into explaining 
things with reference to owners vs. workers or exploiters vs. exploited in the 
productive process. While this development of managerial forms of corporate 
management is common across Western societies as well as in China, in the 
latter, the continued role of state organisation and political control of the 
economy means that ‘party cadre’ positions and managerial positions, in the 
strict sense, are often intertwined. 
Let us now turn to the institutional structure of China that further renders 
traditional class theories problematic for use in China. Hùkǒu (household 
registration) has no parallel in the West. Hùkǒu restricts access to the market for 
individuals and so creates spatially distributed inequality. Spatial distribution of 
equality is politically determined in China whereas it is economically 
determined in the West. 
The dānwèi (work unit) basically provides workplace-linked benefits in 
state-sector employment. Its continued, if abridged, operation in urban China 
gives rise to differences in work situations because it modifies the contractual 




position of workers inside it differently from workers outside it. Both hùkǒu and 
dānwèi create differences in market and work situations, so, together, they 
encourage social networks (guānxi) to emerge across the different groupings 
associated with the Chinese new middle class. 
The dual-pricing structure between the state and private sectors of the economy 
plus the marketised structure of land and property acquisition and ownership 
both serve to maintain a cadre-dominated social hierarchy, thereby highlighting 
the importance of political capital in an otherwise market-oriented economy. 
Which approach best fits with the Chinese reality? Kraus (1981) pinpointed that 
the new middle class in China appears to be stratified in two modes. The first is 
‘stratification by class designation’. It includes some capitalists and landowners 
as well as intermediate designations of the petty bourgeoisie. The second is 
‘stratification by occupational rank,’ which emphasises income and educational 
levels. By adding in dānwèi and hùkǒu, land reforms, guānxi and cultural values, 
it is clear that that the Chinese new middle class can utilize their own advantages 
in the development path of Chinese society. 
The relevance of class analysis to post reform China is also different from that of 
post-Soviet Russia (Gergen & Hout 2004, Sitnikov 2000). The Russian analysis 
does not appear to objection to the idea that class analysis makes a transition 
from communism to capitalism and, accordingly, draws on class categories in 
understanding that transition. This derives from the displacement of the 
communist party and political liberalisation alongside economic liberalisation. 
In China, however, it is unclear if the country is actually undergoing the same 
transition. There is considerable dissension within Chinese studies (and even in 




general Political Science and Sociology) whether or not different things are 
happening in different parts of China. We have to caution that we do not know 
for sure what the transition is in the Chinese case. The continuing existence of 
the dānwèi and the specific nature of the reforms in land and property rights are 
illustrative of the politico-administrative and social ambiguities in China today. 
They underscore the fact that the Chinese transition is at variance with other 
post-communist countries. They also underscore the continuing important 
influence of cadres in society and the reason for the Chinese new middle class to 
have collaborations with cadres in many areas of life. 
Political capital and other capitals in Chinese context 
Political capital refers to the powers and privileges vested in an individual or 
entity by virtue of political or occupational position (e.g. party official). The 
influential role of cadres make political capital one of the most important forms 
of capital in China (Unger & Chan 1995, 1996). Weak or ambiguous political 
progress is a key condition for members of the new middle class to devise ways 
to find fame and fortune. ‘Golden’ opportunities usually present themselves as 
procedural loopholes or other grey areas in the politico-administrative structure. 
These grey areas flow from contradictory policies especially related to business 
registration, capital construction, conveyancing, land auctions and taxation. 
These become gateways for pecuniary gain as well as for prospecting new 
openings to form new class advantages. 
Many of the early entrepreneurs after economic reforms had been cadres in the 
early 1980s. This is called cadre-entrepreneurship (Nee 1989, 1991, 1996) and 
this is very common in Guangdong province, which will be the focus of my 




study. The rise of a hybrid élite of entrepreneurs and ‘cadre-entrepreneurs’ (Nee 
1989, 1991, 1996) is particularly peculiar and prominent in post-reform China. 
When a cadre decides to go into the private sector, s/he would usually try to get 
entrepreneurs and professionals to help out in creating job or investment 
opportunities for him/her. It is not uncommon to see officials reciprocate favours 
among themselves by granting privileges or benefits to another official’s 
enterprise in their jurisdiction. It has been (and still is) common practice for a 
cadre to own his own private company typically registered in the names of 
family members or relatives to sidestep official engagement rules. It is an 
unspoken and accepted fact of life among cadres that many cadres moonlight in 
a second, part-time job. This state of affairs is understandable, given that the job 
of a cadre is not actually a high-paying one compared with the higher earning 
power of the entrepreneur or professional. 
Cadre-entrepreneurs are probably even more able to obtain lower transaction 
costs in trade across boundaries of the redistributive (i.e. state) and private 
economies. They are already involved on both sides of the general economy and 
have more ready access to resources and marketing outlets than do the regular 
entrepreneur or the regular cadre. Their jobs already give them special 
dispensation and advantage, and it is not challenging for them to push that 
advantage for self-gain in the face of decentralisation. This is the reason behind 
the argument by Nee (1991, 1996) that the real winners of the economic reforms 
were former cadres, who could hit the ground running because they knew the 
ropes of government and had the gumption to run a business.  
As a result, many people try to exploit loopholes in the system for personal gain, 




leaving even more grey areas in their wake. Coupled with the influence of 
centuries-old notions of inheritance, there is no change to the entrenched culture 
of interpersonal networking in Chinese society. At the crassest level, the giving 
of gifts to cadres or their families is sure to elicit some sort of benefit. Outside of 
the state sector, another form of alliance between officialdom and the business 
world is ‘symbiotic clientelism’ (Wank 1995, 1999). Symbiotic clientelism 
(Wank 1995, 1999) in China operates on (and is reinforced by) the general lack 
of transparency in administration and policymaking. It is a relationship in which 
officials allocate resources and opportunities to favoured parties. The larger the 
scale of private business, the greater the need for official support, particularly 
where infusions of foreign capital are involved. These resources and 
opportunities are typically privileged access to financial capital, dividends, land 
leasing, trade in restricted goods and facilitated processing of administrative 
procedures, and also protection from local official harassment on insider 
employment opportunities.  
It is clear then that leveraging relationships with powerful government officials 
is a personality trait well worth nurturing when doing business in China. For 
example, to do business in China, special business in particular, you would need 
several different business licences. Cadres are the tiebreakers in issuing those 
licences, so entrepreneurs and professionals are usually very willing to 
cooperate with cadres with a view to facilitating administrative procedures. 
Cadres ‘improve’ their job by giving and accepting ‘gifts’ in the course of their 
official duties and this is an almost universal situation in Guangdong7.  
                                                 
7
 Gifts should not be taken to mean bribery. The Chinese can at times be highly sensitive about 
social honour and sensibility (‘face’) so, for instance, they are fond of comparing gift money 




The implication is that political determination of class situations is an important 
form of stratification, in contrast to the almost entirely economic determinations 
of the West. Since the 1980s, cadres have been capitalising on entrepreneurial 
pathways in the public and private sectors of the mix-mode socialist economy of 
the country. These entrepreneurial pathways are structurally located in social 
networks.  
Having political capital is to have the means to establish relationships on 
political, economic and social fronts (Goldman & MacFarquhar 1999). However, 
the opening-up policy started in 1978 is reducing cadres’ influence at the local 
government level. Many cadres now come to realise that political capital alone 
will not be enough to survive in a decentralising system. Cadres would have a 
more favourable footing in society if they could possess economic capital as 
well, perhaps in forms of organisational assets, bureaucratic access, professional 
skills or entrepreneurial abilities. They could further affirm their footing by 
extending attachments to cultural and social capitals. Already with access to 
official political networks by virtue of their existing or former job positions, it is 
a straightforward matter for a cadre to extend into other social networks. 
Political capital therefore becomes the channel to expand into social capital 
(Field 2003). 
One way of looking at things is that higher consumption causes higher 
competition for jobs and economic opportunities in order to maintain 
consumption at high levels. Higher competition for jobs and economic 
opportunities results in a need to acquire increasingly higher or specialist 
education in order to maximise personal marketability in an increasingly open 
                                                                                                                                 
from celebrations or even funerals to show which person has more face than the other. 




and internationalised labour market of highly mobile individuals. That leads to a 
need to enhance social networks to maximise personal or organisational 
profiling in a fierce marketplace. The search for more economic opportunities 
also causes the need to enhance relationships with officialdom since cadres are 
often in control of important parts of the economy. 
By building up guānxi networks with political, social and cultural capital, many 
members of the new middle class convert these advantages into material wealth 
inside their class boundary. The creation of a mixed-market socialist economy 
has not in fact eroded the institutional foundations of a cadre-dominated social 
hierarchy. That domination is attributable in large measure to the household 
registration system in operation since the late 1950s.  
Hùkǒu and how it affects the functioning of the Chinese new middle class 
The hùkǒu system of household registration in China was implemented 
nationwide in 1958 around the same time as the Great Leap Forward campaign. 
It became entrenched in society very quickly by the early 1960s. The system can 
be summarised into three main functions: (1) resource allocation and 
subsidisation for urban dwellers, (2) internal migration control and (3) 
management of ‘targeted’ people such as political subversives (Wang 2004: 
116).  
As stated in the introduction, the hùkǒu system is something special in that it 
classifies the entire population into two (and only two) categories: agricultural 
registrants are domiciled to rural areas and non-agricultural (i.e. urban) 
registrants to metropolitan areas (though it should be noted that the rural 
designation is largely a regional designation and includes large urban 




conurbations within it). Every hùkǒu holder, rural and urban, is an integral part 
of their households with a specified legal residence (domicile) that is registrable 
with the public security apparatus. The hùkǒu classification (which the 
government calls ‘status’) could not be changed easily, even today (Lee & Yang 
2007). Registrants receive unalike essential services and welfare relief. (The 
same condition differentiates non-locals from locals: non-locals receive fewer 
benefits than locals do.) 
In pre-reform times, hùkǒu made free movement of people practically 
impossible, especially of rural people to urban areas. No one could come into 
cities without prior official permission. The official party rhetoric was that 
hùkǒu was about breaking down urban/rural barriers (Chan 2009, Chan & 
Buckingham 2008). In fact, hùkǒu rigidified the division between rural and 
urban societies. 
In the old days, urban residents were issued ration coupons to buy food and other 
goods at subsidised prices, and these entitlements were linked to domicile. 
(Rural residents were responsible for their own food provisioning.) For the 
urbanites, ration coupons were valid for use only in their own neighbourhoods or 
at specified places. People living or working outside of their authorised 
domiciles did not qualify for rations, housing, healthcare, jobs or other essentials. 
A rural hùkǒu holder would have found it nearly impossible to survive in city 
areas. The only channel in the old days for rural-to-urban migration was nóng 
zhuǎn fēi (农转非), a bureaucratic conversion programme tightly controlled by 
quotas (Lee & Yang 2007: 13). It does much to explain the very low growth of 
urban populations in China from the late 1950s to the late 1980s. 




Thirty years of market-oriented reforms have wrought many institutional and 
economic changes to society (Bian et al. 2005). Since 1980, hùkǒu became laxly 
enforced, which made for freer population movement. The hùkǒu system is still 
in place today, in a trimmed-down form, but is still effective in regulating 
rural-to-urban migration. Given that urban areas are growing economically at a 
very fast pace, internal migration control is important in maintaining social and 
economic order. Today, the main difference between the two hùkǒu statuses is in 
medical insurance coverage and employment eligibility (Wang 2004, Pun 2005, 
Chan 2009), the latter being an important factor in determining class in terms of 
‘market situation.’ Migrants from ‘rural’ to ‘urban’ designated areas without an 
urban hùkǒu are restricted to the casual labour market. 
The socialist market economy is an uneasy blend of planned and market effects. 
An example of such a blending can be seen in lányìn (蓝印 ‘blue-stamped’) type 
of hùkǒu. This relatively new hùkǒu was instituted in 1992 and quite widespread 
throughout the 1990s (Fan 2002, Chan 2009). It provides a migrant with a right 
of abode in city areas and a particular set of welfare provisions. Qualification for 
the lányìn hùkǒu basically boils down to the applicant making a large investment 
or a high-priced home purchase, in addition to the usual criteria like age, 
education and skills. Most rural migrants are ineligible for this type of hùkǒu and 
basically cannot afford one. 
Hùkǒu therefore renders each and every individual and household a different 
social identity. By classifying people into one or the other category, the system 
leads to the formation and segregation of different social classes. Urban hùkǒu 
qualifies for relatively better benefits than rural hùkǒu. Hùkǒu therefore works to 




create differences in class positions (rural vs. urban proletariat) based on 
geographical association. This is spatially distributed inequality (Saunders 1984, 
Otis 2003). In Western societies, spatial distribution of inequality is bound up in 
differential distribution of specific occupations across regions (Saunders 1984). 
In post-reform China, however, the same occupation (in class terms) is rewarded 
differently in different regions because of how hùkǒu operates. An urban hùkǒu 
automatically differentiates it from a rural hùkǒu, so creating a system 
segregated between the two statuses, albeit incompletely, as I shall show. 
Since the hùkǒu status is government-regulated rather than market-driven, the 
rural-registered worker most approximates to the classical Marxist proletariat, 
rather than a lumpenproletariat—a paradox in the Marxist or even the Weberian 
approach to class, in that it is a political designation of their status that defines 
their economic position rather than the operation of the market.. 
The hùkǒu syetem has major repercussions on physical and social mobility of 
individuals even today, including their access to essential services. People, and 
their children, with no hùkǒu for the area in which they live in face phenomenal 
difficulties in getting jobs, education, healthcare and welfare relief. The level 
and type of access in turn deepens the social stratification. The system is not 
absolute, in the sense that there is a market for the purchase of hùkǒu. Those 
without a hùkǒu (for example, children born in breach of the ‘one child policy’, 
or those with rural registration seeking to convert it to urban registration need to 
pay considerable sums of money for a hùkǒu, whether rural or urban (the latter, 
are especially costly). Of course, the ability to pay is also an aspect of 
stratification. Essentially, then, hùkǒu is part of the how the spatial distribution 




of inequality operates, and needs to be approached in those terms, since it is the 
main mechanism determining the flow of migrant workers and the terms on 
which migration takes place, whether legal or illegal. Indeed, most of the very 
considerable number of illegal migrant workers in the Pearl River Delta Area is 
individuals (frequently from the same area) with rural hùkǒu 8. In this way, 
hùkǒu has proven to be one of the more helpful means for sociologists to 
distinguish members of the Chinese new middle class from the rest of the 
population. Rural and migrant workers have little wherewithal to buy an urban 
domicile, and urbanites are unmotivated to want to purchase a (backward) rural 
residency. Given that it was very difficult for a rural household to reclassify itself 
an urban one, it stands to reason that most of the China middle class must have 
had an urban hùkǒu to begin with. 
The process of obtaining or converting a hùkǒu status is gruelling and 
time-consuming, and the outcome usually unsuccessful. Yet, an urban hùkǒu is 
not entirely closed off to people. It could be acquired by way of inheritance or 
naturalisation through marriage or birth, university admission or economic 
contribution. 
Reforms in marriage and inheritance laws contribute to internal migration but in 
new ways. After 1998, children of rural-urban or cross-regional cooperatives 
have a choice of taking up either the father’s or mother’s hùkǒu and location 
thereof, which was not the case before (Wang 2004: 123). 
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 See Wang Feiling (2004) for further details about hùkǒu. See Solinger (1999a) for a vivid 
description and analysis of how hùkǒu constrains the rights and life chances of urban and rural 
populations in China. For a short and sweet anecdote of how hùkǒu affects the individual, read 
Wangjianshuo’s Blog (2006) at 
http://home.wangjiangshuo.com/archives/20060610_hukou_system_in_China.htm. 




In addition, by education you could be granted a temporary urban hùkǒu on 
admission to a university or some state-accredited educational institution (Wang 
2004). On graduation, and if given a state-assigned job, the graduates could 
automatically be given an urban hùkǒu in the same location as your job, or one 
nearest to their original domicile (Wang 2004). So, a skilful worker could quite 
easily get a transitional (‘blue-stamped’) or even a permanent urban hùkǒu. In 
this way, the Chinese meritocracy can be granted the privilege of mobility 
(Wang 2004). 
Economic contribution is another route. Today, it is possible to buy an urban 
hùkǒu in any city in China. Predictably, professionals and entrepreneurs are the 
customers. Two tracks apply: either make a large-enough job-creating 
investment or make a high-priced real-estate purchase in the desired locale 
(Chan 2009). Guangdong province has a third track: you could get an urban 
hùkǒu if your actual tax payments reach a certain level, usually around 
RMB¥80,000 (US$11,708 or £8,088 p.a.) per annum (Chan 2009). Of course, 
buying a hùkǒu is not an outright buy-and-sell transaction in the commercial 
sense of the word. 
Around eleven and a half percent of the population of Guangdong province in 
2006 is classified as middle class (Guangdong Provincial Statistical Bureau 
2006) although there are varied interpretations of the total number of the 
Chinese new middle class exists in China today. This is not a high figure but it 
does show that only the new middle class has the material advantages to pay for 
household registration. It is this pattern and route that the Chinese new middle 
class forms its own social distinction in society. Indeed, some localities have 




tried to attract talent such as Olympic medallists or scientists or high-profile 
industrialists with offers of as many as three local urban hùkǒu. This kind of 
talent-scouting is causing something of an internal brain drain in China9, where 
highly educated professionals flock to desirable metropolitanised areas like 
Guangdong. In this connection, I can see that a mixed-mode economy and the 
continued running of the household registration system together preserve the 
institutional foundations of a cadre-dominated social hierarchy.  
If the rural worker is anything to go by, then migrant workers on the whole are at 
even lower rungs of the social and job ladders. The low level of education of 
migrant workers (who are mostly rural people) is the main reason for this state of 
affairs. The reality is, the migrant worker is part of a floating population because 
his hùkǒu is institutionally (and therefore politically) linked by the system to his 
original domicile rather than to his current physical location in urban areas. 
Again, this segregates the migrant worker as a distinct but significant subset of 
the whole community. 
The inference of all this is that hùkǒu is still relevant and influential for the 
educated and the rich and powerful. New measures enacted for the system since 
the 1980s have provided further and varying degrees of de facto mobility. 
                                                 
9
 Those who have urban hùkǒu in Guangdong can pay cheaper tuition fees, special discount on 
receive a hospitalization expenses and medical care. In addition, urban hùkǒu can entitle 
compensation if they have traffic accidents. If you pay tax approximately RMB¥80,000 for five 
consecutive five years, you are entitled to an urban hùkǒu in Guangdong (Chan 2009; in depth 
interviews 2008). Though buying house in Guangdong cannot entitle urban hùkǒu in today’s 
China, many of the Chinese new middle class still have their advantages to access their urban 
hùkǒu, unlike some migrant workers.  




Dānwèi and how it creates differences in work situations of guānxi 
Economic reforms since the 1980s have altered (and are still altering) the role of 
dānwèi and its general decline and fall in modern Chinese life. Dānwèi refers to 
a place of employment, especially in the context of state-owned enterprises 
during pre-reform times. Today, dānwèi is officially dismantled in rural China 
but it continues to operate in urban areas. Ultimately, dānwèi is the assortment of 
welfare benefits associated with the ‘market situation’ of some forms of 
employment. 
Dānwèi is significant in stratification terms because it often provides the 
institutional framework for relationship (guānxi) networks to form inside a 
particular class boundary. In that sense, dānwèi is one of the major institutional 
factors that directly contribute to the emergence of the Chinese new middle class. 
Dānwèi creates differences in work situations in three main ways: (1) as 
geographical distribution of occupations, (2) as the milieu that gives rise to new 
forms of central-local relations, and (3) as the surroundings that facilitate the 
formation of guānxi inside class boundaries. 
First, as a geographical distribution of occupations, the dānwèi is clearly a place 
of employment, properly in the context of state enterprises. It is the first step of a 
multilayered hierarchy that links straightforward employment with the party 
political machinery of the government. In pre-reform times, workers were bound 
to their dānwèi for life. Each dānwèi was an almost self-sufficient, 
self-sustaining entity, providing members with housing, schooling, healthcare, 
commodities and other essentials. Dānwèi had once helped create a quiescent, 
compliant populace based on ethnic origin, guilds and patron-client relations.  




In post-reform times, though, decentralisation and marketisation of the state 
economy are putting work units in competition with the open market. Work units 
today find it increasingly hard to provide services and welfare to members. 
People today are able to have careers in non-state organisations or set up their 
own businesses, thereby further lessening the dependence on work units. 
Dānwèi is not the sole source of resources for people anymore. People now 
generally have wider connections in today’s China and they can survive without 
dānwèi patronage or protection. Rising unemployment also shifts the balance of 
relationships between the state and society. 
However, dānwèi continues to affect class relations in urban areas in that it also 
sets up segregation between migrant workers and the new middle class. The 
segregation is in terms of occupation, income and welfare provision by reason of 
dānwèi connections with work and market situations. The spatialisation of 
inequality endowed in dānwèi directly relates to guānxi networks. The inference 
is that dānwèi also becomes an internal differentiation within the Chinese new 
middle class, since not all members of that class are actually covered by it. 
Cadres and some managers operate within dānwèi, but private entrepreneurs do 
not. 
Second, as the milieu that gives rise to new forms of central-local relations, the 
dānwèi is largely the place where most of the changes in national land policy 
occur in practical terms. The reason for this is that the central government has 
delegated quite a large portion of its responsibilities to local authorities. In turn, 
local authorities upgrade, downgrade or otherwise modify the responsibilities of 
the dānwèi under their jurisdiction. In short, decentralisation of state power to 




localities is fostering localism (Wu 2002: 1090). The localism creates a new kind 
of central-local relationship in a marketised economy. This ultimately leads to a 
great gulf seen in modern Chinese society, which is between the emerging elites 
(such as the bureaucratic business class) and the popular classes in rural and 
urban areas (Lee 2005).  
The new central-local relationship is a mixture of power conflicts, negotiations 
and collaboration. On the whole, it is mutually accommodating because 
harmony is in the best interests of everyone (Lin 1999, 2000). The reason for this 
is that there is guānxi relations between different factions of the new middle 
class and these factions straddle the central and local sides of the relationship. 
Third, as a facilitative background for guānxi inside class boundaries, this is best 
explained by reference to how economic entities are formed and operated in 
China today. State enterprises often set up sideline companies and subcontract 
the work to de facto private operators. Because of the potential for higher 
income in the private sector, many state employees are motivated enough to 
leave the ‘iron rice bowl’ (tiěfànwǎn 铁 饭 碗 , Hughes 1998)—the 
cradle-to-grave security of the dānwèi system. The more resourceful cadres use 
their already well-established networks in the local dānwèi communities as a 
springboard into the tumultuous seas of the market economy. Some have the best 
of both worlds: if a family member works in a dānwèi (state sector), the 
household could enjoy ‘one family, two systems.’ One member gets the higher 
income from the market sector while another family member receives the job 
security, housing and other benefits from the dānwèi for the rest of the household. 
It is not unusual to find full-time professionals in the state sector having a 
part-time job outside, and use the part-time job mainly to extend business 




networks. For others, the non-state-sector work is the sole source of economic 
benefits (Wu 2002: 1076). 
For much of the reform period, there has been a state-approved drive to 
corporatise state enterprises into a shareholding ownership, especially ones that 
could be floated on the international stock markets. Many state entities in the 
manufacturing, financial and public-utility sectors have been divested of their 
most profitable parts as shareholding companies, which are then used to form 
new consortia with non-state entities. This means that managers and officials are 
effectively running twin businesses in concert, and to private advantage. One 
way is for them to (mis)appropriate materials for funds from the state entity and 
use that in their outside companies (Ding 2000a, 2000b). Another way is for the 
officials (especially if they are in charge of corporatisation for their state 
enterprises) to simply designate themselves as major shareholders of the outside 
companies. There are documented cases of such officers acting to downgrade or 
even eliminate the pensions and other benefits of workers (Ding 1999).  
Land and property restructuring 
Class analysis in the Chinese context also involves implicit assumptions about 
the changes in property ownership in China and how those changes differ from 
Western forms. It is often forgotten that private property ownership and 
collective ownership co-exist in China. Cadres have quite a large degree of 
decision-making influence in land-related matters, therefore it is highly relevant 
to examine how cadres fit into Chinese class analysis. 
The central government is still the sole owner of all urban land in China. As a 
matter of ideology and public policy, state ownership of land subsists via 




administrative or economic units directly run by the central government. The 
fundamental breakthrough in Chinese socialist land policy is in the progressive 
commercialisation of land-use rights since the reforms began. That has led to a 
rapid expansion of the Chinese real-estate market since the 1980s (Smart & Li 
2006: 495). 
In common with Western usage, land ain China is classified as freehold or 
leasehold. Freehold is absolute and defines the enduring ownership of a property 
(in the Chinese land context, the land itself and any structures built on it). 
Leasehold is property held under a lease for a period of fixed minimum duration 
from which point the land and any structures built upon it return to the 
leaseholder, though there may be some compensation for the structures. The 
difference between the situation in China and that of Western countries is that 
leases China rest with the Chinese government to whom leases ultimately revert, 
at least in principle.10.  
Decentralisation of state control of land can be traced back to the City Planning 
Law of the People’s Republic of China (中华人民共和国城市规划法 ) 
promulgated on 26 December 1989. That statute delegates (rather than devolves) 
responsibility to the local government in urban planning, general enforcement of 
development control and land-related administrative matters such as issue of 
construction and land-use permits. Even projects under the aegis of the central 
government must obtain prior land-use permission from the local government in 
order for funding to be obtainable. Additionally, land-lease certificates are 
                                                 
10
 For the benefit of legally minded readers, the Chinese meaning of freehold is analogous to the 
English legal term ‘fee simple absolute in possession.’ Therefore, freehold ownership is not 
liable to end upon death of any person, which ownership rights are not conditional or liable to 
terminate on the occurrence of any event, and that owner’s rights are immediate but need not 




required from the local branch of the national Land Administration Bureau (地
政局) (Wu 2002: 1080). The City Planning Law caused the commoditisation of 
urban land use to explode from the 1990s. 
How does the government sell land use? The Property Law of the People’s 
Republic of China (中华人民共和国物权法), promulgated on 16 March 2007, 
provides that the local government is the legally recognised leaseholder and 
grantor of leases. The purchaser is conveyed time-delimited rights to use the 
land for price paid but no rights of land conversion. Rights to land conversion 
subsist with the local authority or central government. Both types of rights revert 
in time to the state (central or local government). 
Let us take a brief legal detour. The statutory interpretation of ‘leases’ in the PRC 
Property Law appears to relate to the broader meaning of ownership of property, 
as opposed to more restricted meaning of a lessor (landlord) allowing a lessee 
(tenant) to take possession of the land in return for rent (tenancy). The purchaser 
(grantee) is conveyed time-delimited rights to use the land for a specified 
purpose for valuable consideration (i.e. price and fees paid for the land). The 
problem here, legally speaking, is that it is not entirely clear whether the leases 
actually relate to property ownership or to tenancy since time-delimited rights 
conveyed in this legal manner could be construed either way or even both. This 
is exactly the kind of institutional ambiguity that provides the sort of 
opportunistic loophole for groups such as the Chinese new middle class to 
exploit for self-gain. 
 
                                                                                                                                 
imply physical occupation of the property. 




The upshot is that the local government is now the effective maker and breaker 
of land contracts because the law effectively makes the local government the 
lessor and supervisor of land contracts (Wu 2002: 1079). This kind of land 
decentralisation leads to a high level of regionalism in post-reform China 
because what has become commercialised is the income derived from granting 
leasehold rights. The income-generating potential therefore leads to increasing 
privatisation and commercialisation of the housing market in many areas of 
China (but especially in Guangdong province). Increasing commercialisation of 
housing in turn leads to a buoyant black market in land transactions. 
Since the 1980s, privatisation and commercialisation of housing has become 
apparent in Guangdong province. Two distinct, prominent features become 
noticeable when looking at the post-reform land-leasing system. The first is the 
privatisation of public housing and commercialisation of the housing market. 
The second is ‘spatialisation of class.’ In the first, the general trend of change is a 
shift from the dānwèi-based housing provision to a more commercialised 
housing regime. This shift is an uneven process and creates winners and losers. 
As with any zero-sum situation, housing therefore becomes an important 
element of social engineering in the making of a new middle class. As for the 
second, spatialisation of class is still going on in Chinese cities today because 
socioeconomic differences in China today are increasingly inscribed on space 
(Chadha & Husband 2006: 119). 
While government apparatus started decentralising in the 1980s, it also became 
increasingly easier to convert land use into a moneymaking commodity and 
differential rents began to emerge. Various state-owned units that owned 




land—the ‘socialist landmasters’—went along for the ride and established 
property companies for profit-taking. Officials and ex-officials of dānwèi that 
owned land sold land-use rights at sizeable profit to property developers or 
agencies in the state and private sectors. This resulted in a loose but active 
network of landbrokers appearing in many cities across China driving up the 
number of land transactions.  
The government invented various methods to convert industrial and residential 
land for commercial usage, but it was (and still is) common to see factory 
relocations and exchange of land taking place directly between end users. For 
example, in Guangdong province, peasants often sell their landholdings in the 
suburbs directly to private property developers for building commercial 
complexes or villas. Many members of the Chinese new middle class have a fair 
degree of resources and guānxi networks to enable them to buy lower-priced 
property or be allocated housing units from their past employment with 
dānwèi—an association that continues after many switched over to the business 
world. We will return to the issue of land reform in China in Chapter 6. 
The buoyant black market in land is a serious issue in Guangdong. Outside of the 
formal land system, there is a thriving and highly competitive black market in 
land. The Chinese land market is mostly of private land developers. Since the 
supply of land has always been restricted in some way in China, land developers 
often earn large profits from land speculation. Land speculation has long been a 
lucrative, if sometimes wild, business in China. 
The land system of China operates in roughly the same way as its system of 
materials allocation. Economic reforms have brought marketisation over 




production materials, resulting in a relaxation of state control over them. State 
enterprises are allowed to buy production materials directly from the open 
market and sell surpluses to it after fulfilling state quotas. We can see this 
situation most commonly in government hospitals and property companies. The 
marketised portion of the dual-track price structure had grown so much and so 
efficient in practical terms that the state eventually abandoned its system of 
materials allocation (Wu 2002: 1007). 
Likewise in the land system, market decentralisation has introduced market 
mechanisms into the development and use of urban infrastructure. But local 
governments are often unmotivated to take part in projects that benefit only the 
central government but offer no gains at the local level (Wu 2002). In an effort to 
control operational costs, the central government now requires local 
governments to contract out certain important local-level public services to the 
private sector. With the way the land-lease system works, certain infrastructural 
developments then become more attractive to local governments. In such a way, 
it stimulates the tax base for the central government and benefits the local 
government with all sorts of extra revenue. 
It is the localisation of the land system that offers loopholes for the black market. 
The City Planning Bureau (市规划局 ShìGuī HuáJú) that operates at the district 
government level is responsible for enforcing land-use regulations. But the 
overall complexities of land development in China makes land-use enforcement 
easier said than done. Illegal land conversions and black markets often involve 
individuals and companies well connected with the government (Wu 2002: 
1078). Land speculators are willing to be especially cooperative with cadres 




because they know that only cadres have the actual power to release land and 
validate land contracts. 
Often, the cadres are involved in land speculation and other related ‘extra legal 
functions’ for themselves. The Chinese property market reached its most recent 
peak in 2007, when dealers were bidding an average RMB¥1 million (US 
$146,316 or £99,796) for a building or plot of land. This is more or less the same 
problem appeared in big metropolitan cities like Beijing and Shanghai (Wu 
2002). In Guangdong, as much as one-third of the price might go straight into the 
pockets of cadres. The commonest way is for a cadre to buy potentially 
interesting plots of land in advance at below-market prices in the names of 
family members or nominee organisations and resell the plots direct to buyers 
for sizeable profit. Transactions would be initiated and settled entirely through 
‘informal’ channels such as behind-the-scenes negotiation rather than formal 
open tenders or auctions. 
In such a way, the localisation of the land system and the black markets attached 
to it reinforce the continuing importance of cadres in post-reform China. Cadres 
cannot be expected to conduct proper enforcement of the system because other 
cadres also figure in the black market as active speculators or accessories. 
Generational stratification in post-reform China 
If institutional qualities of China make the Chinese new middle class unlike the 
Western middle classes, then age and generational differences plus special 
features of the Chinese parent-child relationship also play their part. Let us first 
turn to age and generational differences in terms of the cultural values, 
mentalities and ideologies of generations and cohorts. 




That different generations have different mindsets is self-evident and 
self-explanatory. Individuals born at different times take in different formative 
experiences, which in turn shape and drive different attitudes, expectations, 
values and beliefs. Different cohorts may in fact embrace multiple cultures with 
possibly contradictory beliefs and expectations, and these may be reinforced or 
altered by contacts with different groups (Louis 1980, Martin 1992). 
The older generations of Chinese are recognisable for their traditional and 
traditionalist values. If sixty or seventy years is taken as a rough maximum age, 
then any individual of that age would have had direct experience of the entire 
gamut of historical events that happened in the People’s Republic. Table 2 
shows the milestone events experienced by some older generations. By contrast, 
the younger generations grew up in an atmosphere of little or no significant 
turmoil or privation, and are more apt to accept Western cultures and 
Westernised ways than would the older generation would be. 




Table 2: Milestone events in the People’s Republic of China 
 
Year Milestone events 
1949 Communist victory over Nationalists in civil war, driving the Nationalists to the 
island of Formosa (now Taiwan) to continue the existence of the Republic of 
China. Founding of the People’s Republic of China. Reconstitutes the capital to 
Peking (Beijing) from Nanking (Nanjing). New marriage and family laws (based 
on Soviet laws of 1920s) implemented nationwide. 
1950-53 Korean War: Chinese land forces mobilises to the Korean peninsula to aid 
defence of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea against US-led UN forces. 
1958 Great Leap Forward begins, forming communes in the countryside to prove 
China’s self-reliance to the world. Hùkǒu system implemented nationwide to 
control internal movement of people. 
ca. 1959-61 Three years of famine associated with the Great Leap Forward. Causes 24 million 
to 30 million deaths. Hùkǒu system entrenched by 1961. 
1966-76 Cultural Revolution begins, causing nationwide political and social mayhem for 
10 years (1966-76). Mao used the Cultural Revolution to assert control, 
consolidating the personality cult surrounding him. Tens of thousands died, many 
committed suicide and the lives of millions ruined. 
ca. 1967-75 The ‘Down to the Countryside’ Movement sends millions of youths to the 
countryside ‘to learn from the peasants’ in an effort to alleviate urban 
unemployment and boost rural development. Education became disrupted or 
non-existent for many, creating the ‘lost generation.’ Secondary-school graduates 
at start of the movement lost the chance for university education when 
universities nationwide were shut down. University graduates at start of the 
campaign became last graduating batch until the next batch at least 10 years later. 
1971 Coup d’etat against Mao fails. Field Marshal Lin Biao (林标), the coup leader, 
escapes and dies in mysterious plane crash in Mongolia on way to the USSR. 
1976 Death of Mao. Cultural Revolution ends. Arrest of the Gang of Four. Party 
struggle for leadership ends with Hua Guofeng (华国锋) becoming Mao’s 
successor. 
1977 Universities reopen. University entrance examinations reinstituted. First batch of 
students to enter universities and graduate in 1980-85 became the country’s first 
batch of university-educated elites since the Cultural Revolution ended. 
1978 Deng Xiaoping (邓小平) becomes paramount leader. ‘Open-door’ policy initiates 
economic reforms and liberalisation measures in incremental stages. The Third 
Plenum of the Eleventh National People’s Congress adopts measures to promote 
national economic development. Government announces that class struggle had 
come to an end, replacing it with economic advancement. 
1980s Economic reforms implemented nationwide in incremental, geographically 
specified stages. ‘Extra legal’ activities surface across China in the state and 
nascent market sectors as a result of ambiguities or incompleteness in reform 
policies or administrative operation. 
1989 Tiananmen Square protests in Beijing against widespread corruption in the 
bureaucracy and a prevailing winner-takes-all attitude in society produced by 
over-attention to economic performance and under-attention to social welfare. 
Sources: Bernstein (1977), Hung & Chiu (2003), with author’s modifications.  




If age and generational differences give a special facet to the Chinese new 
middle class, then the Chinese parent-child relationship gives a highly 
interesting point for sociologists to consider also. 
The first feature to be identified is that of the reduction in family size and its 
impact on the parent-child relationship. Broadly speaking the nuclear family is 
replacing the extended, patriarchal family in urban China. Average family size 
throughout China is on the decline. Family size recorded in the first postwar 
census of 1953 was 4.33 persons. It then climbed to 4.43 in the second census of 
1964 and was officially attributed to the absence of birth control in the 1950s as 
well as the baby boom of the 1960s. By the third census of 1982, family size 
dipped to 4.41. In the latest census of 2000, family size dropped further to 3.44 
persons. (These figures are from the State Bureau of Statistics 2001.)  
Despite increased Western influences and falling family size, intergenerational 
reciprocity is still strongly operative in the Chinese family (Yuan 1987, Ji 2003). 
Intergenerational reciprocity is the mutual dependence of the older and younger 
generations with each other. What is interesting sociologically in this respect is 
that the vast majority of urban youngsters and young adults in China today are 
the only offspring of the family. The reason for this fact comes from institutional 
policies such as the ‘one-child policy’ of the 1970s and 1980s implemented in 
urban China. That fact makes post-reform China unique in socialist trajectories 
of social development of populations. 
Parent-child relationships in the Chinese family are relatively unlike those now 
typical in the West. Mainland Chinese parents today tend to plan and do 
everything for their one child, even to the point of finding jobs or 




accommodation for them. They will spend an enormous amount of time, effort 
and money on their only child, and help that only child to succeed and improve 
the social station of the family in a competitive, increasingly unequal, society 
(Stockman 2000: 12, Stockman 1994). In return, the offspring tends to regard 
older folks as a source of daily help and a kind of trickle-down welfare shield. In 
fact, traditional Chinese mores and norms that anchor family life (such as filial 
piety and individual self-restraint for the greater good) seem only minimally 
diluted by politicisation, industrialisation and modernisation. In China, the state 
provides several types of welfare assistance to older people with children. Older 
people may qualify for temporary housing for their married children (34% of 
recipients), financial relief for non-co-resident (live-out) children (30%) and 
help with housework and childcare for co-resident (live-in) children (25%) 
(Sheng & Settles 2006). (These figures here count only material relief benefits 
and exclude non-material, i.e. psychological, benefits.)  
In the Chinese family even in post-reform times, the parent is paramount in an 
instrumental and functional role as opposed to an equal-standing one. Some 
parents of the Chinese new middle class try to avoid being harsh, authoritarian or 
patriarchal in manner or rule. Others might arrange quality time with the 
children so as to get to know their offspring a little better. Some others might go 
as far as to learn to become friends or partners with their children. By and large 
in China today, Chinese parents almost never have the friendly, supportive role 
that of their Western counterparts. Instead of a high degree of intimacy, as is 
generally seen in Western families, the average mainland Chinese parent 
maintains a domineering character—to be a parent and nothing else. Indeed, 
quite a few of the older generation of the Chinese new middle class [10 out of 




35], especially born in 1948-1960, do not even know what kind of parent-child 
relationship exists in the Western family milieu. This departure from the general 
Western patterns of parenthood makes the Chinese new middle class 
sociologically distinctive. 
The second identifiable feature is the marriage pattern. The marriage patterns of 
the younger generations are profoundly different from those of their parents of 
the older generations (Moore 2005: 375; Liu 2003). In China, women have 
always married early in comparison with Western European women.  Now, in 
post-reform China, many women are most likely to have more chances to 
receive education. Some of the women have relatively more chances to study for 
a master’s degree. With their well-educated level, they show great potential in 
career or further study. With job satisfaction in their careers, they are likely to 
postpone their marriage. The well-educated women of the younger generation 
are likely to challenge patriarchal power in terms of mate-choice, marriage 
negotiation and family life (Shirk 1984, Yan 2006:106, Shu 2004), but economic 
liberation and reform seems have no direct correlation on changes in gender 
norms in today’s China. Most of the traditional norms like women are being 
regarded as the subordinated role in workplace, they become the double burden 
between work and family, still internalize in post-reform China (Stockman 
1994).  
Defining the new middle class for the purposes of this study 
Existing studies of the Chinese class structure, especially those using official 
data, have tended to offer a simple income measure to identify the Chinese new 
middle class. To some degree, it was necessary for me to follow this practice in 




making my initial determination of my sample. In addition to level of income, I 
also used occupation and level of education as indicators (although the latter was 
less useful for the older generation, whose education was disrupted during the 
Cultural Revolution. Table 3 sets out the criteria used for this study.  
Table 3: Selection criteria for samples as the Chinese new middle class 
Criterion Requirements 
Income Minimum RMB¥5,000 (US$732 or £505) a month, per capita. 
Occupation Skilled or specialist job or work at substantially managerial or comparable 
level, either in the state or private sectors. 
Education Minimum post-secondary level, preferably higher, in any stream. 
 
By income. The distribution of incomes, wealth and consumption is the most 
powerful signifier of material hierarchy (Migone 2007: 178). The middle class is 
commonly thought of as having an intermediate level of income in any given 
society. The question is, what is an intermediate level of income? Using income 
as the major criterion for studying the middle-income stratum seems sensible 
enough. Wealth in the form of income and property ownership is nearly always 
used as the most common indicator to define the middle class in many Western 
and Chinese studies. This study takes the same route. 
Naturally, income by itself is unlikely to be the single most important factor by 
which the Chinese new middle class comes to identify itself. If social 
stratification is considered purely on income, the risk is to totally overlook the 
dual impact of culture and economics. This is because income differences for the 
‘same’ class position in post-reform China (especially in Guangdong) (Tables 4a 
and 4b) indicate the average per-capita monthly income and the spatial 




distribution of inequality, which would not be a feature in Western social 
stratification. 
Table 4a: Average per-capita monthly income for white-collar workers in 2007 
 
          
 
          
 
Dongguan          RMB¥
4,650 
          
 
Guangzhou          RMB¥
4,750 
          
 
Shenzhen          RMB¥
4,950 
          
 
Yangjiang          RMB¥
4,250 
          
 
Zhongshan          RMB¥
4,650 
          
 
Zhuhai          RMB¥
4,650 
          
 
Hangzhou          RMB¥
4,250 
          
 
Shanghai          RMB¥
5,500 
          
 
Tianjin          RMB¥ 
4,450 
          
 
National average          
RMB¥
2,948 
          
 
Wenzhou           RMB¥
5,020 
          
 
Beijing          RMB¥
5,000 
          
 
Chengdu (Sichuan)      RMB¥1,900    
          
 
Hefei (Anhui)     RMB¥1,680    
          
 




Sources:  Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (2007). ‘The average monthly salary level of 
white-collar class in the major cities in 2007,’ Salary Index for the White Collars: the 
Anxiety of Social Positioning Behind the Fictitious Criteria, (白領工資標準: 虛構標
準背後的社會定位焦慮). China Business News (第一財經日報), A06, page 1; 
http://www.wisenews.com. [In Chinese] [Retrieved 14 November 2007] 
  
 With author’s artwork and interpretation. 
  
 




Table 4b: Household income distribution in China 2007 
% of households 
 
Source: Euromonitor International from national sources, 2008.  
 
By occupation. As a criterion, occupation provides the individual with the 
requisite social standing and prestige. An industrious taxi driver may well match 
an ordinary white-collar worker in income (or at least frequently be argued to do 
so in popular accounts (as in Western ideas of the ‘high paid plumber’), but is not 
included because he or she does not meet the requirement in terms of education 
or type of occupational skills exercised on the job. Indeed, the nature of the job is 
a decisive factor in accounting for the rise of the Chinese new middle class. Most 
of these people work in substantially managerial positions or as skilled or 
specialist workers in service industries, listed companies, joint ventures, 
multinationals or state enterprises (including state organs as cadres). Therefore, 
we expect the occupational nature of our sample to reflect a significant degree of 
intellectual faculty. Translated into practical terms, it would mean the right to 
make authoritative statements and give advice in the course of work and the right 




to participate in the affairs of the employing organisation. We have not put a 
requirement on whether the job is in the state or private sector, since such jobs 
exist in both. For the avoidance of doubt, we define the job of a cadre as 
managerial, notwithstanding our income criterion. 
By education. Education appears to be an even more significant criterion in 
view of the country’s transition from a command economy to a market-led 
economy. The Chinese leadership has come to realise the value of the human 
capital for the country in the general world order, so it has made important 
strides in getting its educational and employment systems in step with scientific 
and technological standards worldwide. Middle-income households are often 
found to have a relatively high education level, a fact that tends to suggest the 
presence of professional skills and professional-level income. A 2001 survey 
from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS 2002) indicates that 
72.5% of people in middle-income households have post-secondary or higher 
education. A high education tends to smooth the progress for most people in 
getting hold of other kinds of economic, political or social capital. 
Nowadays, China more or less follows the same pathways in educational affairs 
as most Western countries are doing. Global skills or competencies—such as 
mastery of an international language (English mainly) and mastery of 
information and cultural capital—have proven to be essential for the rise of 
China in the twenty-first century (Chan 2007). A college or university education 
is now considered another de rigueur life requirement when looking at the 
Chinese new middle class because that is part and parcel of the concept of 
‘career’ today. Education helps China to be better positioned to achieve 




sustainable development by providing the necessary capability to deal with trade 
and resources at optimum social and economic effectiveness. Things could not 
be done without the mental leverage provided by education. 
Summary 
Using the sociocultural approach is the way I defined the meaning of the Chinese 
new middle class by using the indicators of educational level, occupation, 
household monthly income and consumption patterns. With the same 
characteristics of the Chinese new middle class, they tend to have the same 
consumption patterns and lifestyles. These sociocultural particularities are 
conducive to the emergence of the Chinese new middle class. Consumption is 
the easiest indicator for the new middle class to represent its status, its wealth 
and its social reputation. Massive moves by China into the international arena 
play an important role in putting the idea of consumption within the idea of 
production (Pun 2005). New forms and standards of social distinction arise from 
new modes of consumption. Consequently, these aspects mould new identities 
for the class and make social distinction as inescapable forces (Pun 2003: 477). 
The next chapter (Chapter 3) will be the method ‘talk’ about  how to do research 
with the Chinese new middle class - the group who is the most able to activate 
transferability between their political, economic, cultural and social capitals 
(Anagost 2008, Barson & Schuller 2000). It will also address a general profile of 
the Chinese new middle class in Guangdong province and show how lifestyle, 
institutional changes  and consumption helps promote that new social class in its 
rise in post-reform China. 
 




Mapping the Ethnographic Terrain 
  
“A narrative account is the appropriate form of expression to display 
research as a practice.....Knowing the actual unfolding process of the 
research is important to the understanding of the meaning of the results. 
Thus, it is important that the research be reported in a form that can 
communicate the complex and fluid unfolding of the performance.” 
(Polkinghorne 1997) 
 
THIS CHAPTER PRESENTS THE INVESTIGATION of the Chinese new 
middle class in terms of methodological design and research objectives. The 
latter examine the attitudes and aspirations of the Chinese new middle class, and 
consider the extent to which a distinctive self-understanding of their place and 
role in modern China is emerging. I also aim to show how lifestyle and 
consumption helps to differentiate the new middle class in its social rise in 
post-reform China. In doing so I aim to follow Seale’s recommendation that “the 
attempt to make methodological decisions available to readers of research 
reports is one way of enhancing the quality of research” (Seale 1999: 177). 
Readers deserve to be shown how—as well as how much—has been known 
about the subject matter by the researcher as a matter of a disciplined way of 
coming to know the subject matter. 
This chapter will also highlight the role of the qualitative data and theory in 
relation to the explanatory and exploratory research goals that are dominant in a 
research project of this sort (Aronson 1994). The empirical study will use 
qualitative research techniques such as in-depth interviews, participant 
observation, and other ethnographic skills. Pseudonyms will be used throughout 
and personal details or locations redacted to prevent identification of the 
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interviewees. A discussion of research ethics, reflexivity and the limitations of 
the empirical data is included in this chapter.  
Research objectives and questions 
In the last chapter, I suggested  that Western class categories do not directly 
apply to the Chinese situation and that the Chinese new middle class is 
distinguished more by sociocultural than by economic factors. To address this 
omission in the existing literatures, this study has three research objectives 
associated with the emergence of the Chinese new middle class in post-reform 
China.  
The first research objective is to apply Weberian, Neo-Weberian and 
Bourdieuian approaches to explain the trajectories of the new middle class in 
China. The second research objective is to give a full account of the role of the 
Chinese new middle class.  What are the differences between older generation 
and younger generation in terms of consumption patterns and lifestyles? What 
are the factors explaining their differences?  How can advantages be passed on 
from the old generation to younger generation? The third research objective is to 
use in-depth interviews to know more about class boundaries among different 
groupings within the Chinese new middle class, cooperation, and their cultural 
and political identities. 
The main empirical research with cadres, entrepreneurs and professionals was 
conducted in summer 2008, with some earlier pilot interviews, across six cities 
in Guangdong province. The aim was to use a sociocultural perspective to 
investigate the aspirations and attitudes of the new middle class. Qualitative 
techniques were judged the most appropriate methods to use because my 
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concern was mainly with means, motives and the sociocultural orientations of 
my respondents (Alasuutari 1995, Mason 2002, Boyatzis 1998). 
All of the interviewees had been willing and able to share details of their 
everyday life practices and consumer orientations with me. Entrepreneurs and 
professionals were more willing to talk about their interpersonal relationships 
and guānxi networks, while cadres were more reticent or tried to find ways out of 
sensitive questions. What we see from the interviews with the party regional 
cadres are that the narrative styles of reticence in China are different from those 
of the West, which is where the narrative methodological ideas are derived 
(Freeman 1984, 1993). Of course, it is true enough that we may also find it quite 
hard to get responses from individuals in similarly sensitive locations in the West. 
However, what is apparent in post-reform China is that it is generally difficult to 
get any interviews with the party regional cadres without first having trusted 
contacts make the prior introductions. 
Even after introductions had been made, there were other difficulties. Cadres 
were particularly sensitive about interviews and most unwilling to disclose 
personal biographies or consumption patterns. Some cadres initially provided 
politically sanitised version of their details. Cadres often gave very brief and 
vague responses. Interviews with cadres were often half the duration of the other 
interviews. Interviews with professionals and entrepreneurs were recorded (with 
permission), but those with cadres were not. Some cadres refused to let me take 
in situ notes, so dialogues, observations, research memos and reflections all had 
to be written after the fact (Steier 1991). To that extent, other methods had to be 
found to get inside information with regard to cadres. Complementing the 
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interviews with participant observation compensated for that weakness. Another 
way to obtain more concrete information was to ask entrepreneurs and 
professionals for their opinions of cadres. All the cadres interviewed were party 
members and are therefore understandably more conservative and less 
forthcoming than the other interviewees. Because they are party members, minor 
errors of judgment could put careers or even entire families in jeopardy with the 
party authorities. 
In fact, interviewing cadres required a great deal of skill and technique. The 
researcher is a veteran interviewer in doing in-depth interviews. Plenty of topics 
are precluded with cadres without considerable trust having been established: 
salaries, cooperation with other cadres, ‘special business’ and the like. Even 
more taboo are corruption, collaborations, moonlighting, democracy and 
government affairs in China. Indeed, invitations to cadres for interviews were 
often rejected outright unless ‘trustworthy’ people made prior introductions. 
During interviews, even former party members were likely to give public rather 
than private accounts, probably because it might have become second nature for 
them to subject their past to continual self-criticism because of the need for 
political correctness. Public accounts are sets of meaning in common social 
currency that reproduce and legitimate the assumptions that people take for 
granted about the nature of social reality (Cornwell 1984: 15). Private accounts 
spring directly from personal experiences as well as thoughts and feelings 
accompanying those experiences (Cornwell 1984: 16). 
How to do research qualitatively ‘with Chinese characteristics’? The most 
practicable way to obtain enough data is through informal/impromptu 
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conversation sessions, interviews and participant observation. The data from 
formal interviews tracked the life course of the interviewees through personal 
details and work, family and childhood histories. These interviews were 
augmented with data from informal channels and informal accounts, which in 
many cases involved conversations with the interviewees in cafeterias, karaoke 
lounges or other places after the formal interviews were over. They were not 
necessarily one on one (but usually were), with no set running time, format or 
venue. During the informal sessions, the researcher operated in an 
observer-participant mode and interacted with interviewees in their homes or 
workplaces but without making any pretence of being a participant with or 
without voice recording. Babbie (1992: 298) provides a definition of 
observer-participant methods suitable for fieldwork operationalisation.  
Combining formal and informal methods helped make interviewees feel more at 
ease and to reveal more openly and deeply about their self-identity, life 
philosophy, insecurities, imaginations and outlook on various issues. By 
socialising with the interviewees and taking the initiative to set up meetings or 
shopping excursions with them, I have been able to get at a more authentic 
picture of the inner world of the sense and sensibilities of the interviewees about 
their professional and private lives. 
Academic interviews are not new to most people in China, but they seem not 
interested in giving help enthusiastically if asked. Most interviewees initially 
thought the researcher was a journalist on assignment to report on success stories 
since some interviewees have had prior experience of being covered by 
newspapers or magazines. However, the general consensus of opinion on their 
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being interviewed is one of ‘I am not middle class and my lifestyle is far from 
being middle class.’ With the use of the qualitative research methods such as 
storytelling, narratives and participant observation, the point is how to connect 
and convert the collected data into a textual account. I relied mainly on the 
interviews for the thesis (Bell & Newby 1977). The informal/impromptu 
conversation sessions also provided significant information about their lifestyles 
and consumption patterns. 
Each interview had the same format to help maintain comparability and 
consistency of the data for later analysis (See appendix 1). The formal interviews 
averaged two hours long, the shortest was an hour and a half, the longest four 
hours, and took place in a variety of places and settings. As a general rule, 
interviewees had free rein in what they wanted to tell and how to tell it, and 
questions put to them as and when necessary (Liu 2007, Cortazzi 1993). Each 
session usually started off with questions about their work conditions and then 
moved on to a discussion about general sentiments, satisfactions and frustrations 
in their professional work. They were then asked about their work partners, 
partners in consumption and participation in guānxi networks. Interviewees 
were always asked to illustrate their responses with concrete examples. Most of 
the interviewees were interviewed more than once. Some of them (mainly the 
entrepreneurs and professionals) became open to the idea of voice recording, 
although they were very conscious of being recorded and could be guarded on 
topics about the party, political trends, guānxi networks and institutional 
changes. Cadres were understandably less receptive to it because of the more 
sensitive nature of their work. For cadres, where interviews were not recorded, 
interview notes were either written in situ or as soon as possible thereafter. 
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Hong Kong people are travelling to Guangdong in increasing numbers in the 
years following the 1997 handover for a variety of personal or business reasons. 
It is far less common, however, to see a researcher roam around and discuss 
economically related matters with people there. Be that as it may, the liberalised 
atmosphere and more global outlook of the province have now made it very 
conducive to sociological fieldwork. A researcher from Hong Kong (or 
anywhere else) is now visibly less out of place in Guangdong and his or her 
comings and goings are now generally unfettered and go unnoticed in the 
increasingly cosmopolitan cities of the province. The initial intention was to ask 
local Chinese academics and Chambers of Commerce for help. That approach 
turned out to be unproductive. It later became obvious that the researcher’s own 
informal networking had a very important bearing on the conduct and content of 
the interviews (Liu 2007: 17). It is an example of ‘respondent-driven sampling,’ 
a technique that allows researchers to make asymptotically unbiased estimates 
from snowball samples under certain conditions, such as making estimates about 
social networks connecting hidden populations. (See Heckathorn 1997, 2000 
and Goodman 1961 for details on respondent-driven sampling). 
The sensitive nature of the research presented complications for me in finding 
interviewees (Liu 2006). The field studies involved investigating the lives of 
influential people in a society not built on political permissiveness or having 
strong populist sentiments of social openness to outsiders, both of which are 
preconditions for a Western-style structured investigation. The sampling 
methods that typify Western-style investigations are less useful in the Chinese 
context. Therefore, snowball introduction has been the main sampling method to 
get interviewees. Other sampling means have been tried with the view to 
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lessening the effect of sampling bias that is well-recognised in snowball 
sampling.  
When I first began to interview the Chinese new middle class in summer 2008, 
the first method was to post invitation messages on bulletin boards or forums of 
domestic Chinese websites such as Sohu.com or Sina.com using a giveaway 
supermarket coupon as incentive. These posts were precisely written in the 
Chinese language (free translation below): 
“I am a Ph.D. candidate and at present I wish to know more of the 
lifestyle and consumption patterns of the Chinese new middle 
class. If you earn a monthly income of about RMB¥5,000 
[US$732 or £505], have at least a post-secondary education and 
your job is a managerial position with a state-owned or private 
enterprise or as a professional, you are very welcome to send me 
an email and also let me know of your mobile number. In return, 
you will get a RMB¥100 [US$16 or £10] supermarket coupon for 
your time and contribution.” 
 
The main problem was that this method had a very high non-response rate. It is 
possible that a relatively well-off group such as the Chinese new middle class 
would not be particularly attracted by what is actually a high-priced spendable 
coupon (roughly US$15 or £10 in value). This method produced only four 
responses over a three-month period (two professionals, two entrepreneurs and 
no cadres). Furthermore, those four respondents had shown little, if any 
willingness to be open, especially about their social networking and political 
affiliations. This is in spite of the researcher giving them categoric assurances of 
confidentiality about the information they provided and the purposes to which 
that information was to be put. The most likely reason for their reluctance was 
the researcher being a stranger to them. Indeed, these ‘website respondents’ said 
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in their formal accounts that they use no social networks to find jobs and had no 
connections with government cadres. 
The second method fared no better. It involved sending out invitation letters to 
industry associations and chambers of commerce in the six fieldsites. The 
problem lies in dealing with organisations that are intrinsically bureaucratic. 
Prior written permission had to be obtained from the government and the 
necessary paperwork had to be in order even before these organisations could be 
approached. These administrative tasks are time-consuming and circuitous. The 
researcher was shunted from department to department, and after having found 
one, the researcher was made to wait for more than half a year for the application 
to be processed. In the end, the department told the researcher that it could offer 
no help. A research study such as this one is unlikely to produce any real 
commercial gain for these organisations, so there is little or no motivation for 
them to help. In the end, this method produced no respondents. 
In the end, it came down to referrals from one interviewee to another. The 
researcher had no choice and started guānxi networking initially through her 
acquinatinces to find the right candidates for interviews. It quickly appeared that 
snowball sampling was the most effective way by far in terms of time and 
disbursements. By using this snowball sampling, there was no possibility of 
random sampling though the researcher tried to increase the authenticity, 
reliability and validity of the selected samples. Each city had one native 
introducer to refer potential candidates to conduct the in-depth interviews. Then 
I used snowball sampling to enlarge the sample size.  
One usual criticism of snowball sampling is about the risk of similarity of 
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characteristics between referrers and the referred (Heckathorn 1997, 2000; 
Goodman 1961). In fact, all referrers and referred in all six fieldsites show 
different backgrounds, income, education and occupations, even if the referrer 
was a cadre (or entrepreneur or professional) as the referred was also. Using the 
researcher’s own personal network turned out well in getting a good number of 
interviewees (nearly five dozen), the variation among professionals, cadres and 
entrepreneurs plus there was no need for incentives. 
Initially, I occupied the role of a part-time business woman (helping my family 
member to manage their business), and it was possible to piggyback on those 
introductions to establish networks with the new middle class. As time went on 
and with more travels into mainland China, I built up greater familiarity with the 
contacts. New contacts became friends, who in turn introduced other members 
of their cliques to me. Treating contacts to a meal is a simplest way to return 
favours. The researcher knows the tactics of guānxi networking to do business in 
China. All the business partners including entrepreneurs and professionals knew 
that the researcher was a doctoral student from another territory. 
Getting inside information with guānxi: a problem of research ethics? 
Connections and reciprocity are quite literally the modus vivendi in Chinese life. 
Connections are of course important everywhere. We see on television that 
anthropologists and ethnographers working in places like Papua New Guinea or 
Africa are nearly always accompanied by guides—the trusted ‘face’ for the 
outsiders with tribal elders. In advanced societies such as the UK, there is 
guānxi—the ‘old boys’ network’ so well depicted by John Rae (2009) and James 
Burke (1995). However, guānxi (whatever its name or guise) is particularly 
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important in China.  
I have learnt from the fieldwork that it is extremely difficult to tell what 
constitutes a truthful account. A great deal depends on the situation at the time of 
the session. It is not apparent to see that any reading of an interview is loaded 
with the researcher’s own interpretative baggage (Kwong 2001). There are 
issues of trust, truth-telling, authorship and voice between the subjects and the 
researcher (Kwong 2001). These are necessary caveats for any researcher in any 
field. Why should informants trust the researcher since it is the researcher who 
ultimately controls the interviews and their later re-telling. Qualitative 
researchers are ‘guests in the private spaces of the world’, their manners must be 
good and their code of ethic strict” (Stake 2005: 49). Accordingly, ethical 
considerations relating to research methods were carried out in full cognisance 
of the University of Birmingham’s Code of Conduct for Research. This code 
“describes standards of work performance and ethical conduct expected of all 
persons engaged in research [in the University of Birmingham]”.11 Therefore, 
research involves, inter-alia, the pursuit of truth in furtherance of the 
advancement of knowledge12. 
                                                 
11
 Details see University of Birmingham (2010). ‘Code of conduct for research website’. 
http://www.ppd.bham.ac.uk/cop/code8.htm, retrieved 27 Jan 2010) 
 
12
 According to the website from the University of Birmingham, research workers should, in all 
respects of their research: (i). demonstrate integrity and professionalism, (ii). Observe fairness 
and equity, (iii). Avoid, or declare, conflicts of interest, (iv). Ensure the safety of those associated 
with the research, (v). Observe all legal and ethical requirements laid down by the University or 
other bodies properly laying down such requirements. 
Research methods and results should, subject to appropriate confidentiality in relation to 
personal or commercially protected information, be open to scrutiny and debate. 
For my doctorate project, I follow the research ethics proposed by the University of Birmingham. 
The collection of empirical data was carried out in accordance with the ethical framework 
stipulated here that encompasses the standards upheld by the British Sociological Association 
(BSA), details see University of Birmingham, Research and Enterprise (2010). ‘Governance, 
Management, Conduct and ethics’. http://www.res.bham.ac.uk/information/ethics.pdf.  
Retrieved 27 Jan 2010. 
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However, as already argued, doing qualitative research in China is quite 
different. To a certain extent it may not be able to completely comply with all the 
stipulations of Western research ethics. Having close connection (guānxi) to the 
interviewees makes doing research in China seems necessary and inevitable. 
Having found suitable samples of the Chinese new middle class in Guangdong, 
how must a researcher maintain relationships with them with a view to getting 
insider information?  
Doing research in China today, whether qualitative or quantitative research 
methods, guānxi is a ‘must-have’ necessity. The guānxi network makes doing 
research in China, to a certain extent, limit the objectivity and neutrality but 
increases the reciprocity. Qualitative research involves probing life histories, 
and if the interviewee comes from a more reserved culture, then referrals from a 
trusted or influential contact is the only way to access another contact (Mishler 
1986, 1991; Morse 1994; Ressman 1993 & 2001). It is not the done thing in 
Guangdong (or anywhere else in China) to ask interviewees to sign consent 
forms that specify all the minutiae of obligations and responsibilities of the 
researcher with respect to the confidentiality of the information. A small 
minority (usually professionals and entrepreneurs) are fine with consent forms, 
but, for most, this kind of legalistic form-filling just seems risky and frightening 
(Liu 2007). This is why I chose to tape-record or transcribe interviews without 
ceremony or documentation.  
Over half of the cadres [7 out of 11] show some hesitation in signing consent  
forms but have allowed me to use the interview material as data as long as they 
are only identified by aliases or pseudonym. For every interviewee, I obtained a 
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verbal permission for conducting an in-depth interview. In each case I had an 
introductory session to introduce my project. This introduction established that 
their accounts would be kept strictly confidential and be used for the purpose of 
research only. The verbal permission declares their understanding that their 
participation was entirely voluntary. A clause granting participants the option for 
withdrawal at any stage was also included in my conversation with my 
respondents. All participants gladly obliged with none insisting otherwise. Most 
respondents, except cadres as I have already commented, had no qualms 
speaking with the tape recorder on. Full anonymity to all respondents was 
assured with special care taken to present responses in a way that would not 
result in the interviewees becoming identifiable. 
I had six different and reputable introducers in the six selected cities. The 
interviewees initially trusted my reputable introducers rather than trusting me. I 
also showed and gave the respondents one copy of my publications with an 
executive summary (both Chinese and English versions) as a form of reference. I 
myself belong to the Hong Kong middle class. Aside from some obvious cultural 
differences, being middle class has made it relatively easier for me to get into the 
inner sanctum of the Chinese new middle class. Being middle class and having 
the right kind of professional biography helped to provide the necessary space 
for finding something common to talk about and reflect upon afterwards. 
Research interviewing is much more than information-gathering: its interactive 
nature “allows [the researcher] to ask for clarifications, to notice what questions 
the subject formulates about their own life, to go behind conventional, expected 
answers…” (Anderson & Jack 1991: 23) 
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From interview to text 
There is a constant effort in this study to keep authentic flavour to all of the data 
and conversations collected. I am not so naïve as to accept as true the 
recollections of interviewees at face value. However, the long period in the field 
and making extended contact with old and new informants from the Chinese 
new middle class has allowed me to verify most of the information collected. 
Idioms and phraseologies used by interviewees in expressing actions and goals 
are closely scrutinised. Partaking in the everyday activities of the subjects during 
the course of doing the fieldwork provided many more opportunities to probe 
more deeply into the more intimate sentiments of their work and personal 
relationships (Lincoln & Tierney 1997). Participation and informal dialogue 
helped to verify and amend discrepancies between the interview data and 
observation data. But most times it seemed more sensible for me to step out of 
the researcher role—to wit, to act more as a friend to the subjects and share in 
their enjoyment of their lifestyles and consumption habits. And it is from the role 
to be a friend that many of the interviewees have found an interest in this study 
and has led them to provide more personal views. In fact, most of the subjects 
took the initiative to explain themselves while going about their lives.  
Ethnography, storytelling, narratives and qualitative research are 
language-heavy and language-dependent (Emerson et al. 1995, Maines 1993), 
so it places a very high premium on language or linguistic skills, which so often 
comes from a literary education more than the most of us who were educated 
after the 1980s have. Typescripts of every interview were made and organized 
case by case.  
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In other words, we need a set of techniques to build transcripts and texts from the 
raw data suitable for analysis, interpretation and construct meanings that fit in 
with our conceptual framework and research objectives. One of the difficulties is 
with the language itself. This is a particular difficulty when transcribing 
interviews and informal dialogues through in situ notetaking, in situ voice 
recording and post-event fieldnotes and memos (especially relevant in case of 
cadres). We should not be so naïve to believe that translating speech data from 
Putonghua (Mandarin) or Cantonese into English would not transform it in some 
way. Any translator or interpreter can attest to this. This is especially difficult 
when the two languages are so dissimilar in every linguistic respect. It is 
extremely hard to retain an authentic flavour of a Chinese conversation in an 
English-language translation. However, I took great care in the choice of words 
and expressions when translating the interviews. The following methodology 
memo captures my deliberation on this process: 
“The first-generation version of the transcripts is produced in this 
way: listening to the tape recording first and describing the 
context in a part-narrative/part-verbatim record. Apart from 
converting speech into text and then translating into English 
words, this is the straightforward part of the process. The result is 
a first-person narrative account of the interview.” [Kwong 2001] 
 
But sometimes it is quite difficult to know the actual meanings from 
interviewees’ dialogue. Informal follow up and close connection with the 
context is important.  Take, for example, the phrase 上的下的、左手一的的、
右手一个亲爱的 [shàng-de xià-de, zuǒ-shǒu yī de-de, yòu-shǒu yī-gè qīn-ài 
de]13. A literal translation of the expression is ‘that which is on top and bottom, 
that which is on the left hand, and that which is a loved one on the right hand.’ 
                                                 
13
 Refer to Chapter 4 for the real context and content of this proverb.  Also see glossaries.  
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The ‘proverb’ [actually a running joke making the rounds in Chinese society in 
the 1960s and 1970s] had it that, if you had the means to own good clothes, they 
would have been made of Dacron. And if you had Dacron clothes, then it would 
be quite easy for you to find a good and good-looking wife (or husband!). 
The other example is Mao Zedong [The 1st President of the PRC] like the sun 
who shines for a brighter future in China [Mao Zédōng xiàng tàiyáng, zhàodào 
nàlĭ nàlĭ liàng 毛泽东像太阳，照到那里那里亮]. Deng Xiaoping [The 2nd 
President of the PRC] like the moon, who makes the society more extravagant 
and corrupted, people always go to karaoke lounges [Dèng Xiăopíng xiàng yuè 
liàng, kă lā  OK dào tiānliàng 邓小平像月亮，卡拉 ok 到天亮]. Jiang Zemin 
[The 3rd President of the PRC] like the star who makes many laid-off or 
redundant workers since 1990s [Jiāng Zémín xiàng xīngxing, xiàgăng gōng rén 
shù bùqīng 江泽民像星星，下岗工人数不清]. 
I wrote out the phrase in a research memo to reflect on what had been meant so 
as to reduce the chances of misinterpreting the original meaning as expressed by 
the informant (sentence structure is another concern). I also did some informal 
interviews with the Chinese new middle class to clarify some special meanings 
of the proverbs (Mishler 1991). In this, Cantonese is a particular sticking point: it 
is a pre-eminently spoken dialect, whose spoken structure is very different from 
the written form. Because of this, fieldnotes had to be altered to reflect the 
broken sequence of utterances. 
The interviewees 
I interviewed 59 members of the new middle class in Guangdong for this study. 
Chapter 3 Mapping the ethnographic terrain 
 
94
There are 31 are entrepreneurs, 11 are cadres and 17 are professionals 14 . 
Demographically, my sample is between twenty-five and sixty years old, born 
during or just after the Cultural Revolution, entering the workforce in their 
twenties.  Tables 5a and 5b summarize the generational organization as well as 
the general profile of the Chinese new middle class.  
Table 5a: Generational organisation of the Chinese new middle class 
Generation Cohort General characteristics 
1st Born in 1948-58 
22% of sample (N=13/59) 
First-hand childhood or adult experience of civil 
war, political events of the 1960s and 1970s, 
economic reforms of the 1980s and 1990s up to 
the present day. Some are university or secondary 
school graduates in the 1960s and the restoration 
of higher education in the late 1970s. 
2nd Born in 1959-69 
37% of sample (N=22/59) 
Baby boomers of the 1960s. Childhood spent in 
internal political turbulence in 1960s and 1970s. 
First generation of the economic reforms of 1978. 
First-hand witness of the 1989 Tiananmen Square 
shootings. High social prestige and power because 
of higher education and income levels. 
3rd Born in 1970-79 
32% of sample (N=19/59) 
Entered workforce in the 1990s. Employment is 
contractual in nature, based substantially on 
qualifications and job performance. High 
educational ambitions. 
4th Born after 1980 
9% of sample (N=5/59) 
Some are children of first and second generations. 
Formative years spent mostly in surroundings of 
no significant privation. Has highest and most 
conspicuous consumption of all other generations. 
High educational and cultural ambitions. 
Generally proficient in at least one foreign 
language (English) or even a second one. 
Considers self-advancement to be important for 
career building. 
Sources: Bernstein (1977), Hung & Chiu (2003: 210, 224), Mayer & Muller (1986), Mayer & 
Schoepflin (1989), Walder (1986, 1989: 421, 1995a, 1995b), Yang (1996). 
 
                                                 
14
 Refer to appendices 1-2 for the detailed profile of the interviewees.  
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5b: Profile of the Chinese new middle class  
 
Date of birth Age (in 2008) No. % Married/Single 
1948-58  50-60 13 22 13 married  
1959-69  39-49 22 37 22 married  
1970-79  29-38 19 32 13 married, 6 single 
Born after 1980 25 or below  5 9 0 married, 5 single  
Details  Total interviewees: 59 
Mean of age: 45 
Total No. of older generation: 35 (59%) 
Total No. of younger generation: 24 (31%)  
Male: 49 (Old generation: 31; Young generation 18) 
Female: 10 (Old generation: 4; Young generation: 6) 
48 married  
11 Single 
Source: In-depth interview 2008.  
 
The older generations were born after 1948 are more likely experienced the 
Cultural Revolution. One consequence from those turbulent times is that the 
older generation had practically zero possibility of family inheritance of tangible 
or intangible assets. These respondents mostly lived in poverty and received no 
semblance of a normal education until well into the 1980s when the turmoil 
completely ended. The second group is the younger generation who were born 
after 1970s. We could deduce that the better-educated members of this class 
must have been born after the 1970s. They started to work during 1980s and their 
jobs are likely contract-based and the degree of stability is low. Their job is not 
potentially permanent and there is a keen and competitive job market since 2002 
after China accessed to the World Trade Organization15. 
The second aspect is education level. Cadres, entrepreneurs and professionals 
generally finished post-secondary education in the late 1960s or early 1970s. 
Among everyone else, the professionals are most likely to have a university 
qualification; this group forms the most highly educated portion of the research 
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sample. Like everywhere, high education is regarded in China as the best asset to 
have. Education is seen as the easiest, most practical gateway to achieve 
personal success since it usually puts the individual in an optimum position to 
work for multinational entities. 
The third aspect is work history. Most of the research subjects started ‘getting 
rich’ by the mid-1980s, that is, after economic reforms were launched in China. 
Their wealth accumulation shows common features. One-third of them started 
careers in the state sector by being allocated jobs under the dānwèi system. 
When the so-called open-door policy started in 1978, they moved over to the 
‘semi-private’ sector into what are known as collectively owned enterprises and 
joint-venture corporations because of better personal and professional 
opportunities there. Later, they moved on to better-paying and more providential 
foreign-venture enterprises owned mostly by Hong Kong, Taiwanese and 
Japanese entities. They gained the necessary experience, wherewithal and 
connections to set up their own businesses by as early as the mid-1980s. 
The fourth aspect is income distribution. As mentioned in the previous chapter, 
the minimum per-capita income of RMB¥5,000 [US$732 or £505] a month is 
the baseline for selecting my respondents (Qiao & Jiang 2005, Yu 2005). The 
entrepreneurs and professionals in this study have the highest income of any 
group (often significantly more than RMB¥5,000 a month), and regional cadres 
the lowest. Entrepreneurs also have the most fluctuating income level of any 
group; sometimes they may make no more than RMB¥5,000 (if that much) while 
at other times very substantially more. Many entrepreneurs also bolster their 
primary income through secondary income channels such as financial 
                                                                                                                                 
15
 See glossaries, WTO and restraint of trade.  
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investments, property speculation or the like. 
It is interesting to note that regional cadres often earn the nominal minimum 
income set by this study. However, their jobs come with perquisites and their 
actual income is often higher by reason of their official or semi-official 
privileges and networking assets. Their official jobs often lead to their partaking 
in a variety of part-time employment or income-generating activities—a 
situational norm among many cadres in Guangdong province. 
Entrepreneurs 
As the biggest portion of interviewees, the total interviews of the entrepreneurs 
are 31.  The entrepreneurs prove to be the most willing and most open in 
expressing thoughts and sharing life activities for the purposes of this study. 
More than twenty of them have allowed participant observation in their daily 
lives (e.g. accompanying them on shopping trips, home or workplace visits, 
taking part in photo-taking events). Many of the entrepreneurs run multiple 
businesses in Guangdong in textiles, real estate, electronics, entertainment and 
other service industries. 
Cadres 
Cadres showed the least tendency to accept invitations to participate in this study. 
There is clear reluctance on their part to disclose even cursory information, such 
as about their work units or offices. Those who did accept invitations required 
detailed disclosure from me as to identity, research objectives and what use the 
research would be put to. The sensitive nature of their jobs is the main cause of 
their reluctance. China, after all, is still a politically conservative and cautious 
country in comparison with the West. Many a cadre is extremely careful to not 
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do anything lest it be misinterpreted by the powers-that-be as a wilful breach of 
party discipline and/or administrative regulations. For this reason, cadres 
constitute only one-third of the sample. 
Securing an appointment with the more powerful cadres (at the vice-mayoral, 
mayoral or higher levels) was impossibly difficult. The primary hurdle is the 
lack of any political affiliation, social networking and/or professional 
connections with such people. However, I was fortunate to be able to interview 
Guangdong provincial cadres at the city and township levels. 
Professionals 
The last group in the research sample is the professionals. They include 
engineers, doctors, managerial personnel in joint ventures and multinationals, 
college lecturers and professors. Altogether, professionals are very willing to 
accept invitations for interview and are cooperative and helpful. There is a wide 
spectrum of professionals in this study and many of them work for 
multinationals. 
The most prominent social change in China brought about by marketisation is in 
the area of education. It is increasingly seen as an important of human capital 
and a means of upward mobility, coexisting alongside carryovers from the 
established system before the reforms began (Chen 2007). New professionals 
with specialist knowledge (such as accountants, asset managers, financial 
analysts, lawyers, and so on) have rapidly emerged in large, numbers in 
Guangdong. Broadly speaking, university graduates in China working at 
foreign-related companies are high on the job target list because there is a 
growing number of foreign businesses in China and also because most Chinese 
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‘capitalists’ tend to subcontract work or form alliances with foreign capital. 
Indeed, the private sector of China has become a veritable ‘capitalist paradise’ 
because of the reforms, attracting all sorts of investors worldwide like a magnet 
(Petras 2006). 
In conclusion, all the samples of cadres, entrepreneurs and professionals are 
selected in terms of generic middle class 'origin' characteristics and not on the 
basis of 'own class' identification, since it was precisely the development of 
ideas of class and social positioning that I wanted to research. All the interviews 
will be organized in terms of generational changes and in terms of the three 'own 
class' categories of entrepreneurs, cadres and professionals.  
Choice of fieldsite  
Why choose Guangdong province as my fieldsite? Guangdong province has 
experienced high economic development since the outset of the economic 
reforms. Photos 1-2 give the full pictures of China as well as Guangdong 
province.  The open-door policy initiated since the early 1980s quickly became 
the cornerstone for economic growth for the province. Those and other policies 
provide the background for the researcher to choose Guangdong province as the 
fieldsite to study the Chinese new middle class. It is also significant that the 
Pearl River Delta Area was one of the first Special Economic Zones identified in 
the early stages of the reform period after 1992. They were specifically targeted 
by Deng Xiaoping to be the generators of new economic growth. These zones 
provided preferential economic conditions and labour market ‘freedoms’, 
especially for overseas firms This explains the rapid exponential growth of the 
six cities selected in Guangdong province for my fieldsite. The six cities are also 
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cities that have attracted the highest proportion of migrant workers, both legal 
and illegal. Even illegal migrants enjoy a high degree of de facto legitimacy, 
having been resident in many cases for 10 years or more. In this way, it can be 
seen that residency status, or hùkǒu, operates to stratify the labour market and 
create restrictions upon more competitive processes that might destabilise 
employment relations even more than is the case. 
Map 1: Map of the People’s Republic of China 
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Map 2: Prefectural cities in Guangdong province (excludes Hong Kong and Macau) 
 
 
The 6 cities where are the researcher to do the in-depth interviews include Dongguan, 
Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Yanjiang, Zhongshan and Zhuhai.  
 
Source: http://www.travelChinaguide.com/cityguides/guangdong/Dongguan. [Retrieved 1 
November 2008] 
  
Guangdong province is mainly a migrant province, with over 90% of the 
provincial population (Statistical Yearbook of Guangdong, 2007) being a 
non-native floating population. In Guangdong province, with faster economic 
growth, the GNP per capita is relatively more or less the same with the Shanghai, 
Beijing and Suzhou (See table 4a in Chapter 2), which provides an excellent 
place to observe the emergence of the Chinese new middle class and the 
development of its sociocultural attitudes. In addition, the other factor for 
choosing Guangdong province is my personal networking originally built up in 
that province with my acquaintances. Networking is the major limitation and 
restricted the researcher to go only so far and no more. I would have been unable 
to meet any Chinese new middle class respondents in the larger cosmopolitan 
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cities like Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjian and Suzhou.  
The fieldsites are major cities in Guangdong which are all within easy travelling 
distances from Hong Kong (my homebase). Guangdong has always had the 
greatest potential for economic development than any other province of China. 
Compared with the national total, Guangdong in 2006 had the largest GDP 
(12.4% of the national total), the highest industrial output value (14.1%), the 
largest export value (31.2%) and the largest retail sales value of consumer goods 
(11.9%) (Guangdong Provincial Statistical Bureau 2007). The Pearl River Delta 
Economic Zone (PRDEZ) is the main economic hub of the province and one of 
the world’s most densely cultivated and populated areas. Guangdong province is 
rightly recognised for its economic prosperity. 
Tables 6 and 7 are indicators of economic growth of the six major cities of 
Guangdong province. 
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Table 6: Economic indicators (2006) of six selected cities in Guangdong 
 
             
             
  Gross domestic product      
 
 Value added of industry (for state-owned & other enterprises with min. sales of RMB¥5 million 
p.a. 
 
 Retail sales      
 
 Exports      
             
             
Guangzhou           GDP RMB¥607.4 bn 
     VAI RMB¥197.1 bn      
      Retail sales RMB¥218.3 bn     
  Exports RMB¥32.4 bn      
             
Shenzhen           GDP RMB¥581.4 bn 
      VAI RMB¥308.7 bn    
     Retail sales RMB¥167.1 bn      
    Exports RMB¥136.0 bn      
             
Dongguan     GDP RMB¥262.7 bn     
   VAI RMB¥131.9 bn       
  Retail sales RMB¥58.5 bn        
  Exports RMB¥47.4 bn         
             
Zhongshan   GDP RMB¥103.6 bn        
  VAI RMB¥69.6 bn        
  Retail sales RMB¥33.1 bn        
  Exports RMB¥15.6 bn        
             
Zhuhai  GDP RMB¥74.8 bn        
  VAI RMB¥41.5 bn        
  Retail sales RMB¥25.6 bn        
  Exports RMB¥14.8 bn        
             
Yangjiang  GDP RMB¥52.0 bn        
  VAI RMB¥15.3 bn        
  Retail sales RMB¥18.8 bn        
  Exports RMB¥20.3 bn        
             
  
 
Source: Guangdong Statistical Yearbook 2007, with author’s artwork and modifications. 
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Table 7: Geographical vs. per-capita GDP (2006) of six cities in Guangdong  
            
            
  Land area (square kilometres)    
  Population (millions)    
  Per-capita gross domestic product (RMB¥) p.a.    
            
 
           
Guangzhou           16,000 sq km 
 
       6.7 millions   
 
         RMB¥63,100 
 
           
Yangjiang      7,813 sq. km    
 
   2.6 millions       
 
  RMB¥15,700        
 
           
Dongguan   2,465 sq. km        
 
       6.4 millions   
 
      RMB¥39,468    
 
           
Shenzhen   2,050 sq. km        
 
         ca. 8.5 millions 
 
          RMB¥69,450 
 
           
Zhongshan  1,800 sq. km         
 
   2.5 millions       
 
      RMB¥42,058    
 
           
Zhuhai  1,653 sq. km (larger than Hong Kong)     
 
  1.3 millions        
 
       RMB¥52,185   
 
           
            
Source: Guangdong Statistical Yearbook 2007, with author’s artworks and modifications. 
            
 
In 2006, GDP specifically for the PRDEZ was RMB¥2,142 billion (US$313 or 
£216 billions), or 82% of the Guangdong provincial GDP (Guangdong 
Provincial Statistical Bureau 2007). One of the fastest-growing land areas in the 
world, Guangdong has long been host to a sizeable contingent of affluent 
international professionals, entrepreneurs and regional cadres who consume 
high-end goods and services (Lee 2007: 102). In fact, Guangdong was one of the 
country’s first places (if not the first) to kick-start economic development when 
the ‘open-door’ policy was launched in 1978. Relatively low tax rates and 
favourable investment policies at the local level have helped Guangdong attract 
Chapter 3 Mapping the ethnographic terrain 
 
105 
worldwide investment vis à vis the rest of China by dint of long history of 
trading with foreigners. The six cities used in this study are among the top cities 
in Guangdong with the best economic performance. 
In 2004, per-capita gross domestic product (GDP) reached US$1,200 (£817) a 
year and make Guangdong one of the leading provinces in China. The other 
decisive factor favouring Guangdong is the growing influence of China in the 
new political and economic world order. The 1978 reforms have completely 
transformed urban life for China. Many Chinese cities are undergoing 
politico-economic and cultural transitions on an almost historic scale. Many 
cities in Guangdong province are no longer centres of production but also 
centres of consumption. Consumption dominates practically everything and 
everywhere in China today. Internal and external economic pressures have 
transformed many Chinese cities into critical intersections where the state 
crosses paths with society—where the elite interact with ordinary citizens, 
where the old world order of state socialism forms alliances with the brave new 
world of market realities (Hurst 2006). The middle class in China has been said 
to be the chief beneficiary of the country’s rapid economic growth (Li 2006). 
You can find many commercial skyscrapers and financial hubs everywhere in 
Guangdong. Again, the effect is much more prominent in Guangdong than 
anywhere else (see photos 1-2). 
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Photo 2: Commercial building in Guangdong province  
 
 




This chapter has presented a set of three research objectives of this study, 
relative to the extant literature reviewed in Chapters 1 and 2. Through a critical 
engagement with the research objectives, I justified my decision to use 
qualitative research methods - interviews, thick description, participant 
observation and sometimes oral history - to understand the lifestyles, 
consumption practices, class relations, collaborations, cultural and political 
identities among the Chinese new middle class. The next four chapters will 
present my findings.  
 




Class boundaries of the Chinese new middle class 
 
“Every Tuesday, my friends and I have to go to the Lucky Restaurant to 
have our dinners. It’s a regular gathering and it’s been our habit for the 
last six years. During our gathering, I can get many resources like the 
latest news, economic conditions and even the latest ways to earn 
extra money. No matter how busy I am, I have to attend the set 
gathering. By sharing the same issues and experiences, by drinking the 
same brand of drink like Xiaohutuxin (小葫涂仙), by smoking the same 
brand of cigarettes like Hongtaishan (红塔山), I feel really relaxed and 
comfortable. This type of gathering enhances the sentiment between 
my friends and me. It provides the topic [huati 话题] for us to talk. It also 
provides that sense of same class sentiments [zìjǐrén 自 己 人 ] to 
discuss business matters.” 
(Uncle Yuen, 56, entrepreneur) 
 
UNCLE YUEN’S CONVERSATION SEEMS TO summarise the important 
element between class boundary and class membership. Common 
acquaintanceship acts as a connecting thread to infuse a ‘common identity’ and 
draws them within a great sense of awareness within the new middle class 
boundary. The ethnographic information collected in this study indicates that the 
practices of the Chinese new middle class create a distinctly modern cultural 
space. This study classifies the Chinese new middle class according to the 
distribution of birthdates of the interviewees roughly into two major cohorts, 
namely, the older generation (the first cohort was born from 1940 to 1958; and 
the second cohort was born from 1959 to 1969) and the younger generation (the 
third, was born in 1970s. The fourth cohort was born in 1980s). 
Why classify the new middle class into older and younger generation? Social 
institutional theory (See Inglehart 1977 & 1990), historic generation cohort 
theory (See Inglehart & Norris 2003, Rogler 2002) and the concept of collective 
memory (Details see Belk 1988 & 1991, Lipsitz 1990) all suggest that the 
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behaviours and mentalities of different cohorts are shaped by social changes as 
well as by their peer groups. Each cohort will have different thoughts and 
ideologies based on their experience and perceptions of historical events.  
Many events in the modern history of China greatly influence the life courses of 
the different generations of the Chinese new middle class (Mayer & Muller 1986, 
Mayer & Schoepflin 1989). Down the years China,  has seen many national and 
political campaigns take place: marriage law reform, legal schooling age, 
one-child policy, entitlements to state welfare services, compulsory social 
insurance, provision of social services for age-specific target groups, economic 
liberalisation and others (Meisner 1999). The direct impact of these modes of 
state action is to create a “society-wide universalisation of the welfare-state-type 
life-course patterns” (Mayer & Muller 1986: 233). But the Chinese collectivist 
type of welfare state had been greatly disrupted by market reforms after the 
1980s. This chapter mainly presents the features of the lifestyles and 
consumption patterns of the older generation of Chinese new middle class. It 
also analyses the factors that influence those features of the older generation.   
Older generation of the Chinese new middle class  
The older generations can be subdivided into two cohorts. The first cohort is 
now in their fifties and early sixties, born in 1948-58 (ages 50-60 in 2008), and 
occupies 22% of the research sample (13 out of N=59). This is the generation 
that has first-hand adult experience of the hardships following the civil war 
between the Kuomintang and the Communists and the later political upheavals 
of the Cultural Revolution which ended in 197616. They are not particularly 
                                                 
16
 As children, the first generation lived through the famine of the Great Leap Forward in 
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well-educated because of a disrupted education caused by the Cultural 
Revolution. They spent their childhood years when the country was in a state of 
internal political turbulence from the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural 
Revolution (Zhou & Hou 1999, Zhou & Pei 1997, Zhou & Brandon 1997, Deng 
& Treiman 1997). 
The second cohort of the older generation is the post-war baby-boomers now in 
their forties and early fifties, born in 1959-69 (ages 39-49 in 2008), making up 
37% of the research sample (22 out of N=59). This cohort is the first to witness 
the launch of the country’s opening-up policy in 1978 and the first beneficiaries 
of the economic reforms when the country was most in need of a versatile élite 
for economic growth (Hewitt 2007). They lived through widespread economic 
changes of the early and middle reform years and witnessed in varying ways the 
1989 Tiananmen Square protests.  
The first and second cohorts of the older generation occupy about 59% (i.e. 35 
out of N=59)17 of the research sample. They are generally seen as the lucky ones 
when compared with the ‘lost generation’ of xiàgǎng gōngrén (下岗工人 
laid-off/redundant workers) when many Chinese state enterprises closed down 
around the mid-1990s because of economic streamlining measures. They did not 
suffer from the so-called destratification of social status (Parish 1984, Davis 
                                                                                                                                 
1958(Yang 1996). With their education disrupted, the government carried out a ‘send-down’ 
policy intended to lessen urban unemployment and build up rural development. Millions of 
urban youth were ‘mobilised’ and sent ‘up the mountains and down to the villages’ (上山下乡运
动 shàngshānxiàxiāng) (Bernstein 1977).  Secondary-school graduates at the outbreak of the 
Cultural Revolution are later dubbed lăosānjiè (老三届 the ‘three old classes’) in the reform 
years. Many married couples during the Cultural Revolution lived apart in different cities for 
years on end. The experience of the first generation of having a peaceable life only began when 
Deng Xiaoping launched the economic reforms in 1978. Therefore, major nationwide socialist 
campaigns to re-engineer everyday life define the first generation (Hung & Chiu 2003: 210).  
17
 Details see Chapter 3 and appendix of the research samples. 
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1992a:1062-1085, Bian 2002a: 105).  
The younger generation of the Chinese new middle class covers people born in 
the 1970s and those born in the 1980s and later. The first cohort are now in their 
thirties, born in 1970-79 (ages 29-38 in 2008), and occupies 32% of the research 
sample (19 out of N=59) and the second cohorts is in their twenties, born after 
1980s, and occupies 9% of the research sample (i.e. 5 out of N=59). The younger 
generation occupies about 41% of the research sample (i.e. 24 out of N=59)18. Of 
the total 24 sample of the younger generation, 11 are single. These people have 
no significant privation or politically inspired negative experience in their 
childhood and their upbringing is less restrictive than the older generation. They 
entered the workforce at the height of the urban modernization and globalised 
economic growth in the 1990s. Their employment is mostly contractual in nature 
(so covered by the labor contract system implemented in 1986) and based 
substantially on qualifications and performance, both of which in many respects 
symbolized the dismantling of the ‘iron rice bowl’ of employment in state 
enterprises up to then (Hung & Chiu 2003: 224). 
The older generation covers people born in the 1940s and 1950s (the first cohort 
of the older generation) and those born in the 1960s (the second cohort of the 
older generation). As a whole, they are characterised by their pragmatic frame of 
mind in their way of life and utilitarian consumption habits. As we shall see, this 
is in marked contrast to the conspicuous consumerism of the younger 
generations after them (Smart & Smart 2003, Smart & Li 2006). The older 
generation can generally be characterised by their industriousness and diligence  
                                                 
18
 Details see Chapter 3 and appendix 2 of the research samples. 
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in making savings. Typically, they are not well-educated owing to missed or 
denied educational opportunities as a result of the outbreak of the Cultural 
Revolution. Indeed, that political upheaval accounts for the fairly strong 
financial background but analogously weak education of some of this generation 
of the Chinese new middle class. 
Factors encouraging pragmatic consumption 
What is it that causes the older generation to have more down-to-earth attitudes? 
Three major factors identified from our research sample indicate they encourage 
pragmatic and utilitarian consumption in the older new middle class. 
1. One arises from the collective memory of the Cultural Revolution and the 
effects associated with it on the formative years of people. 
2. The other is the lasting merit of traditional Confucian values and mores in 
modern life. 
3. Another is the constant need for self-improvement to uphold personal 
competitiveness in the face of rapidly changing economic and social 
environments, and this self-improvement also covers gearing oneself to 
extending business connections. 
We can understand collective memory as a form of nostalgia that contributes to 
social identity (Chan 2003, Lee 2000, Yang 2003). For the older generation in 
my sample it can be delineated into two major timeblocs and it revolves around 
negative experiences in both. The first timebloc is the Maoist period and the 
Cultural Revolution in the 1960s and 1970s. Here, the negative experiences are 
the poverty in childhood or early adulthood and the disillusionment of missed or 
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denied educational opportunities. The second timebloc is the more liberal 
reformism of the 1980s and 1990s. Here, the negative experiences are those of 
the trials and tribulations of entering into the world of commercial business and 
involvement in ‘extra legal’ activities like smuggling or illegal 
emigration/immigration. 
Collective memories 
‘Collective memory’ refers to people born in the same age cohorts and sharing 
some common historical trajectories in their life history (Yang 2003, Chan 2003). 
A collective memory helps individuals to construct and maintain an identity in 
two ways, by (a) first making links between past experiences and their current 
meanings and (b) then stimulating them to articulate in narratives these links in 
their generational experience to moral critiques of the present (Bruner 1987, 
Josselson & Lieblich 1999). 
In the Chinese context, collective memory contrasts a ‘Past’ viewed as 
containing meanings and purposes against a ‘Present’ dominated by economic 
inequality and instrumental rationality (Yang 2003). For a lot of the older 
Chinese new middle class, the unimaginable tumult and hardships they 
experienced during the Cultural Revolution is the most vivid, most clearly 
remembered past (Chan 2003: 82). The ghost of the Cultural Revolution is their 
signature collective memory, a memory and identity that evolved for them 
through a process of construction and negotiation over the years (Chan 2003: 85). 
Then there is the collective memory of working in state organisations/enterprises, 
and also the experience of transitioning to the private sector and possible 
involvement in ‘smuggling’ (a word that has a broader meaning to the Chinese 
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that covers many ‘extra legal’ activities). 
The first collective memory, nostalgia and identity directly derived from the 
Cultural Revolution. We can see the forces of collective memory at play in the 
older new middle class: they have a certain nostalgia for Maoist times, and it is a 
general social sentiment of theirs (Lee 2000). In that idealised version of Maoist 
China, there was no pain and no worry even while they tell you that the past was 
not one of unequivocal bliss (Lee 2000: 228). Romanticisation of past events and 
childhood privations is sometimes heightened by tragic stories (Lee 2000: 225). 
Although the older new middle class might be nostalgic for Maoist times, nearly 
all of them are negative in their experience and assessment of the regime during 
the Cultural Revolution under Mao Zedong. In the ten years that the Cultural 
Revolution lasted, the party suppressed all ideological dissent and human 
initiative, and various political campaigns caused the wanton destruction of 
capital and manufacturing assets (not to mention cultural and intellectual assets) 
that lead to the eventual near-collapse of the general economy by the mid-1970s. 
It was the Red Guards (hóngwèibīng 红卫兵) who, in the name of ‘struggle’ 
( pīdòu 批斗), set in motion the mayhem that led to much of the misery of those 
times. 
“I still remember the Red Guards forced me to fess up my family 
and my grandfather and grandmother had some connection with 
the Kuomintang and other Kuomintang comrades. I was 
assaulted by events from the past, slipping on the ridge between 
past and future. I was uncertain which way to allow my sweaty 
body to slide. An unimaginable depth lay in on my heart. I 
needed to rename my surname to Lam and again to Sam 
(pseudonym) after the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution.” 
(Uncle Sam, 49, entrepreneur) 
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Many pointed out that everyone was hungry and poor then. If anyone had any 
ability to buy a chicken during the Cultural Revolution, they could not eat it 
because they would have been branded as counter-revolutionaries on suspicion 
of hoarding ‘capitalist’ seeds for the chicken. They yearned for peace and better 
times, but the future looked very bleak then. 
 The Cultural Revolution is not easy on the memory of most people. Uncle Wah 
was about eighteen years old when the Cultural Revolution broke out. He had 
been sent to the countryside to learn from the peasants. He says,  
“We were the intelligentsia at that time even though I was only a 
senior secondary graduate. We wrote many shānghén wénxué (伤
痕文学, trauma literatures) about our harsh childhood. We called 
it yì kǔ sī tián [益苦思甜 ‘trying to come up sweet’] of the trauma 
literature. This so-called yìkǔ sītián is a good healing medicine to 
pacify my emotions. I don’t want to remember the torture of 
memories and my childhood. This is why I needed to work hard 
in the early years of 1980s and seize every chance to behave 
myself to become rich. Life was full of ups and downs. We don’t 
know what happens, right?” (Uncle Wah, 50, professional) 
 
Close relationships are derived from collective consensus and understandings as 
a result of shared lifestyles and consumption practices by reason of being in the 
same age cohorts. Being in the same age cohort means the chances of their 
gathering together are also increased. Sharing memories and experiences causes 
people to have alike habits in lifestyle and consumption that they could share 
with one another. Shared lifestyle and consumption practices help develop and 
reinforce deep and close relationships between those people.  
The second collective memory is nostalgia and identity derived from an 
impoverished childhood. Poverty is the common thread in the nostalgia of the 
older new middle class. Even by the mid-1970s no one in China was particularly 
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rich; everyone was poor. The experience of privations in childhood is a driving 
force in their current values of industriousness, thriftiness and ambition. So 
when members of the older new middle class meet and gather together, they 
reminisce about past experiences of poverty and hardship. 
“My home had fluorescent lamps. We were poor. We always 
went to our neighbours, who had electric lighting, lamps and 
television sets to watch in black and white. I remembered we 
were enthralled by soap-opera serials. If anyone had a bicycle or 
a television set, it was incredible—and made me feel envious 
because of their pride. Even if you had a handkerchief, báixié [白
鞋 white shoes, i.e. plimsolls], a bicycle or a colourful fashion 
item made of di què liáng [的确凉 Dacron], you were considered 
a rich and powerful person in China in the Sixties. The 
commonest torture in my childhood then was 上的下的，左手一
的的，右手一个亲爱的 [shàng-de xià-de, zuǒ-shǒu yī de-de, 
yòu-shǒu yī-gè qīn-ài de]. When we think of our past memories, 
we always mention this conversation. It really made me laugh, 
made me so unforgettable of it, and I’d mention this conversation 
frequently in my gatherings with my friends. This conversation 
made a strong impression on my past experience during my 
childhood. If you had [clothes] made of Dacron, then it was easy 
[for you] to find a good and beautiful wife in the late Sixties.” 
(Uncle Fong, 48, entrepreneur) 
 
Here is how the proverb works (according to the interviewee): 
De (的 of) is an abbreviated, highly colloquialised nickname at the time for 
Dacron (di què liáng 的确凉), the polyester-like fabric material. 
Shàng-de (上的  of the top) means the upper part of the body, which the 
expression alludes to your ability to buy and wear clothes made of Dacron. 
Similarly, xià-de (下的 of the bottom) alludes to wearing Dacron trousers (or 
slacks, since skirts were not worn because of connotations of bourgeoisie 
decadence!). 
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Zuǒ-shǒu yī de-de (左手一的的 literally, left hand [with] one of those) alludes to 
carrying the best things in life in your left hand as well as your ability or 
wherewithal to buy clothes made of Dacron. 
Yòu-shǒu yī-gè qīn-ài de (右手一个亲爱的, [on the] right hand a loved one) 
alludes to the high possibility of getting a good-looking and goodly wife if you 
were one of the lucky few who had Dacron handkerchiefs, Dacron clothes, 
bicycles and radio sets. 
This is often repeated in any get-togethers of the older generation of the new 
middle class, and it always elicits great laughter among them. Their recounting 
of past experiences brings on in them feelings of emotional attachment, deep 
love, unforgettable memories of joy and suffering, melancholy thoughts of 
things past and reminiscences in tears (Yang 2003). 
Emotional traumas do not afflict just the individual, but whole communities or 
even entire nations. Emotional trauma is essentially a social event (Muhlhahn 
2004: 109). When we recount unpleasant things in our past, we bring about 
feelings of warmth and connectedness in others who share more or less the same 
things in their past. When people talk about their past, they have feelings of 
adoration and apotheosis. It is the apotheosis of the self that becomes very 
important as a strategy in maintaining individual identity under conditions of 
rapid change in general society (Yang 2003). This is the meaning of same 
sentiments and same group—zìjǐrén (自己人 ‘one of our own’). 
Recollecting the past creates the same feelings especially in the older new 
middle class. Those cohorts of the Chinese new middle class who have 
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experienced the whole history of the People’s Republic are more able to form 
and sustain close relationships with their peers because of collective experiences. 
Collective memory is the thread that stitches different individuals into a 
cohesive grouping. Such a collective experience of the older new middle class 
can be referred to as the totality of individual memories, articulated in the 
narrative, and contributing to the collective nostalgia of their childhood. Radical 
changes in the cultural terrain of modern-day Chinese life do not threaten or 
even destabilise the identities of these older members of Chinese new middle 
class because the internal anchor is the collective memory. 
The third collective memory is nostalgia and identity derived from working in 
the state-owned enterprises (SOEs). A lot of the older new middle class started 
working at around sixteen years old because of the interruption caused by the 
Cultural Revolution. Many have been unable to go much beyond mid-secondary 
school, much less go on to university. The lack of education and the history of 
childhood privations they experienced encourages many of them to live frugally 
and sensibly. The better-educated older group form the core of the Chinese new 
middle class in terms of forming and contributing to the shared lifestyle and 
consumption patterns of that class. Lack of education, of course, provides an 
in-built exclusionary imperative. A better job equals higher earnings and better 
career advancement, both of which together equalled higher status in the social 
hierarchy of Maoist China up to the Cultural Revolution. 
People of the older new middle class who had higher education in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s were the elites of society at the time. They were allocated to 
work in the state sector, usually in the larger, better-paying state enterprises in 
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low-level positions such as clerks or even non-skilled workers. Many stayed 
with these enterprises upwards of ten years. By dint of long employment, quite a 
few have risen through the ranks and into management. A few become highly 
influential bureaucrats. Working in the state-owned enterprises built up work 
experience and sometimes provided opportunities to gain technical knowledge. 
Both in turn opened up vistas to accumulate economic assets following the 
market reforms, which in turn allows for the development of certain lifestyles 
that could be shared with others who have gone through roughly the same 
pathways. 
As these people worked their way up to the top, many extended their networks 
into the private sector and professional bodies in the reform years. In other 
words, the possession of a component of cultural capital (i.e. educational 
credentials) guarantees employment in the state sector in the old days though 
they graduated from senior high school. Higher education allowed former cadres 
in state organisations/enterprises to shift career paths from the public to the 
private sector. 
Most of the older generation experienced a harsh past but a sweeter present. It 
can be very painful indeed to become impoverished again after having lived in 
better times. A big unknown is whether China will be in social or political 
turmoil again. The future of course is never sure. To be sure, the experience of a 
bitter past moves these people to save up for contingencies and for their children. 
Even the rich are prudent with their money and in spending. 
The fourth collective memory is nostalgia and identity derived from the 
transitioning to the private sector for the older generations.  The road to success 
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in the business world can be a tortuous one and fraught with pitfalls. The 
Chinese new middle class as a whole is the most successful among all sections of 
the Chinese populace in adapting to the improved commercial climate 
[especially in Guangdong] since the 1980s. Adapting to new conditions and 
making favourable use of the winds of change happening in the general and 
provincial economies shows a high ability to achieve successful outcomes—or 
at least avoid unsuccessful ones. The older new middle class has the ability to 
make practical adjustments to achieve reasonably successful outcomes within 
the framework of ambiguous/incomplete institutional policies at the same time 
that changes take place in the investable part of the economy. 
Soon after the economic reforms and market mechanism started to take hold by 
the early 1980s, Guangdong was the first province to take off economically and 
the investment climate there became more and more attractive. Entrepreneurs 
who emerged in Chinese society because of the economic reforms are widely 
regarded as opportunists whose business acumen and astute insights helped 
them to adapt to the new and favourable investment environment in Guangdong 
in a pragmatic way (Heberer 2007). Some of the older generations started out as 
small, self-employed shopkeepers who ran small street businesses like grocery 
stores. Others had been street vendors because they could not afford to pay rent 
for their businesses. All in all, these people mostly sold perishable or 
non-durable commodities such as groceries or garments—anything considered 
to be daily necessities for the majority of people. Uncle Fong ran a meat shop 
because his father, uncle and aunt were butchers in the 1980s. He wisely adapted 
to the favourable investment climate in Guangdong. He says,  
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“In 1980s, I took in food tickets and sold them away at higher 
prices. I made profits from these transactions. I remembered that 
I could earn twenty or even RMB thirty yuan (£2) a day. These 
lucrative profits inspired me and helped support me in building 
my larger house in the early ’80s. But you have to try many times 
to succeed, though. Life was hard at the time. I was in debt with 
my parent, family members, relatives and friends. I still 
remember clearly how hard those times had been.” (Uncle Fong, 
48, entrepreneur) 
 
Ration coupons (liáng piào 粮票) were a feature of urban life in Maoist times. 
Liàng piào were issued to people by their work units or workplaces because even 
people with money in those days were unable to buy food or other necessities 
without coupons. Rural domiciliaries had no need for ration coupons since they 
were self-sufficient in provisions. Today, many of the older new middle class 
have become quite rich, but the memories of hard times stay with them and very 
much shape the way they do business now. 
The fifth collective memory of nostalgia and identity derived from extra legal 
activities (smuggling) and being a stowaway. In Maoist times, some topics were 
taboo or plainly too dangerous for any discourse even behind closed doors 
between likeminded people. Once-taboo topics, such as about smuggling (zǒusī 
走私) or stowaway (tōudù 偷渡)19, can now be discussed fairly openly. These 
two practices were very prevalent in China during the 1980s and 1990s. 
The reason for the relatively greater openness in discussing these taboo topics 
lies in the way some people have come to fortune during the reform years: 
                                                 
19
 ‘Smuggling’ (zǒusī 走私) has a somewhat wider meaning in Chinese. Normally speaking, 
Smuggling has negative meaning in Chinese. The Chinese meaning can cover illegal stowaway 
(tōudù 偷渡). In addition, the legal meaning of smuggling is ‘the offence of importing or 
exporting specified goods that are subject to customs or excise duties without having paid the 
requisite duties’ (Oxford Dictionary of Law, 4th edition, 1997: 434). But the normal English 
meaning is to bring into or take out of the country secretly under illegal conditions. Details see 
glossaries.  
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collusion with corrupt officials ‘in the restraint of trade’ (the World Trade 
Organisation euphemism for market cornering) or conducting illegal or illicit 
manoeuvres in times of market chaos. 
The moment that any one of these taboo activities are made known to others 
during a gathering, many will describe having ‘warm feelings’ and mutual 
understanding with their friends and associates. 
“When I was a worker in a collectively owned corporation, the 
workload in this factory was heavy and the working hours long, 
from 8 am to 10 pm. I couldn’t stand the long hours. In the late 
Seventies, I stowed away to Hong Kong five times in a row. The 
police never caught me the first four times. But the fifth time, I 
got caught by the police in Shataukok [沙头角 the cross-border 
town on the Hong Kong side]. The untidy and unpleasant prison 
made me scared, shocked and in disbelief. I never forgot this 
experience.” (Uncle Moss, 48, entrepreneur) 
 
China was rife with smuggling in the late 1970s right through to the early 1990s. 
It was also very lucrative, but also risky, as Uncle Moss’s experience of arrest 
indicates. It was also an activity that could only be undertaken for a short time. 
However, those of the new middle class who got involved in this line of business 
sometimes recalled that part of their lives with great sentimental nostalgia. 
“I’d wanted to fulfil my dream of making money in 1980. So I 
stowed away five times to Hong Kong. Unfortunately, my dream 
of making money failed in Hong Kong. There was a huge mix of 
goods like sunglasses, trousers, jeans, blouses, T-shirts, digital 
watches and different types of foodstuffs. These goods were very 
cheap and even we could afford to buy them. Although our 
business was small-scale, we were profitable and mercenary. I 
could make RMB¥40 [£4] a day and this income was high when 
compared with working in the collectives, which paid only 
RMB¥60 [£5] a month in the late Seventies [author’s emphasis]. 
By returning back home, we were singing, too. I remembered we 
were happy doing this business.” (Uncle Chris, 49, 
entrepreneur) 
 
Although smuggling and stowaway to Hong Kong had always been illegal in 
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China, the Police Bureau on the Chinese side paid little attention to stopping 
them. In fact the (then) Royal Hong Kong Police Force and the British garrison 
did much of the crime fighting during most the 1970s and early 1980s. 
Smuggling and stowaway (which by the 1980s took the form of smuggling 
illegal immigrants into Hong Kong) turned out to be short-lived lines of making 
money since the Chinese authorities began to tighten up border policing after 
1982. 
A collective memory among ex-smugglers and ex-stowaways provides some 
sort of lubricant for them to seek partners in more conventional, more legal lines 
of business and in guānxi networks with people with similar collective 
sentiments and shared understandings. As the business climate throughout the 
country became more positive towards the late 1980s and 1990s, their 
involvement in mainstream business helped their rise and success in Guangdong 
province. 
Smuggling continues even to this day. Those who are still involved in it have 
close, inside connections with the government in order to carry out those 
activities. It may partly account for the widespread corruption among cadres in 
Guangdong in the 1990s. 
“I got the help [from some officers]. They seem have close 
connections with the district offices in Guangdong. Their helps 
make my smuggling business smoother and more lucrative in the 
post-reform era [author’s emphasis].” (Uncle Ho, 49, 
entrepreneur) 
 
A common acquaintance acts as a connecting thread to infuse a common identity 
in two persons and draws them within a single circle of ‘insideness’ (Wank 1999: 
164) within the new middle class circle. In the broader sense, the new middle 
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class may gather together by the same accent, speaking the same tongue20, 
kinship ties, blood relationships and even the same surname. The past shared 
experience provides the lubricant for the older generation to form a class 
boundary and membership because they have similar topics and discourses to 
share. The same group can still be formed only subtle and even minuscule 
cultural understanding (such as tastes and understandings). All of these things 
are elements of culture and these refer to the sociocultural practices of the 
everyday life of the new middle class. 
Confucian values, self-improvement, class boundary and admission  
There are other reasons to explain why some of the older generations are quite 
frugal in their consumption patterns. Confucian values are one of the factors. 
Given that most of the older new middle class had impoverished childhoods, the 
majority of that older generation [30 out of 35] is very practical in personality so 
as to achieve their present success. They are very practical in their consumption. 
The general state of mind of the older new middle class seems to be ‘income of 
the new middle class, consumption of the common people.’ Confucian values 
exist in the minds of many older generations. This explains why they prefer 
frugal lifestyles. Quintessential Confucian values such as sincerity, integrity, 
compassion and righteousness are still preserved in the minds of the older 
generation. Confucian values have a way of working into the 
pragmatic/utilitarian approaches and handiwork of the older new middle class in 
their private and business lives. It is not unusual for some of them making 
RMB¥100,000 (US$14,631 or £10,004) a month to bargain with shopkeepers by 
                                                 
20
 That may variously be Standard Cantonese vs. any other kind of Cantonese, or Cantonese vs. 
the dialects of other provinces or regions, or Cantonese vs. Putonghua or even Putonghua spoken 
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the roadside or keep leftovers from a meal for the next. 
“I won’t buy any famous brands even if I’m more than able to 
afford them. I’ll pick up my leftovers when I dine out. It doesn’t 
mean I’m mean, but it’s the Confucian value I’m used to. I don’t 
want to waste anything. Most of my friends are very conservative 
in consumption. We’ll buy whatever we need, but we’re not 
buying for pleasure though we have money.” (Aunt Monica, 60, 
cadre) 
  
Industriousness and thrift brought riches to the older new middle class, so 
restraint in consumption is something of a self-declaration of their practicality in 
life. They generally lead a life of relative simplicity and thrift. They have no 
overriding desire to buy branded merchandise, at least not for themselves. In fact, 
they can be inveterate bargain hunters. Their general lifestyle is basically ‘waste 
not, want not’—down-to-earth in taste, pragmatic and utilitarian in direction. 
Even the more affluent members employ no chauffeurs. On business trips, they 
travel not in first class but in economy. 
However they feel the need to upgrade themselves to have more marketable 
skills. The more contact with the ‘outside world,’ the greater will be the social 
impacts brought to the older generations. A number of ideological beliefs and 
values normally associated with modernisation are making inroads into the 
picture of present-day life in China, such as initiative, competition and the 
pursuit of excellence. They are keen on overall change coming from economic 
progress and globalisation. The consensus of opinion from them is that it is 
impossible for China to keep the national economy running at a growth rate of 
10% year after year. The idea that everyone everywhere is blessed with limitless 
opportunities and longlasting materialism is less and less realistic as time goes 
                                                                                                                                 
in Guangdong vs. Putonghua spoken in other regions. 
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by. Even financially secure members of the second generation of the Chinese 
new middle class now find it necessary to learn to be adaptable when they face 
the challenges of cultural pluralism that is integral to economic progress and 
globalisation. 
“I studied a part-time MBA at a local university even though I 
already have a local degree. If I want to get promoted and not get 
fired, I’d need to upgrade myself and pursue a higher degree. 
Even though social networking is still very important in 
government bureau, we face a threat from newly recruited young 
university graduates. They’re very assertive and efficient, and 
relatively low paid. This poses a great threat to me. Even though 
I’ve worked in our department for more than fifteen years, I still 
face this threat.....” (Uncle Leung, 48, cadre) 
 
Those who have suffered in some way from structural transformations in the 
economy no longer believe that work skills are the only survival tools to cope 
with the future (Lui 2004: 48). Consequently, these people are much more ready 
and willing to upgrade their education to avoid being marginalised in society 
than others are. You cannot manage future challenges if you are outdated or even 
phased out because of obsolete skills and social networks. 
Uncle Fong, the rich and successful entrepreneur, relays his worries about the 
era of globalisation: 
“I don’t want to look back. If you are rich and enjoy life now, you 
don’t want to go back to the economic bitterness and hardships 
[of before]. I bought detached houses, apartments, commercial 
buildings and shops for sale because I only got the senior high 
school and society has changed dramatically [over the years]. 
You don’t know what will happen tomorrow. I don’t consume 
conspicuously, but will consume famous brands [in the presence 
of] my business partners. You cannot cope with future challenges 
if you are outdated or you don’t have marketable skills.’’ (Uncle 
Fong, 48, entrepreneur) 
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Uncle Fong’s remarks above illustrate why the older new middle class is so 
pragmatic and utilitarian in lifestyle and consumption, especially those who 
don’t have higher educational credentials. These people tend always to take a 
backseat instead of a frontline stance in taking a stand for their causes. They feel 
highly anxious that their educational credentials are not high enough. They fear 
they may be phased out because of obsolete skills and social networks in a 
rapidly globalising world. In a way, they are a somewhat calculating lot, always 
taking a cautiously watchful attitude to things, and are often willing to wait until 
conditions are almost completely right before acting (Lui 2004: 136). 
Social class boundaries are defined by (a) the associations between individuals 
or families, (b) the nature and extent of those associations over time, and (c) the 
particular class positions of those associations (Scott 1994: 934). Based on 
Scott’s (1994) indications, it is not hard to see why it is quite easy for the older 
new middle class to communicate, cooperate and share in social and business 
affairs. Shared lifestyle characteristics, similar consumption patterns and 
comparable tastes help the older new middle class demarcate the parameters of 
its membership. People who classify themselves as members of the new middle 
class will regard other similar individuals as zìjǐrén (‘one of our own’)—an 
insider categorisation. Those who do not (yet) possess this kind of lifestyle or 
consumption stay outside of that class boundary. 
Major features of consumption of the older generations 
Our interviewees who belong to the older generations are on average in their 
mid-forties today. They are generally regarded as industrious in work and 
diligent in saving money. Their fairly strong final standing in fact owes a great 
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deal to their experience of political upheavals in the past. Their shared set of 
collective memories from childhood makes the older generations advocates for 
practicality in all matters of life. They practise what they preach and lead 
relatively simple lives and buy down-to-earth, reasonably priced goods that last. 
Cadres and entrepreneurs show similar lifestyles since they are more frugal than 
the professionals.  
The older generation of Chinese new middle class tends to take part in 
entertainment activities as a group, especially with those whose backgrounds or 
lifestyles are similar to their own. They have more or less the same sociocultural 
factors like shared consumption patterns and lifestyles to enter the new middle 
class circle. Entertainment activities are not serving for the purpose of 
entertainment as such, but it is a good way to seek more business partners and 
with their former workmates in state enterprises and village mates.   
Entertainment activities 
 Entertainment activities can reveal much about the lifestyles, consumerism and 
attitudes of people. Karaoke lounges, bars, nightclubs, massage parlours and 
lychee orchards are major venues for the older generation to gather together and 
relax with friends or business associates. Other activities include playing chess 
or mahjong, having dimsum meals or Chinese banquets and other different 
social gatherings. 
“Owing to the nature of my job, I have to go to karaoke lounges 
and nightclubs frequently. If professionals and entrepreneurs 
regard you as powerful enough and you can help them, they will 
frequently seek help from you. Many entrepreneurs and 
professionals are trying excessively to please me and that I give 
them favours when they register their ‘special businesses.’ I 
always attend their meetings and they give me favours, gifts and 
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banquets. This is not the secret but the common practice here 
[Guangdong]. Going to karaokes becomes part of my job and is 
also my leisure activity.” (Uncle Fang, 49, cadre) 
 
The karaoke lounge is a major venue in the entertainment activities of the older 
new middle class. Gatherings at karaoke are not simply for singsongs: singing 
and eating provide only symbolic meanings. In fact, going to karaoke is a group 
activity for them to share and reminisce, and sometimes to discuss business. 
Participants are enjoined and bonded together by shared personal histories and 
they communicate with one another within that framework. The karaoke is the 
main forum of social practices in the lifestyle of the older generation. 
The massage parlour is another common venue. These establishments have 
grown in number and popularity in Guangdong since 1997. They are fairly 
affordable establishments and a typical four-hour session at an average massage 
parlour costs around RMB¥100 (US$15 or £10). Many are fitted with private 
rooms, large meeting rooms or clubhouses, licensed bar, indoor swimming pool, 
gymnasium or even squash courts. The massage parlour provides enhanced 
privacy to discuss business. 
Older members of the new middle class tend to have more staid pastimes. 
Playing a couple of rounds of chess or mahjong with friends and acquaintances 
is a form of ‘appreciation’ of (that is, getting a ‘handle’ on) the other side in 
doing business. Mahjong is in the blood of all Chinese people and is a great way 
to enhance sentiments and connectedness with friends and businesspeople alike. 
Other older members are simply content with visiting flower gardens or lychee 
orchards or just going to hotels for entertainment activities. Indeed, some of 
these people tend to live near these places and invite a fairly close circle of 
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acquaintances to join them for visits. The invitees, of course, pay liǎn (脸 ‘face’) 
to the inviter and oblige attendance. China now is such a face country and it is an 
important way to survive. 
“I invite business partners and buddies to go to my lychee to have 
gathering. They usually will come since they trust me. They give 
face to me though they are very busy. Gathering all my buddies in 
lychee orchard is a good way to meet more business partners and 
extend some networks. My friends usually bring their friends and 
we can establish network to do business. ” (Uncle Hui, 60, 
cadre) 
 
“Face party is a must item to do business here. This is social 
capital since we meet different potential business customers with 
some reputable introducer. If some influential entrepreneurs or 
someone who has close relationship with government, I must 
attend.” (Uncle Fang, 49, cadre) 
 
I was cordially invited to go to this lychee orchard with Uncle Wong in 2008. 
Thirty to forty dishes were served to the guests at lychee orchard. The dinner 
offered a great variety of dishes, as many as you could ask for, vegetables, fish, 
meat, sea food, desserts, rice, noodles, congee, soup, fruits and beverages, which 
were all served in a way of Chinese buffet. The Chinese new middle class talked 
about precious jewels, for example, diamond, jade, gold and silver accessories. 
What were the best gifts sent to cadres? The items are luxury cars like 
Mercedes-Benz, houses, shares, funds and land investment. They also 
considered other business opportunities21 arising from the World Expo to be 
held in Shanghai in 2010. This manifested their middle class lifestyles. I found 
that I hardly joined their conversations.  
 
                                                 
21
 I interviewed those Chinese new middle class in 2008. All the ages of the Chinese new middle 
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It is observed there are symbolic meanings of lychee orchards to the older 
generations. Lychee orchard serves as a source of arts for the older generation to 
meet in this special location. Lychee orchard is a commercial business but it 
does not serve only as a commodity for the older generation. It serves as a 
holiday resort to have tea, reunion, gathering with their potential friends who 
later may become business partners. The lychee orchard is a classic symbol of 
refinement and statement of civilization, but it also serves as a kind of symbol of 
the Chinese new middle class.  
In terms of business engagements, the older generation look on entertainment 
activities with a certain degree of pragmatism, even if they sometimes do not 
relish attending such functions. They know entertaining for business help, 
extend opportunities or serves customers. They are also useful gateways for 
building careers or political capital or for extending social networks generally. 
The tactical objectives are risk minimisation, transaction cost reduction, supply 
assurance and cost control of time and money spent in gathering information. To 
entertain people is also to show personality. Personality is very important to the 
older generation in business. It is not too surprising to find the older new middle 
class often entertain or are entertained in nightclub banquets until the small 
hours of the night. In business, perceptions of trustworthiness are always 
significant versus that of competitors (Wank 1999: 275). 
Tobacco and liquor 
Smoking and the passing around of cigarettes among smokers has become a kind 
                                                                                                                                 
class based on the year of 2008. In 2008, the older generations sorted out any opportunities 
arising from the World Expo to be held in Shanghai in 2010. 
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of ritual among Chinese businesspeople. Since many of the older generations 
share common tastes in lifestyle and consumption, people are probably going to 
‘use’ smoking and drink to seek mutual collaboration within the middle class 
boundary. The older generations say that this is a courtesy and an opener for 
socialising with different kinds of people if you know the ways to smoke and 
drink. In China, handing out cigarettes to greet friends is like shaking hands or 
giving a hug to people. Mutual collaboration helps improve sentiments, 
cohesion and trustworthiness when doing business. 
“Every Tuesday, my friends and I have to go to the Lucky 
Restaurant to have our dinners. We always go to the appointed 
restaurant, The Lucky Restaurant, every Tuesday at seven 
o’clock. We share experience and topics of our childhood. Also, 
this gathering is a way to express my feeling, like unhappiness 
and frustrations in the family or in business. No matter how busy 
I am, I have to attend our gatherings and definitely won’t miss 
any one of them.” (Uncle Chung, 56, entrepreneur) 
 
Indeed, business partners are often entertained with the accompaniment of 
ex-schoolmates and other close friends of the participants. The older new middle 
class love to see ex-classmates any chance they can get, and gatherings are 
precious moments to catch up and gossip without [an overt] pressure of using 
those gatherings to make money. When former cadres went into business in the 
early 1990s, many of their ex-classmates, villagers and comrades who worked 
with them in various state entities become business partners. At these gatherings 
of the older new middle classes, the same discourses are shared between the 
participants, lubricated by drinks and stoked by cigarettes of popular brands like 
Xiaohutuxin (小葫涂仙), Wuliangye (五粮液)22 and Hongtashan (红塔山)23.  
                                                 
22
 Wuliangye 五粮液 (‘The Five Nights’) and Xiaohutuxin 小葫涂仙 (‘Fairy of the Little Lake’) 
are top-selling brands of alcohol in China. Xiaohutuxin in particular is a favourite among the 
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The older generation has no particular reason for mentioning those brands of 
drinks and cigarettes other than the fact that whenever the brands are mentioned 
they tend to evoke certain common feelings among participants. In gatherings, 
drinking and smoking the same brands are used for enhancing credentials and 
perceptions of trustworthiness. People would willingly spend RMB¥1,000 
(US$146 or £99) on a bottle of Remy Martel X.O. cognac and a further 
RMB¥1,500 (US$219 or £149) on a karaoke or bowling gathering. The older 
new middle class often sees this kind of high spending as ‘assets’ crucial in the 
world of commerce. 
Sharing the same brand of consumables in social gatherings goes to help lighten 
the load of possible friction in business and ameliorate the search for a mutually 
equitable resolution. In other words, if you are willing to spend serious money 
on drinks, you are in effect sending a message to the other side that you are 
prepared to bend over backwards to please them because you are honourable and 
upstanding (Davis 2000: 275). 
These gatherings contribute to the enhancement of same-class sentiments, and 
                                                                                                                                 
older new middle class in Guangdong. The name Xiaohutuxin apparently means something 
along the lines of ‘to soothe annoyance and anxiety,’ so to serve this brand at gatherings is to 
suggest that annoyance or disappointment would become lessened. Details see glossaries.  
 
23
 Hongtashan (红塔山 ‘Red Pagoda Mountain’) is a domestic brand of cigarettes from the 
southwestern part of Yunnan and highly popular in Guangdong. Most domestic cigarettes come 
in soft packs but Hongtaishan comes in crushproof packets and costs around RMB¥15 (US$2 or 
£1.3) a packet, much more than the price of foreign brands. In fact, Hongtaishan is considered 
the archetypal brand-name cigarette in Guangdong. Also popular are imported and 
foreign-branded cigarettes. Back in the 1990s, Good Companion 良友(Liang You),a Hong 
Kong-made premium brand made from blended American tobacco and priced around RMB¥5 
(less than £1) a packet, was popular with entrepreneurs. Today, the most popular foreign brands 
are the so-called lǎopáizì  (老牌子 ‘the old brands’): Kent, followed by Winston, Marlboro and 
other brands such as 555 (Davis 2000: 275). The 555 in particular evoke images of ‘old money’ 
business family heritage within the Guangdong business community and connote an aura of 
good breeding, reliability and professionalism. The average price of foreign cigarettes is 
RMB¥12 (£1) a packet. The state heavily regulates and taxes cigarette imports. Details see 
glossaries.  
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provide a capillary effect to lubricate business later. In short, these gatherings 
provide a peaceful and harmonious atmosphere to discuss business. Shared 
practices suggest an undercurrent of shared sentiments and worldviews in the 
older generation of professionals, entrepreneurs and cadres. 
“In our meetings in karaoke lounges, bars and nightclubs, you 
give me a cigarette, I give you a cigarette of the same brand. No 
one really thinks it’s important, but it creates sentiment [ gǎnqíng
感情] [between us] and it becomes easier to discuss things.” 
(Uncle Yuen, 56, entrepreneur) 
 
Shared sentiments and worldviews suggest solidarity with likeminded 
individuals or a willingness to be in cohesion with them. Solidarity or 
willingness to pull together in turn reinforces a sense of togetherness in the same 
group. 
The older generation have experienced the same historical development of 
China. Some have roughly the same collective memory of their upbringing. 
Drinking and smoking the same stuff during entertainment activities paints a 
picture of mutual goodwill and respect for the worldview of each other. Cadres 
have influential roles in today’s China. The reason for seeing entertainment 
activities as a power-building exercise is that twenty years of economic reforms 
have given cadres a larger and wider range of authority, particularly in the 
regulatory structure over business licensing and taxation (more details in 
Chapter 6). The first benefit of a close relationship is the ability to discuss 
problems more frankly. The second benefit is to act as a framework to let 
nostalgic feelings surface and to reinforce any sense of solidarity among parties 
to the relationship. 
The general measures of justice and regulatory oversight in China continue to be 
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haphazardly administrated, with sizeable pockets of inertia or corruption, or 
both. Close personal ties developed in this or any other way a long way to help 
reduce the hazards of administrative or legal harassment that can occur from 
confrontations with some regulatory agencies. 
Shared consumption patterns in smoking and drinking habits produce a set of 
common activities and practices. Commonality of practices supports perceptions 
of sociability. Sociability is valuable in the cold, hard-headed world of business. 
Sociability serves as the warmth of connectedness and increases understandings 
and harmonies, thereby promoting collaborative strategies in business for the 
older new middle class. 
Some administratively mediated commodities could only be had even within 
officially recognised channels through having good relationships with officials. 
They therefore try to build warm human relationships with powerful or 
knowledgeable people in or around the administrative apparatus. The continued 
haphazardness of the overall administrative structure but the increase in the 
authority of cadres means that economic survival is in many ways conditional on 
having the right kind of ‘business intelligence’ network, as it were. By doing 
apparently commonplace things as smoking the same cigarettes and drinking the 
same brands together, the older new middle class is making use of these 
practices ‘to condition’ others into developing close relationships that could be 
used for economic objectives. 
The cultural politics of food and eating 
Chinese cuisine is one of the best in the world, and eating out offers an ideal 
condition for transforming informal socialising into active economic or political 
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networking. The cultural politics of food and eating of the older generation can 
be regarded as pragmatic and utilitarian. Around half of the entrepreneurs [20 
out of 31] and cadres of the older generations in this study say they prefer to dine 
out for business. Their choice of venue would be upmarket restaurants, hotels 
and coffeehouses because those types of establishments tend to meet the 
practical needs of business transactions. The majority of the professionals [8 out 
of 17] say they prefer to dine out at some western fast-food shops like 
McDonalds, Starbucks, Pacific Coffee or other western cafes. Going to the 
western venues shows the new adaptation of the older generation of Chinese 
new middle class in a highly globalizing world (Held & McGrew 2002, 2003). 
This shows that the older generation try to adapt new techniques to do business 
in a highly globalising world.  
The pragmatic food consumption patterns of the older generations have several 
essential aspects. The general rule is, the more important the occasion, or if it is 
business-related, the more expensively they eat. They will patronise more 
moderately priced and decorated establishments when dining out with relatives, 
friends or neighbours. At any other time, it is dinner at home. In other words, the 
older new middle class dines according to the objective situation. 
Normally, food consumption for the older new middle class is a no-frills affair. 
“I don’t always go to very luxurious restaurants, which I regard 
as [rather] gratuitous, but only when it’s necessary for my job. It 
is an inevitable part of my life to dine with my clients. I like to go 
to elegant rather than luxury restaurants. My character is like 
many Cantonese people, that is, being practical.” (Uncle Chan, 
60, professional and cadre) 
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Another interviewee mirrors the same idea: 
 
“A business dinner party would double as a social engagement, 
and typically costs RMB¥7,000 (US$1,025 or £708) or RMB 
¥8,000 (US$1,171 or £809) each time. I don’t mean to show off. I 
don’t have a sense of superiority. I prefer to spend money on 
buying houses or cars. If I gambled away RMB¥10,000 
[US$1,463 or £999] on football games, I’d forget about this the 
next day. This is the common answer for many [people of] the 
Chinese new middle class.” (Uncle Fong, 48, entrepreneur)  
 
The older generations are more accustomed to have lunch or dinner in fast-food 
shops or restaurants if they have no business appointments. Food and eating 
patterns are rather plain and simple whether dining out or at home. Food-related 
social attitudes and behaviour are becoming quite obvious in China now. The 
older generation of the Chinese new middle class seems to also like to patronise 
restaurants, fast-food shops and other places and settings that are popular in a 
globalising China.  
In addition, the preference for buying food in large-scale street markets (but not 
supermarkets) is widespread among the older new middle class. They consider 
foods in street markets fresher, with a variety of choice and much cheaper than in 
supermarkets.  
Dining out in upscale Chinese restaurants is also widespread among them. 
“If I have no meetings with clients, I’ll stay home for lunch and 
dinner. I don’t really care what the aesthetic culture of foods is 
and eat in a luxurious way. For example, there’s no need for me to 
eat luxury foods like oysters, shrimps and [other] seafood every 
day. I’m not concerned about what to eat and how to eat it, but eat 
according to my own tastes. If you’ve spent your childhood in 
poverty, you couldn’t even identify what different tastes like 
sweet, bitter, sour or salty are. So you won’t insist on what to eat 
and how to eat. In my own situation, I think even vegetables and 
rice will make a very good meal.” (Uncle Victor, 50, 
entrepreneur) 
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The older generation are being flexible and pragmatic, and consumption for 
them is more to nurture cordiality and trust-building. Situations like doing 
business require rapport between the parties. The older generation knows it is 
important to draw upon and also show their internal reservoir of personal 
credibility. Credibility comes from judicious disclosure of personal biographies, 
recollections and worldviews, preferably in a socially acceptable setting. 
Exchange of gifts solidifies that credibility. In other words, they must engage in 
frank and cordial conversations with their business collaborators to help induce 
the ‘appropriate’ emotional response suitable for business. Trustworthiness, 
friendliness and friendship for the older new middle class are made to work for 
business, not just in business. Therefore, eating out (and its attendant gift-giving) 
is the socially acceptable setting to oil the wheels of commerce and set the stage 
for making money. 
Many anthropologists like Levi-Straus and Mary Douglas (Douglas & 
Isherwood 1996, Watson & Caldwell 2005) have tried to link food (and eating) 
with other dimensions of a given culture. Mary Douglas (ibid.) tried to decipher 
the social codes contained in meals and analyse different metaphors of food. 
However, there is no concrete food stratification to be found just simply by 
looking at the restaurants and fast-food shops that the Chinese new middle class 
go for. There is no clear pattern of food stratification but to blur social 
boundaries. In Guangdong at least, food consumption patterns among the older 
new middle class do not appear to be particularly extravagant or luxurious. They 
prefer to buy durable goods instead of consuming extravagantly and luxuriously.  
In terms of food, the older generation of professionals show some differences 
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from their counterparts of entrepreneurs and cadres. They dine out at some 
Western buffets or go to Starbucks or McDonald’s but then nearly always for the 
purpose of doing business. They will also go to some cheap restaurants. The 
professionals of the older generation as a whole are not Epicurean devotees of 
sensory pleasure when it comes to food consumption (Jussaume 2001, Ritzer 
2001). They don’t have particular patterns for meals. But they do quite highly 
emphasise the importance of hygiene and nutrition. 
The professionals of the older generations select food more for nutrition and 
fitness than for mere sustenance (Watson 2007) or even narcissism. Even so, 
they would almost never eat in food stalls, only in visibly sanitary and 
air-conditioned restaurants. Interior décor is as important to them as the food 
itself, for surroundings can make you healthy or ill. For them, hygiene and 
nutritional value supersede low prices. 
Consumption in fashion 
Most people of Guangdong (the older generations of the new middle class 
included) are not particularly mindful of how they dress relative to the rest of 
China. This is partly because Cantonese culture towards fashion is markedly 
different from that of Shanghai, Nanjing or places up north24.  
The Northern Chinese sometimes remind us of the French: it is not uncommon to 
see them dressed to the gills as they shop for groceries in supermarkets or even 
communal street markets (‘wet markets’). Down south in Guangdong, the order 
                                                 
24
 People of Shanghai, Nanjing and Hangzhou are far more fashion conscious than are the 
Cantonese, and they place quite a bit of cachet on what to wear and how to wear it for different 
occasions. Indeed, they are relatively sophisticated dressers and are much appealed by clothes 
that are branded and of good construction using quality materials. 
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of the day for most people is just T-shirt and jeans. Perhaps the subtropical 
climate is a factor. Even so, the Cantonese new middle class will still dress up for 
important occasions, and in ways that play up status and identity. Therefore, we 
can surmise that the pattern of fashion consumption in a place like Guangdong is 
essentially pragmatic and utilitarian. As a matter of habit and preference, the 
older generations generally wear high-quality, branded casual wear such as 
Adidas, Nike and Puma. They also prefer to buy from department stores and 
only very reluctantly from street stalls, where the quality could be dirt-cheap but 
decidedly not cheerful. 
But appearances can be deceiving. The Cantonese mind is not wild about clothes 
and is mostly preoccupied with food and diets, so many of the new middle class 
in Guangdong have no qualms about being shod in shorts and flipflops. (Only an 
observer unversed in the ways of the Cantonese would take them for factory or 
migrant workers.) 
Uncle Ho, a handbag manufacturer and retailer in Guangdong, offers some 
reasons for the casualness: 
“When I was starting my own business, I was extremely 
emphatic about what to wear and how to wear my clothes. I’d 
often buy brand-named clothes like suits and leatherware. But 
now I don’t wear suits or buy brand-named clothes other than 
durable [i.e. longer-lasting] items. If I dress elegantly, it’ll be 
suddenly awful, and that makes me feel uncomfortable—just like 
monster in the street. At present, I like causal and sensible clothes. 
I like to wear shorts, T-shirts and sandals, and that makes me feel 
relaxed and comfortable. For other durable products like watches, 
mobile phones, wallets, fountain pens, suitcase and leather shoes, 
I tend to buy brand-named ones.” (Uncle Ho, 49, entrepreneur) 
 
We see from our research sample that the trend among the older new middle 
class is to dress casually. Their style is simple, comfortable and wearable—a 
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distinctive ‘taste’ for them. But they will dress more formally for business 
functions or important occasions like weddings, for which they are more likely 
buy or use brand-named merchandise. 
“I dress very causally, like T-shirts and jeans. Occasionally when 
I meet clients, I’ll wear suits. Actually, I hardly ever wear suits. 
I’ll buy brand-named products for leather shoes, leatherware and 
fountain pens. I’ll consume these products no matter how 
expensive they are. I think, no matter how expensive the products 
are, I’ll consume according to my needs, but not the prices.” 
(Uncle Chris, 49, entrepreneur) 
 
It is quite common for the older new middle class to have friends going or living 
abroad buy brand-named products for them. These products are mostly for the 
purpose of gift-giving and tend to be mobile phones, timepieces and jewellery. 
The usual places are Hong Kong, Japan and South Korea. Uncle Kwok, 
entrepreneur, says,  
“I only buy durable products and the expensive items without 
bothering to know whether they are brand-named products or not. 
There are not too many varieties for men. I do crazy shopping 
once per year. I usually consume shopping around Lunar Chinese 
New Year. I usually go to some large western chain stores to buy 
T-shirt like Nike, Addidas, Puma and Li Ning (李宁, the big 
name of gymnastics in China. His name became the brand-named 
for some athletic products in China. Li Ning is also a listed 
company). I buy shirts from some large-scaled shopping mall 
which import from overseas. These products are durable and can 
keep wear for almost 10 years.” (Uncle Kwok, 40, 
entrepreneur)  
 
Uncle Lee agrees with Uncle Kwok. He says, 
“I will buy suits from Gucci, Empori Armani, Versace because 
they are more durable and can wear more than 10 years. It doesn’t 
mean that I am longing for brand-name, but the qualities of the 
local brands are too bad and it damages easily.” (Uncle Lee, 40, 
entrepreneur) 
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Fashion consumption shows different practices in the older generation between 
men and women. Take Aunt Jennifer for example. She is a cadre and is rather 
fond of shopping. Aunt Jennifer won’t buy any durable products in China, but 
she consumes durable and brand-named products in Hong Kong and in Europe. 
She travels twice a month to Hong Kong just for that: 
“I always visit Hong Kong [travel and meal allowances from her 
SOE] whenever I travel. I think Hong Kong is a shopping 
paradise where I could always buy the most wonderful and 
beautiful fashion and other products. The most exciting thing I 
buy is jewellery. Each time I spend RMB¥50,000 [US$7,322 
£5,058] on various jewels like diamonds, jade, gold, silver and 
pearls. Shopping in Hong Kong really makes me go crazy. All the 
products [I buy] will be used for gift-giving to my business 
partners. I hardly ever consume it myself.” (Aunt Jennifer, 53, 
cadre) 
 
Aunt Lisa tells me the same story of buying durable products in London and 
Paris.  
“I usually go to London, Paris to buy LV, Prada and other 
brand-named products. This guarantees that I must buy the 
genuine LV, Prada since there are too many counterfeits (chāo  A 
huò 超 A 貨 means counterfeits with nearly 90% genuine to the 
real product)  in China. It is shameful for me to use fake LV 
handbags. It is worthy and some of products cannot buy in Hong 
Kong and then I go to London or Paris to search for my favourite 
items.” (Aunt Lisa, 40, entrepreneur) 
 
Aunt Monica and Aunt Jenifer more or less share consumption patterns with 
some men. They frequently buy some fashions from Hong Kong and most of 
them are exported from Europe. Aunt Monica says,  
“I usually go to Hong Kong [travel and meal allowances from her 
SOE] to buy some clothes, like Marks and Spencer. I prefer some 
fashions which are exported from Europe or the States. The styles 
are attractive and suitable for my age. The most important thing I 
will say is they are durable. I don’t want to buy brand name, but 
the most important point for the clothes I bought should be 
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durable. I am not the person who always pursues the latest and 
trendy fashions and brand names.” (Aunt Monica, 60, cadre) 
 




“I buy according to my needs. I won’t pay much attention to the 
price and brands, I only focus on quality.” (Aunt Jennifer, 53, 
cadre) 
 
Aunt Jane, a professional and cadre, says 
“I usually spend my money on buying brand-named clothes in 
Hong Kong [trip allowance from her work unit]. I won’t buy any 
clothes in China since the quality is really bad. I really get 
addicted and crazy to go to Hong Kong to buy some brand-named 
clothes, handbags, jewelleries, cosmetics and other daily 
necessities like Shampoo or bath cream. I usually go for Hong 
Kong twice per month.” (Aunt Jane, 40, professional and 
cadre)  
 
The fashion consumption patterns of the older generation of women are varied. 
Some of them prefer to buy brand-named, fashionable and trendy clothes from 
Hong Kong, Paris, London or Europe. But some of them have similar fashion 
consumption patterns of the men in the older generation. They prefer durable 
brand name instead of some trendy or brand-named products. Fashion 
consumption for the older new middle class tends not to be conspicuous, 
pleasure-seeking or luxury chasing. They are willing and able to outfit 
themselves quite elegantly when occasion calls. They prefer serviceable 
products for personal consumption but at the same time will use branded 
products in front of outsiders so as to highlight their identity and strengthen 
business interests. 
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Travel patterns of the older generation 
Entrepreneurs and cadres are fond of travelling in China whereas the 
professionals like to travel to Europe, America and other places outside China. 
For some entrepreneurs and cadres, despite institutional improvements for 
individuals to travel inside China and overseas, the most popular destinations by 
far for most people are other cities and provinces in China. The reason for 
sticking with Chinese destinations is largely cultural since the older generation 
of cadres and entrepreneurs, rather than professionals, have a strong sense of 
pride in Chinese culture. The strong sentimental attachment to the motherland 
sometimes manifests itself as a kind of ‘patriotism’ in travel behaviour. Mother 
China is the most magnificent place on earth to relax and do sightseeing—a 
veritable paradise for food and shopping. 
“I travel to other Chinese cities twice a year. I’ll travel with my 
friends around China. China is most beautiful and worth 
travelling around for. I think that if I have to spend money, I 
would spend it in my motherland. I hardly ever go to other places 
like Hong Kong, Thailand or Japan, but I used to go to those 
places when I was working for the government bureau ten years 
ago. Also, I hardly ever go to Europe or the United States. Mostly 
I travel with my business partner and I take that opportunity to 
extend my existing networks and to extend my scope of friends. 
The most important thing is that I meet more influential people in 
Guangdong.” (Uncle Tang, 49, cadre) 
 
Cadres and entrepreneurs prefer to travel with friends and business 
acquaintances rather than with family members. Uncle Chung, grocery 
entrepreneur, explains why: 
“Travelling with my friends is my joy. I’m used to group 
travelling. I’m planning to go to Zhangjiajie25 (张家界) and other 
                                                 
25
 Zhangjiajie ( 張 家 界 ) is a very famous trademark and a prefecture-level city in the 
northwestern part of Hunan province.   
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places in mainland China. I seize the chance to meet my friends 
as well as my business partners to get more updated information 
about running a business. At the same time, I can extend my 
business networks too.” (Uncle Chung, 56, entrepreneur) 
 
The most important attitude about travelling with non-family members for the 
older generation is to ‘get on’ with friends and business acquaintances for the 
purpose of doing business. The older new middle class is involved in overseas 
travel, but value it only if it encourages business. 
Many of them have over the years built up close links with business 
acquaintances abroad, especially during the early reform years. In the last ten 
years or so, however, their attention is turning mostly inwards to the growing 
domestic Chinese market, mainly because of various changes to the global 
marketplace and also because of perceptions that the domestic Chinese market is 
full of untapped commercial potential. The attitude of increasingly sticking with 
China often manifests as full plane bookings during the Chinese New Year 
(January-February), Spring Festival (or Ching Ming Festival 清明节, around 
February-April), Labour Day (1 May) and National Day (1-3 October) holidays. 
Of course, this does not mean there is any less keenness for foreign business 
opportunities. It just means that there is added keenness for the domestic market. 
As a form of consumption, travel is more than a lifestyle for the older new 
middle class. Its practical function is for business. Travelling with friends and 
business acquaintances is a form of strategic thinking to safeguard business 
competitiveness because the sense of bonding between fellow travellers helps 
enhance cooperation and collaboration. Travelling together has the general 
effect of imbibing fellow travellers with a sense of togetherness and 
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belonging—what the Chinese would call sentiment (gǎnqíng 感情) and a sense 
of belonging between people (Farrer 2000 in Davis 2000: 244). Travel therefore 
becomes part of a commodification process for finding guānxi connections to 
match business collaboration. It becomes a form of social interaction done for 
the ultimate purpose of furthering business interests. Travelling acts as a form of 
social capital that comes from doing things on the road together, helping to grow 
trustworthiness and reliability (Chen & Lu 2005, Gold 2002, Gold et al. 2002, 
Baron et al. 2000). 
In non-business situations, the sense of togetherness and belonging coming from 
travelling with others translates into a strong emotional affection for the home 
province. This affection is most visible during holidays such as the Chinese New 
Year, May Day and National Day, when people ‘touch base’ with kith and kin 
and rebuild kinship networks. 
Summary 
I have been looking at some features of the consumption of the older new middle 
class and the factors that account for the pragmatic nature of that consumption. 
Consumption in food, fashion, entertainment, travel and investments for the 
older generation is done by default in a matter-of-fact, practical manner, but 
would be more extravagant and conspicuous when meeting business-related 
objectives or extending business connections. 
Consumption can be used by the older generation to construct and nurture power 
relationships with friends, colleagues and business associates because some 
parts of the state administrative structure are ambiguous or incomplete enough to 
Chapter 4 Class boundaries of the Chinese new middle class 
 
147 
warrant the building of personal connections with decision-makers and 
knowledgeable people in the state apparatus. 
The pragmatic and utilitarian nature of consumption is largely anchored in the 
past histories of the older generation, most notably collective memories of 
Maoist-era impoverishment, rising through the ranks in state employment, the 
winding road to the world of business, and possible involvement in illegal 
activities. Pragmatic consumption is to a slightly smaller extent also attached to 
traditional Chinese or Confucian values of life as well as the need to carry out 
continual self-improvements to offset unknown but potentially threatening 
variables in a fast-changing economic and social landscape. 
Pragmatic consumption habits also set up a certain social class boundary for the 
older new middle class. Admission or exclusion from that class boundary for our 
purposes is analysed in terms of lifestyle and consumption patterns. Those who 
have alike lifestyle and consumption may be more easily considered by the older 
new middle class as one of their own, whereas those who do not are less easily so 
until such time they acquire such a lifestyle or consumption. The older 
generations generally have a collective culture (Hui 1988, Triandis 1995, Moore 
2005:361) though they are pragmatic and utilitarian in making their 
consumption patterns and lifestyles. They still have collective memories in 
common with their classmates, villages and ex-colleagues in the state enterprises. 
They place a high emphasis on the importance of guānxi networks.  
In contrast, as we shall see, the values, attitudes norms and practices of the 
younger generation are undergoing dramatic changes when compared to their 
parents. One of the most important changes in attitudes is a kind of 
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individualism that stands emphatically opposed to the collectivist spirit 
promoted during the Cultural Revolution (Moore 2005:357). The younger 
generations glorify individualism (Cherrington 1997, Furlong & Cartmel 1997), 
whereas the older generation regards such individualism as problematic (Moore 
2005:375), more details will be in Chapter 5.  
In the next chapter (Chapter 5), I will discuss the consumption pattern and 
lifestyles of the younger generation of Chinese new middle class. They are the 
group who was born after 1970 and shows the greatest tendency to practice 
conspicuous consumption as a means to display wealth and status. Chapter 5 
also addresses the ‘spaces’ of consumption in Guangdong and looks at some real 
situations related to the younger generation specifically in Guangdong.  
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Chapter 5 
Generational effects in the Chinese New Middle Class 
 
‘A lifestyle can be defined as a more or less integrated set of practices 
which an individual embraces, not only because such practices fulfil 
utilitarian need, but because they give material form to a particular 
narrative of self-identity.....’ 
(Pinches 1999:  74-75) 
 
A CONSUMER REVOLUTION IS HAPPENING in China today. The younger 
generation is acutely aware of the need for educational attainment as a form of 
cultural capital to develop careers and enhance incomes. At the same time, they 
realize that political and social capital is also crucial to getting good-paying and 
secure jobs (Coleman 1988 &1990). This cohort is seen as long-term planners of 
their education: many tend to map out in advance how to proceed with their first 
and higher degree studies, and what to do after graduation. Many are ambitious 
and want to pursue higher degrees at famous universities abroad. They are 
generally proficient in English or may even speak a modern language such as 
French, Spanish and other languages. For the younger new middle class, 
conspicuous consumption is directly related to a way of life and it demonstrates 
its superiority over other classes and, therefore, legitimises its position of 
superordination. The younger generation progressively seeks to capture the 
means of cultural reproduction as a way of securing its own social reproduction 
(Bourdieu 1984 & 1996). On the other side, they are flexible enough to upgrade 
their competitiveness in the highly globalizing China. Lives for many younger 
generations are full of challenges and ‘dynamic’ but, they are quite anxious and 
uncertain about their life chances in the future. They cannot follow the same 
trajectories of success like the older generation.  
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The emergence of consumerism  
Since the mid 1990s, post-reform China has been experiencing a consumer 
revolution. Urbanisation, modernisation, Westernisation and globalisation are 
all processes and symbols of the fast pace of economic development and the 
resultant changes in social life in many cities of China today (Ma & Wu 2005: 
344, Held & McGrew 2002 & 2003). This change is dramatic, coming after the 
Maoist period when consumption was determined by the producer. With the 
market reforms, producers have become increasingly subject to the demands and 
tastes of consumers (Jayne 2006, Breslin 2000). The consumption in cigarettes, 
alcohol, household appliances, leisure and recreational services has kept 
increasing since 2005 in China (See table 8).  
Table 8: Recent growth in consumer spending of selected categories  
  
Source: Euromonitor International from national sources, 2008.  
Note: The first row of each item represents the year of 2006-2007. The second row of each item 
represents the year of 2005-2006.  
2006-2007 
2005-2006 
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Economic liberalisation has contributed to a massively growing Chinese 
advertising industry (Hung et al. 2007: 839), and much of the apparently 
novelty-seeking materialism of the younger generation is cultivated by 
advertising and marketing. Emulating the lifestyle of Western capitalist societies 
(usually in a highly romanticised form) is a big feature of the current lifestyle 
ideology of Chinese society today. Materialist values and egoistic materialism of 
making money are quickly becoming major preoccupations in the mind of many 
Chinese. That new pivotal function is expressed as a desire for buying homes, 
appliances, fashionable clothes and services. Fashion magazines, advertising 
and most facets of commercialism are constantly trying to promote a lifestyle of 
comfort, elegance, high taste and exquisite behaviour for the Chinese new 
middle class. Exaggerated slogans like  ‘Giving you a Chinese new middle class 
home!’ or  ‘Enjoy the life of the bourgeoisie!’ stimulate the senses of many 
people on a daily basis, thereby helping to position the lifestyle of that class as 
attainable, concrete objects. 
Because of a high exposure to consumerist messages in the media and better 
living standards compared with their parents, the younger generation has already 
developed tastes in fashion and products similar to those of younger people in 
the Western world. The Internet has helped this cohort to better connect with the 
outside world and, so, develop a desire for anything foreign (Hung et al. 2007: 
839). That desire creates a viable market for outside investors from Europe, Asia 
and the USA, who set up manufacturing or marketing operations for global 
brands in the Chinese market (Zhang & Huang 2003). According to Zhang & 
Huang (2003), foreign direct investment in China rose fivefold from 1992 to 
2002. 
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Consumption can be defined as “selection, purchase, use, reuse and disposal of 
goods and service” (Chambell 1995: 104). It comprises a set of practices that 
permit people to express self-identity so as to mark attachment to social groups, 
to accumulate resources, to exhibit social distinctions, to ensure participation in 
social distinction, and to ensure participation in social activities (Warde 1997: 
304). Consumption is a way for people to construct, to experience, to interpret 
and to use spaces and places (Urry 1995, Aldridge 2003, Gay 1996). 
Consumption is not just about goods that are manufactured and sold, but also 
increasingly that ideas, services, knowledge, places, shopping, eating, fashion, 
leisure and recreation, and sights and sounds are all consumable. Consumption 
and lifestyles are the major criteria to distinguish class distinction. The Chinese 
new middle class can afford to buy famous brands to represent their economic 
ability to consume expensive goods. It is also the way to show their sense of taste. 
Displays of possessions bearing famous brands underscore the personality of the 
individual and highlight identity differentiation. Featherstone (1991: 21) 
pinpointed that “culture is a hybridised synthesiser, which deals with not only 
what to wear but also how to wear.” The Chinese new middle class uses taste in 
fashion to differentiate it from all others, and it can do that because of the 
advantage of higher economic capital.  
The productivist logic of Maoist times is now replaced by a desire for 
consumption, one that can only be understood as a yearning for setting the 
country on the rails of global modernity. This is why consumption, rather than 
production, is extremely important in the era of globalisation in post-reform 
China. Consumption then becomes a good means to distinguish the new middle 
class from the lower classes in society such as workers, migrants and peasants 
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(Pun 2005). 
Michelle Lamont (1989 & 1992, Lamont & Lareau 1988) points out that 
everyday life practices are the key indicators to evaluate distinctions among 
different groups in society. Life practices are what Lamont (1992) suggests as 
the moral, socioeconomic and cultural boundaries of the “upper new middle 
class” of the USA and France. From Lamont (1989 & 1992) and Storey (1999), 
we can say that consumption in the Chinese context has practicality as well as 
delicacy, which gives rise to ‘taste’ in living. 
Sociologists such as Giddens (1990) and Featherstone (1991) also point out that 
people not only consume products as ‘utilities’ but they are also reproducing 
consumerism as a legitimate way of life. Lifestyle can be defined as a more or 
less integrated set of practices that individuals adopt because, first, those 
practices fulfil some utilitarian need and, second, they give material form to a 
particular narrative of self-identity (Giddens 1990). Consumers in a consumerist 
culture therefore take on the symbolic value of the items they consume. The 
result is that consumption becomes a major form of self-expression and a source 
of identity. The implication in the Chinese context is that both material and 
non-material items (such as kinship, affection, art and intellect) are now 
becoming increasingly commodified among the younger generation.  
Geography and spaces of consumption in post-reform China 
In any street in any city or town in Guangdong province, it is not hard for anyone 
to be hit with a certain vision. The imagery everywhere is at once suggestive of 
the hustle and bustle of Hong Kong. Chain stores and outlets such as G2000, 
McDonald’s, Starbucks, Park n’Shop, Chow Tai Fook Jewellers and other 
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well-known names in Hong Kong have sprung up in large numbers on any 
number of street corners. In fact, Shenzhen, Dongguan, Zhuhai, Guangzhou, 
Zhongshan and even the ostensible backwaters of Yangjiang now appear more 
like modern, cosmopolitan cities that would not be out of place when compared 
with Hong Kong.  
Along many of the main thoroughfares of Guangdong province, large pictures of 
brand-named products splash across the eye-catching advertising hoardings. 
Pictures of beautiful models covered in jewellery in freestanding advertising 
kiosks are publicly admired. In short order, China has turned into a battleground 
for international brands, which are increasingly looking to groups such as the 
Chinese new middle class to provide profits and growth (Friedmann 2005). 
Many cities in Guangdong province are literally packed with brand-named 
products, branded chainstores and branded fast-food shops. A quick stroll along 
Dongmen Walk ( 東 門 街 ) in Shenzhen will at once portray the growing 
cosmopolitan nature that has come to characterise many parts of Guangdong 
(see photos 3 and 4). 
Chapter 5 Generational effects in the Chinese new middle class  
 155 




Photo 4: Shopping mall in Guangdong province 
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Photo 5: Boutique in Guangdong province 
 
 
Sprawling complexes of street-level restaurants, cafés and bars are everywhere. 
Shopping malls and fishball stalls are replete with Hong Kong-style signage. 
Trendy locals pack cheek by jowl with tourists. People wear as much 
foreign-fashioned and in-fashion clothes as people do in Hong Kong. Pop music 
and ballroom dancing proliferate. Nightclubs light the night across the province, 
packed as they are with beautiful and beautified people, crowds throbbing to 
pulsating music, bars spilling over with fashionist as quaffing cocktails. There 
are many shopping malls, restaurants, shopping centres, commercial skyscrapers 
and many multinational enterprises in Guangdong (see photos 6-7).  
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Photo 7: Multinational enterprise in Guangdong province 
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Guangzhou and Shenzhen, the two major cities of Guangdong province, boast 
the highest per-capita income of the province. When I conducted the first 
fieldwork, the immediate impression was that there are many newly rich people 
wherever one looked. There was heavy conspicuous consumption, especially of 
brand-named products, the latest mobile phones and big-name cars. These two 
cities harbour serious wealth, which is why prestigious retailers such as Louis 
Vuitton S.A. and the luxury department store Lane Crawford and others have 
moved in.  
In many parts of Guangdong province, consumption is no longer only about 
buying tangible things anymore. It has now progressed to the buying of services 
that go to improve living standards, for example, the use of babysitters, 
chauffeurs, family doctors, travel consultants, financial planners, insurance 
agents, stockbrokers and the like.  
These younger generations (especially those in management in the bigger 
companies) of my research samples know only too well that their ‘dress code’ of 
Guccis and Rolexes is everything to them if theirs is a professional image they 
wish to project to others. Because of their jobs, dress codes of these people are 
often the readiest identifier of their social class, even on the very first 
impressions. They are of the belief—with no small measure of truth—that your 
dress, your cars and your accoutrements easily show the social class and this is 
the strategy to extend business partners. Conspicuous consumption is an 
important modus vivendi for our younger generation because they often lack 
well-developed networks or business associates. The ability to consume 
conspicuously enables them to impress others that they have the capability to 
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take on major business undertakings. 
Rising consumption of branded goods  
The rising consumption of brand goods rapidly sweeps in Guangdong since the 
economic reform. Most of the younger generations are more fashionable, 
presentable, stylish and highly educated. This explains why the beauty economy 
in China has opened up lucrative career alternatives for the younger middle class 
into capitalizing on their bodies (Wang Q. 2008). We can therefore see that 
consumption is not simply consumerism itself but the pleasure of consumption 
with an emphasis on desirability and status symbols. Consumption of 
brand-name products gives the younger new middle class a sense of superiority 
in an increasingly free and open market of life chances. To that extent, Farrer 
(2000: 244) is right in that a culture of leisure in a marketised economy moves 
from a culture of production to a culture of consumption. 
The younger generation appears to have a tendency to consume in ways that 
suggest the purpose is to flaunt their wealth and status. The predilection of many 
of the younger generation is to purchase conspicuous ‘mansions’ and luxury cars 
to make them feel distinctive (Hubacek & Anamika 2007). As we shall see, my 
qualitative data shows impressive spending behaviours in the form of expensive 
merchandise and luxury services that allow them to exemplify their financial 
power and higher status in society. They patronise luxury restaurants, place 
high-priced bids on auspicious-sounding mobile-phone numbers or car number 
plates, set up extravagant banquets, and travel. 
Generally speaking, the younger generation are good consumer targets for a 
wide range of retailers and service providers in China because of their relatively 
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high purchasing power as against the rest of the population. They tend to be on a 
pleasure-seeking principle, fed by a growing need to be seen as modern and up to 
date and up with the world outside China (Wang 2002, Faure 2008: 476).  
“I am addicted and crazy to buy brand names like LV, Porter, 
Agnes b, Polo and Vivienne Westwood. I’ll buy it from Hong 
Kong but not from China. I don’t want others to expect me to use 
some counterfeits. I like these brands because they make me feel 
different from other people. Perhaps these brand names are 
expensive to buy. Sometimes, I accompany my mother and my 
husband [author clarification: her husband is an assistant 
professor in Hong Kong] to go to Europe, Paris and Japan to buy 
these brand names.’’ (Lily, 30, professional) 
 
The rising consumption of brand-named goods in China is a quantitative change, 
but it is also an expression of the search for new lifestyles, new identities and 
desire to show off their status. Consumption big brands give them a sense of 
cultural identity and distinction from other Chinese people. The younger 
generations consume brand-named products to make them more distinctive, 
civilised and elegant like the middle class from western countries. Many ideas 
and practices from around the world are constantly disseminated and assimilated 
into Chinese society as a byproduct of economic liberalisation and globalisation 
(Held & McGrew 2002 & 2003, Holmwood 2007).  
The younger generation now takes to fine dining and fine drinking, wearing 
Louis Vuittons, Guccis, Rolexes or Omegas almost as a dress code and driving 
around in sportscars. Those in the upper income bracket parade their social 
identity through luxury lifestyles in the form of upscale living quarters or villas, 
shuttling around in limousines, patronising high-class eating establishments and 
parading their golfclub memberships. The bottom line is, extravagant 
consumption is the best way to display capability, wealth and status. Business 
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networking is essential to display enhanced consumption as an indicator of 
successful networking. 
Ken, an MBA-qualified entrepreneur in an engineering company, says: 
“I bought my BMW from Hong Kong because China wouldn’t 
have such an export [foreign] car. I wear a Rolex and have the 
latest models of mobile phones. It isn’t because I have to have 
these luxury items, but it’s to show off in front of my buddies and 
business partners. You drive a luxury car and live in a luxury 
apartment to represent that you’re rich. This is the most important 
part of attracting someone who you’d like to continue to do 
business. With precious and luxury accessories like BMWs, 
Rolexes and villas or detached houses or even high-storeyed 
apartments, it’s the best way to attract more new business 
partners.” (Ken, 30, entrepreneur) 
 
Alex has the same mentality as Ken. Alex is a graduate of a rather renowned 
university and makes about RMB¥10,000 (US$1,463 or £999) a month. He 
drives a Chinese-made Honda he bought two years previously for 
RMB¥350,000 (US$ 51,210 or £34,916). He usually wears the most fashionable 
and trendy clothes. He goes to Hong Kong twice per month to buy some 
brand-named products. He says,  
“My slogan is ‘spend money for tomorrow’ or ‘realise the dream 
for today.’ No need to worry about tomorrow but seize happiness 
wholeheartedly in nightclubs with my friends. I don’t have 
‘saving’ in my dictionary. Temptations are terribly many in 
Guangdong. You can find much entertainment and play here. 
Money runs, money comes, no need to worry too much.” (Alex, 
35, professional) 
 
It transpires from my time with Alex that he is always travelling to Europe and 
buying famous branded products. Alex cannot afford this kind of luxury lifestyle 
simply with his monthly salary. This explains why the professionals need to 
collaborate with entrepreneurs and cadres to do business to maintain their luxury 
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daily expenditure. Alex told me that he usually has part time jobs like 
subcontracting trade with some cadres and entrepreneurs. This explains the 
source of his money and why he can maintain luxurious lifestyles though his 
monthly salary is not high by western standards (Wynne 1998). He is married 
but he does not want children yet. Alex appears to live life to the full, with no 
financial worries. His story is a common one among most of the younger new 
middle class. 
The ownership and display of luxury and precious possessions become part of a 
larger strategic plan to extend business networks and attract more business 
associates. The need or desire for conspicuous consumption is not just any 
consumption. It has to be consumption of expensive, brand-named, distinctly 
foreign and visibly authentic merchandise. They buy for pleasure, status and to 
show their wealth to their business partners rather than for genuine use. They are 
ashamed to use counterfeits although they’re very popular in Guangdong. Mary, 
a French/German-educated accountant, felt that practising conspicuous 
consumption with her peers is the strategy to strengthen and enhance [the 
relationship with] more business partners. She explains: 
“Dress code is the status and my peer group could spend a whole 
month’s salary to buy brand-named bags like LV, Gucci or others. 
If we buy counterfeits, there’s no difference with the blue-collars. 
Though you have a real LV bag, most people will think it is a 
counterfeit. It’s shameful in front of my friends because they can 
identify whether or not they’re fakes. To play safe, I’ll buy in 
Hong Kong or in France. The LV bag is a must-buy item for my 
peers.” (Mary, 25, professional) 
 
Ada, an entrepreneur in a large garment factory, echoes Mary’s attitude: 
“I don’t have any confidence buying brand-named goods in 
China since there are so many counterfeits. I’ll order the latest LV 
bag from Paris and ask for shipping. Otherwise, when you wear 
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the latest style of LV bags, [people could see] it’s a counterfeit 
and it’ll be awkward and awful. Our business partners measure 
our wealth and businesses by the brand-named products, luxury 
cars and apartments [that we have]. Our business partners also 
calculate and quantify our wealth through what we wear and 
where we live.” (Ada, 32, entrepreneur) 
 
Chiu agrees with Ada. Consumption has its own intangible and intrinsic 
function to do business. He says,  
“I prefer to buy a car instead of buying a villa since we can show 
off our car in front of our clients.  We cannot show off our house 
directly in front of our client. For the face to face meeting, my 
clients quantify my wealth in terms of my possession of car 
(whether it is BMWs), watch (whether it is Rolex) and club 
membership.” (Chiu, 28, entrepreneur) 
 
Tong, concurs with Chiu. He says,  
“I prefer to buy Iphone, car or brand-name suit [Prada] since I can 
show off when I meet my clients. Although I am not a boss, but I 
need to be more presentable and dress decently when I meet my 
clients in order to earn bonus and commission from my job.” 
(Tong, 32, professional)  
 
The younger generations believe buying brand names and foreign goods indicate 
your higher status for consumption. With your higher social status, it means that 
you have more refined personal tastes and a more modern fashion outlook. They 
need to differentiate themselves from the rest of workers, they prefer to eat less 
and save up money to buy their genuine and not counterfeit brand-named 
products. 
“I think if entrepreneurs want to invest businesses in China, they 
need to bring some exotic branded goods to Guangdong. They 
need to show us the certificate of each branded goods with the 
product code. This can guarantee I won’t buy any counterfeit 
goods. I feel disgusting if I spend huge of money on buying some 
counterfeit branded goods.” (Ivy, 26, professional) 
 
Chapter 5 Generational effects in the Chinese new middle class  
 164 
Indeed, the younger generation mostly has a burning desire for anything 
brand-named (Pun 2003: 484). What has once been the old-fashioned Chinese 
way of consumption (for actual needs) and remains in the older generation, is 
now replaced in quick order by a pattern of consumption revolving around desire 
(Yau 1994). Consumer goods worldwide are dwindling in their serviceable 
functionality and giving way to fashionability. Today, in contrast to yesteryears, 
the goal of consumption behaviour is in pursuing the completion of desire—a 
desire that is artificially created and equally artificially excited—rather than to 
satisfy genuine utility of need (Pun 2003). 
Fashion tastes and styles of the younger generation are more in tune with those 
of Hong Kong, Japan, Taiwan and Europe or anywhere else that is regarded as 
‘hip.’ Fashion signifies unity with those in the same class while having the 
power to exclude others. Fashion in the upper stratum of society (such as those 
of political bureaucrats and the intellectual élite) are never identical with that of 
the lower groups (such as workers and marginal groups). It is a product of class 
distinction and yet it also operates as producer of class distinction by way of a 
strategy of inclusion and exclusion. Fashion therefore has the function of 
reproducing social power and privilege by marketing and maintaining social 
differences and distinctions (Bourdieu 1984 & 1996). Storey (1999: 40) 
considers fashion in the context of power and ideology, and argues that it is 
‘fashion’ per se (rather than the content of the fashion) that is the signifier of 
social difference that helps maintain social status in society. Fashion constitutes 
and communicates a position in the overall social order while possibly 
challenging relative positions within it. As such, Barnard (1996: 39) pinpointed 
that “fashion and clothing are used as weapons and defence in that they express 
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the ideologies held by social groups which may be opposed to the ideologies of 
other groups in the social order.” In other words, fashion acts as the resource by 
which social groups can maintain either a dominant or a subservient position 
within a social order.  
For the majority [20 out of 24] of the younger generations said that if they have 
money, they will buy whatever they want. Most of them will go to Hong Kong 
and other countries to buy the latest and trendy fashions. Alex says, 
“I like to buy fashion from Japan, such as Ape, Porter, Agnes b, 
Birkenstock and other brand-named products. In fact, we aren’t 
out of fashion but I know we’re always giving foreigners the 
feeling that we’re unfashionable. Now, we’re quite trendy and 
much more fashionable than many of the middle class all over the 
world, including the Hong Kong middle class.” (Alex, 35, 
professional) 
 
Fai agreeing with Alex, says,  
 
“I definitely won’t buy any local fashion brands but I only buy 
some international brands like LV, Gucci, Prada, Jack and Jones, 
Calvin Kelvin, Polo and Burberry. We are not old fashioned at all. 
There are many large-scaled shopping malls in China. How can I 
avoid the attractions and temptations?” (Fai, 28, entrepreneur) 
 
Fashion means status and class. It seems as if the Chinese new middle class is 
trying to steer itself away from the bad sense of dress that it thinks the rest of the 
Chinese have in the eyes of foreigners—and the undertone of ‘village 
provincialism’ (tǔ gǎn jué 土感觉) that comes from it. So the fashionable look 
depends on having that quintessential imported or foreign look.  
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The bar and self-commodification 
In this section I want to show how bars and similar establishments are ‘used’ by 
the younger generations to set itself apart from the general population. In 
Guangdong province there is a bar that I am frequently invited to by members of 
the younger generations. It is about 1,000 square feet in size and its atmosphere 
exudes happiness. The décor is by a Japanese designer, consisting of a delicate 
garden almost fit for meditation and a bar where you can quietly pass an 
afternoon with a glass of your favourite drink in hand to the sounds of light jazz 
music. Sweet and shapely waitresses are at your beck and call, all services are 
value-added, and the wide assortment of food and beverages cost at least 
RMB¥50 (US$7 or £5) a serving. Meanwhile, the ubiquitous but equally 
high-priced karaoke bars do a roaring trade. Peter, an entrepreneur, who has a 
habit of bringing me to bars and discotheques, says: 
“Wine and song are our companion for leisure or business if you 
have the cash to match. Well-dressed foreigners relax in 
scrumptious sofas, and many people have come to use the bar as 
if it were their second office or a second home. It is a place for me 
to meet more girlfriends, business partners, share and exchange 
trendy tastes in fashion, brand-named products and travelling.” 
(Peter, 34, entrepreneur) 
 
Andy concurs with Peter. He unusually brings me to bars and parties.  
 
‘‘We drink, dance and hang out with friends in pub where such a 
wonderful place to enjoy my life is. I can escape from reality. ’’ 
(Andy, 35, professional) 
 
Most of the younger generation feel up-to-date, trendy, and they feel more 
energetic and young-looking when interacting with other young people. As the 
hours tick away, the night becomes even more beautiful. The bar becomes a 
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gathering spot for the privileged few of the new middle class (men and women 
alike) (Farrer 2000 in Davis 2000: 245). Farrer (ibid.) observed from dancing 
activities in Shanghai that discotheques and dance halls are not simply acts of 
‘consumerism’: the discotheque, with its emphasis on desirability, is actually a 
place for ‘self-commodification’—a place for selling the self to public. This 
study finds that this is also the case in Guangdong. Farrer (ibid.) believes that the 
central logic of the market for most young people in China is not the discipline 
of production or the self-indulgence of consumption. Rather, he believes it is an 
‘ordeal’ of selling themselves in an increasing open and free market of life 
chances. 
Mary is an accountant educated in Germany and France. She spent ten years in 
those countries getting her secondary education and also her first and master’s 
degrees.  
“I’m good at dancing at a Pub. I’m usually the most egotistical 
and often self-intoxicated with dancing or whatever to wash 
away my unhappiness of some sort amid the sparkle of the night. 
In a bar, you treat yourself as the master, wine as your unique 
quest, and music as the soul of it.” (Mary, 25, professional) 
 
When the younger generations share their own stresses and difficulties in pubs 
or bars, they have their own language to express their distinctiveness: 
‘‘…We have common language used in pub, like In (cháo 潮); 
hea [nothing to do, just stay at home]; tram guy [‘diànchēnán’ 电
车男, guys only stay at home to play computer games or play 
computer); middle lady [中女  ‘zhōng nǚ’ or 剩女 ‘shèng nǚ. It 
means some ladies who over 30, but still not yet have boyfriends 
or get married]; 3S [means Single 单身 ‘dānshēn’; Seventies 
(born in 1970s, 多生於上世纪七十年代‘duōshēng yú shàngshìjì 
qīshí niándài’); Stuck (‘bèi kăzhù le’ 被卡住了, cannot find 
boyfriends or husbands)] and kù [it means cool]. All are our 
slangs used in pubs. We will also talk about our interested topics 
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like cohabitation, sex, gayman and lesbian. All these make me 
more energetic and young looking though I have been working 
for many years.....It is a good way to relax..…’’ (Mark, 35, 
entrepreneur) 
 
Most of the younger generations feel cool (kù) by using slang with their fellows. 
Those people who are ku refer to those who are against dominant culture and 
support many subcultures in society. They express themselves as more 
independent, individualist, strong-willed, friendly and easy-going in everyday 
life (Ma 2006, Hui 1988, Hurst 2006). In addition, appearance and following the 
dress code with trendy fashions and styles are examples of kù (Moore 2005).  
Fast-food shops vs. Chinese restaurants 
Guangdong province is rightly regarded as a food paradise because of the great 
choice of cuisine there. Indeed, economic prosperity provides abundant choices 
of food. The wider choice reaffirms the high importance of food consumption 
behaviour in Chinese personal relationships. Eating establishments therefore 
become hubs of socially significant activities and so it makes food markets 
useful places to investigate changes in consumption patterns. 
Veeck (2000) points out that food has long been recognised as a central vehicle 
for analysing identities, roles, relationships, rituals and ceremonies. The 
individual communicates the nature of his relationship with others through the 
acquisition, preparation and consumption of food (Bestor 2005). 
In fact, the younger new middle class in Guangdong tends to dine out in 
Western-branded fast-food outlets such as McDonald’s, Starbucks and Burger 
King. Fashionably dressed youngsters of that class are often seen relaxing in 
those fast-food outlets during their leisure time and on public holidays. Indeed, 
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dining in Western-style fast-food shops is an integral part of their new lifestyle 
because that kind of dining apparently makes these people feel as well as be seen 
as more civilised (Watson & Caldwell 2005). They usually utilize this space to 
chat with their friends or even meet with their business partners. They feel a 
strong sense of pride and superiority in these western cafes or fast food shops. 
They feel more civilised, westernised and differentiated from other Chinese.   
“I usually stay at Starbucks with wifi (internet) to surf from 
internet and chat with my friends. I go to Starbucks for reading or 
thinking. This westernized cafe gives me some feeling that I am 
the Chinese middle class. I have the feeling who I am. I find 
myself more civilized and westernized.” (Lily, 30, professional) 
 
Consuming ‘foreign’ foods is an important way for the younger generations to 
set itself apart from the other classes. Many of the younger generation 
interviewed in this study say that, while the food and flavours of Western-style 
fast-food shops are not great, the experience of eating in such establishments 
made them feel good and appear more modern, civilised and young. Therefore, 
the appeal of ‘foreign’ foods is not in the physical sensations of eating them, as 
one frequent patron of Starbucks explains: 
“It’s acceptable but I feel a bit outdated to go to Chinese 
restaurants for my morning tea. I like to go to McDonald’s and 
Starbucks to enjoy my Western-style breakfast. That gives me a 
private space to ‘digest’ Western culture. Then I’ll feel more in 
step with the economic development in China and feel more 
civilised, too.....” (Chiu, 28, entrepreneur) 
 
Ben echoes Chiu, he says, 
 
“I personally like Starbucks, Cafe, Italian restaurant and some 
buffets in hotel.  I don’t know how to say..... but I like the settings 
of some western restaurant or hotels. They give me the feeling of 
individualized, modern, trendy, hygienic, elegant and innovative. 
I love this feeling.....” (Ben, 35, entrepreneur) 
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In spite of the fact that overtime work is part and parcel of the daily routine for 
many of the younger Chinese new middle class, they are trying to look for a 
better lifestyle within their own limited window for leisure time. Going to some 
westernized cafes like Starbucks, Pacific Coffee or hotels can serve as a private 
space for them to think about their life chances. They act like some western 
middle class since they know what the meaning of leisure life is.  Having coffee 
nowhere else but Starbucks, dining nowhere but Pizza Hut are typical facets of 
the food lifestyle of the Chinese new middle class. They can give them a taste of 
‘modernity’ (Hsu 2005). 
Mobile phones and portable computers 
Like many younger people around the world, the younger new middle class gets 
to know the world around it through the Internet. Because of globalisation, the 
younger generation is somewhat more proficient in English because of a better 
and unbroken education. That facilitates more of the culture of the 
English-speaking world (especially America) coming into their world. It is also 
through the Internet that the younger generation learns to recognise and cultivate 
a liking for foreign and brand-named goods.  
Communication is a key to the rising knowledge of the Chinese new middle 
class. They are most likely to buy the latest model of mobile phones and 
computers with advanced email and browsing functions. However, the mobile 
phone is also moving away from strictly being a communication tool to a symbol 
of a fashionable lifestyle. It means quality of life.  
 
“If you own a fancy mobile, you’re effectively transforming 
yourself from backward to advanced, from traditional to 
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modern—meaning a status of real success. Otherwise, you will 
be criticised ‘are you still using the old model? You are too 
outdated!’ Also, it’s now very easy to get high-tech products. I 
change my mobile phone model frequently, maybe once every 
two months. I ask my friends in Hong Kong or in other South 
East Asian countries to buy me the iPhone or a 3G phone or some 
other high-tech products like notebooks [computers], Netbooks 
and the MacBook. I’m attracted to the sharp and ‘in’ appearance 
of the iPhone and 3G phones.” (Chiu, 28, entrepreneur) 
 
 
“I cannot live without Iphone and computer (netbook). They all 
remind me I am not bad now, at least I still have my job though I 
don’t have time to enjoy my life. Due to job nature [author’s 
clarification: he is a fashion designer], I need to keep up to date in 
my fashion sense and taste. Therefore, I need to have my Iphone 
and netbook all the time to keep contacts with the world and my 
friends.” (Jacky, 30, professional) 
 
There is a preoccupation with mobile phones and other electronics with a 
multiplicity of advanced functions. Consumption of these goods gives the 
younger new middle class a sense of greater connection with the rest of the 
world and helps them overcome the bulwarks of their physical locations (Xu 
2007: 373). That sense of connection with the more faraway and more advanced 
outside world also helps the Chinese new middle class to adopt newer status 
symbols. 
Residential preferences and brands of car 
There is a yearning among the Chinese new middle class for spacious, 
comfortable living quarters. Indeed, these people are often found to be living in 
large homes, normally around 150 square metres (1,500 square feet), with 
beautiful gardens and multiple parking spaces. Their homes are comfortable and 
elegant in décor and typically located on a hillside or by the seashore. 
Western-style houses built on green grassy knolls and near a stream show 
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harmony. The home is usually constructed in a way that is evocative of a natural, 
healthy and sunny environment for a life of comfort and leisure amidst a strongly 
cultured atmosphere (see photos 8-10).  
Photo 8: Middle-class residential area 
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In fact, the Chinese new middle class can go to some lengths to have their homes 
show exquisite levels of naturalness as much as discriminating taste and status. 
The new middle class is sometimes known to spend in excess of RMB¥1 million 
(US $146,316 or £99,796) on just interior decoration alone to achieve good taste 
and stylishness. I was once invited to a picture-perfect home: a three-storey 
building with a sloping roof, a huge front garden, a modern kitchen and elegant 
rooms done up in tasteful pastels in a blend of modern and traditional design. 
(See photos 11-12) 
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A dream home is no dream home unless, of course, it is matched by a good 
network of transport and amenities. It should be within easy reach of 
Western-styled shopping and entertainment facilities. Geographically, it should 
be near lakes, hills, forests or parks and also have panoramic views—qualities 
that help the new middle class distinguish outstanding social status. Tsang owns 
such a dream home: 
“I live in a hundred and fifty square metres [home] with my wife 
and two daughters. I spent about RMB one million yuan [US 
$146,316 or £99,796] to newly furnish the house. The house isn’t 
just for living, but to live in with taste where my family and I [can] 
pursue a high quality of life. I didn’t just have it designed for 
luxury but, rather, for a taste for the modern. I bought materials 
especially from France, Italy and other European countries to 
decorate my house. I simply pursued my tastes in living and don’t 
like to follow popular furnishings in China, which I regard as 
tasteless and without character. We wanted to have our own 
swimming pool and [now] only the residents have the privilege 
of access [to it].” (Tsang, 37, entrepreneur) 
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Raymond and Peter seem to agree with Tsang.  
 
“Quality of life is very important for me. I don’t want a shelter 
but I demand for the art of living. Clubhouse is a must item for 
me .....” (Raymond, 30, professional) 
 
“.....When I invite my business partners to my home, they will see 
where you live and which brand of car you drive. All relate to 
business opportunities.....” (Peter, 34, entrepreneur) 
 
Many high-class recreational establishments in China are barred to the otherwise 
well-heeled because they are for members only or for government officials. We 
can see that one of the ultimate goals of the younger new middle class is to 
consume for status so that they can extend social circles to include cadres with a 
view to extending those social circles even further. 
Gender relations or attitudes of the younger generation 
The younger generations of the Chinese new middle class generally tend to 
marry late. For my in-depth interviews and participant observation with the 
younger generation, most of the discussion is organised in terms of generational 
changes from the three major 'own class' categories of entrepreneurs, cadres and 
professionals.  From my samples of the younger generations, men generally got 
married around 30 while women generally got married around 28. There is an 
increasing trend that some of the younger generation, women in particular, may 
even decide not to marry. Most of such women are highly educated and they are 
most likely to be professional.  
Ivy is a professional and she comes from a middle class family in Guangdong. 
She has a boyfriend and says, 
“I personally think that guys from the outset, they will focus on 
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my physical appearance, figure, body and personality. It doesn’t 
matter relate to your talents or abilities. It takes me several years 
to look around and then I finally select this guy as my boyfriend. 
But most of the Chinese guys are stressful now since they need to 
pay for the bills if they dine out with their girlfriends. They need 
to buy apartment if they want to get married. They also need to 
feed their parents and grandparents. Luckily I am not a PhD 
student. I won’t pursue PhD since this will become the burden for 
me to find my husband. My parents told me that one master 
degree is sufficiently enough for me right now.” (Ivy, 26, 
professional)  
 
After talking to some younger generations, it is quite difficult for some young 
and well-educated women to find boyfriends or husbands, especially for those 
women who pursue their study abroad. Betty earned her bachelor in Guangdong 
and earned her master degree abroad. She says,  
“If you can speak fluent English, this makes many Chinese guys 
even run away. In Guangdong, not too many guys can speak and 
write good English. But if some guys can speak fluent English, 
they are our dream boyfriends or husbands. But I can say, in our 
company, actually, I cannot find any good-quality guys. 
Therefore, I think I have great tendency to late marriage or even 
no marriage.” (Betty, 30, professional) 
 
Sung is a young professional and he only has a bachelor degree. He is now single, 
but he won’t consider choosing a PhD holder or even a master holder to be his 
girlfriend or wife.   
‘‘It will be very difficult for me to talk to female PhD holder. I 
don’t mind to have a PhD holder to be my girlfriend, but I am 
afraid I am not academic enough to communicate with her. I want 
to find one who can share my job, happiness or pain, instead of 
finding someone who are so knowledgeable enough..... It makes 
me so stressful.....” (Sung, 30, professional) 
 
 
Dan, professional, also shares the same view with Sung. He says,  
 
“.....I need a wife who can share and live with fun, but I don’t 
need books or dictionaries.....’’ (Dan, 29, professional) 
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However, Sunny is a very trendy, young and optimistic entrepreneur with a 
different perspective. He is still single. He says,  
 
“I don’t mind the education level of my girlfriend, I only have a 
bachelor degree, if I can have a PhD girlfriend or wife, how 
gorgeous and cool I am. Then, my PhD wife will know how to 
educate my son or daughter in the future.....” (Sunny, 34, 
entrepreneur) 
 
It is a common phenomenon in today’s China for some of the women who are 
PhD holders to hide their PhD identity in order to find their future husbands. In 
China, there is a very famous slogan to describe the highly educated women. If 
you have a bachelor degree, you are Huáng-róng (she is beautiful, intelligent 
and easy to communicate. Běnkēshēng shì huángróng 本科生是黄蓉). If you 
have a master’s degree, you are Lĭ Mò-chóu (she is intelligent and good at 
gōngfū but quite difficult to get along with other people. Shuòshìshēng 
shì lĭmòchóu 硕士生是李莫愁). If you are PhD holder, you are Mièjué shī 
tài (She is very good at gōngfū, but she is very eccentric. She is superbly terrible 
to talk and communicate. Bóshìshēng shì  mièjuésh tài , 博士生是灭绝师太.)26  
In contrast, the study also finds that the highly educated man, like the PhD 
candidate, is the dream man for many Chinese women to choose them as 
boyfriend or husband.  Dan says,  
“Most girls learn that I am PhD holder (bóshìshēng 博士生), they 
show appreciation to me. If a lady who is over 30 and they are 
still unmarried, they will be regarded as ‘middle lady’ in society, 
whereas I will be easily to find a high-quality girlfriend. I want 
                                                 
26
 The name Huang-rong comes from 《射鵰英雄传 shèdiāo yīngxióngzhuàn》. Lĭ mòchóu comes 
from《神雕侠侣 shéndiāo xiálǚ 》and mièjuéshī tài comes from《倚天屠龙记 yĭ tiāntúlóng jì》. 
All are the major characters from the martial arts novel or gōngfū novel from jīn -yōng (金庸), a 
very famous Chinese gōngfū (功夫) novel in Hong Kong and China. 
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my wife should have a good career... I don’t want to find one who 
financially relies on me.....’’ (Dan, 29, professional) 
 
Jiang, a professional, is the son of the older generation. He got his PhD from 
Hong Kong. He absolutely agrees with Dan. He got married and now he has a 
daughter. He told me that he had tremendous choices to choose his wife since he 
is the dream man for many women in China. He is intelligent, young, comes 
from middle class family and can speak English well. The most important thing 
for Jiang and Dan is that they earned their PhD from abroad (‘jìnguò  xiánshuĭ ’ 
浸过咸水) and are now working in China. Jiang says,  
“I don’t want female PhD to be my wife. It doesn’t mean that I 
will marry one who has primary or secondary education. My wife 
has a master degree. She should be beautiful, intelligent, soft, 
gentle, can cook well and docile.’’ (Jiang, 31, professional) 
 
The men in the younger generation in general prefer their girlfriends/wives more  
economically and financially independent. Ben says,  
 
“I can say, some women in China are normally dependent on their 
future husband. But I like that my wife should be financially 
independent. I hate to say my future wife wants to be highly 
dependent on me.” (Ben, 35, entrepreneur) 
 
Melody is a professional who is now working in China after finishing her MA in 
Hong Kong. She believes that most women are relatively richer than men27 of 
her age. But she needs to be independent and needs a job even when she gets 
married. She says,  
‘‘I foresee I need to have my full time job after I get married. I 
                                                 
27
 Chongqing Commercial Newspaper interviewed 500 single women, their ages range from 28 
or above. This research shows about 83.56% have their own houses, 29.16% have cars, 75.46% 
have monthly salary more than RMB 4000 (mean salary in Chongqing was around RMB 2248.5 
in 2008). (‘More you have, more difficult to get married, increasing the number of 3S women’ 
(‘條件愈好愈難嫁’, 3S 女日增’, Economic Daily, A16, 20 Feb 2010). This story well predicts 
what is to happen in Guangdong as well.  
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don’t have any fantasies. I cannot fully rely on my husband. I 
cannot act like my mother who never works after she got married. 
She is a housewife since she was only 20. But now, I expect if I 
get married and I have children, I need to work.  My future 
husband cannot afford all the expenditure if I don’t work. I want 
to be financially independent as well.” (Melody, 28, 
professional) 
 
Lily is married and she concurs with the views of Betty and Melody. She has a 
full time job though she has children as well. She says,  
“I don’t want to rely on my husband since I can work. I want to 
have my own salary to buy all the stuffs. I like branded goods and 
diamonds. Otherwise, I need to ask my husband to buy, but it is 
something wrong if he refuses to buy things to me..…” (Lily, 30, 
professional) 
 
The well-educated men show different criteria to choose their girlfriends or 
wives in China today. There are no common patterns for this phenomenon. But 
one thing that can be guaranteed is that men with a PhD, particular those who 
study abroad are the dream man for many Chinese women. The well-educated 
man also wants his wife to have a good job and be more economically 
independent. They want to find someone who is intelligent, economically 
independent instead of good at doing domestic chores. Both the marriage 
patterns of men and women of the younger generation show relatively different 
patterns from their parents (Zhang 2006).  
Parent-child relationship between generations 
In terms of consumption patterns and lifestyles, the younger generations do not 
act like their parents, as I shall show in later chapters. Why do the younger 
middle class not have a more frugal or workmanlike lifestyle, as their parents 
have? There are two dominant areas in which the younger generation do not act 
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like their parents. These are consumption patterns and marriage practice.  
My respondents are well aware of the hard and impoverished lives of their 
parents, and many would have been instructed by them on the benefits of 
frugality. Yet the childhood memory for the younger generation is mostly of fun, 
good food, good clothes and nice toys, and parents doing their best to afford 
them the best-possible surroundings for growing up. 
 In Chapter 2, I explicated some conceptual frameworks describing the Chinese 
parent-child relationship and why it is different from that in Western societies. In 
analysing the parent-child relationship between the older and younger 
generations, we can view that relationship on two fronts. The first is that Chinese 
parents tend to indulge their children. The second is that the relationship is also 
hierarchical and of unequal standing. 
First, middle-class Chinese parents tend to indulge their children. The unique 
and perhaps most astounding aspect about the parent-child relationship in 
post-reform Chinese society is that a very high proportion of young urban people 
are in fact the only offspring of their families. The one-child family policy is 
more strenuously enforced for urban families than for rural families, which are 
allowed to have more than one child.  
As an only child, most are quite highly dependent on their parents. Broadly 
speaking, the only child is king or queen of the household in the eyes of many 
Chinese parents. Parents are often involved in planning career paths for their 
children, preparing them for studies abroad, using their guānxi networks to find 
jobs and even helping them to find boyfriends or girlfriends. Many parents in 
fact look on their progeny as the torchbearer of the family. 
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My sample of the older generation show different views about their relationship 
with their children. Uncle Fang’s son is currently studying abroad. He does the 
best to provide whatever his son wants and says,  
“I don’t think I spoil my son. I just want him to enjoy his study 
without worrying any about money. I am proud of him since I 
know whatever he did is good for us (family). I pay for his tuition 
fees around RMB¥110, 000 (US$14,641 or £11,134) per year. I 
provide him RMB¥5,000 (US$732 or £506) for his monthly 
expenditure and I pay for his accommodation [author’s 
clarification: each month costs him around US$800 or £400 for 
his son’s accommodation]. I don’t want him to get distractions 
from his study. ” (Uncle Fang, 49, cadre) 
 
Indeed, Chinese parents are unable to release their offspring and apt to do and 
plan everything for them since they relatively more have cultural capital than the 
lower class family or peasant family (Wang et al. 2006). The result is that many 
sons and daughters of the Chinese new middle class never learn to be 
independent. One interviewee explains: 
“Some of my friends are very protective of their sons and 
daughters. They really want to send them abroad when they’re 
only eleven, twelve years old. Most of them send their sons to the 
UK, Australia, the USA or Canada in order to learn more English. 
But most of my friends just send them away with no parental 
supervision. The result is that most of the kids learnt nothing and 
ends up a bad guy or girl. Not only are they weak in English but 
they’re also bad morally. They’re not mature enough to learn 
how to be independent or to have critical thinking. So they’ve 
wasted their parents’ money and become a pǎobùjī [跑步机 
‘walking machine,’ i.e. make no progress]).” (Uncle Vicky, 45, 
professional) 
 
The one-child policy of the country provides a kind of driving force for these 
attitudes as many urban parents see their only offspring as the object of hope and 
expectation to carry on the family line. Meanwhile, the one-child policy also 
produces a negative aspect especially for nuclear families in that it tends to 
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encourage an egocentric personality in the individual. Broadly speaking, the 
only child in an average Chinese family is cared for and indulged by roughly six 
adults whose habit is to push that child to become a high achiever (Faure 2008: 
479-480). Uncle Tom, the father of Mary, told me that he hadn’t spoiled Mary 
when she studied in France. Instead, he taught Mary how to be independent and 
earn for her own daily expenditure.  
“I paid her tuition fees for the 1st year in France. The rest of years 
she got scholarship from University since her GPA was quite high 
at that time. She got private tutoring and taught Putonghua in 
France. She earned all her livings in France. I would say whether 
you spoil or not (your children), it really depends on how you 
teach (your children).” (Uncle Tom, 45, professional) 
 
Uncle Tom’s attitude on how to teach children is not frequent in my sample. 
Indeed, my findings indicate that the Chinese new middle class does not seem to 
know much if anything about Western-style parenting, especially more so 
among the older generations. While the Chinese new middle class parents put a 
great deal of resources into what is often for the family the only child, it does not 
necessarily mean there is any close affection with the child. The parent-child 
relationship between the older and younger generations does not seem to have 
the kind of friendly quality that is seen in the Western societies. 
In general, the Chinese parents, whatever the class, have authority and command 
respect and expect obedience. In some, there is a high level of intimacy and 
affection, with parents in the habit of coddling their kids and generally treating 
them like cherubs, even if the children deep down do not necessarily respect 
their ‘god.’ By and large, parents of the Chinese new middle class tend to fit the 
profile of a patriarchal parent, although there are pockets of liberal-minded 
attitudes depending on the historical conditioning and education level of the 
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parent concerned. 
From the dialogues recorded for this study, we could see that many of the 
younger generations receive a great deal of care from their families. Sometimes 
this can turn into a kind of pressure because they need to maintain the face of 
their family reputation. Indeed, for those post 80 generation (bāshíhòu 八十后, 
was born after 1980s ) or post 90 generation (jiǔshíhòu 九十后 was born after 
1990), their childhood is mostly one of cramming and swotting (Huang 2008). 
Ivy is a twenty-six-year-old accountant in a top accounting firm. She is the only 
daughter of an older-generation family who obtained her first degree in Hong 
Kong. 
“..... How to say, the relationship with my parents? It’s 
bittersweet emotion, including respect, love, conflicts and thanks 
to my parents. They want me to be an accountant, a prestigious 
job that can guarantee work until I retire. This job has no age 
barriers. Usually, I tell the good news to my parents and hide bad 
things. I am the only daughter in my family. My parents want me 
to be Number One in front of my relatives. I don’t want my 
parents to lose face. I need to upkeep them since they’ll be 
retiring very soon. I don’t have any siblings and the pressure is 
unexplainably huge.....” (Ivy, 26, professional) 
 
Jiang concurs with Ivy. He comes from a reputable family in Guangdong. He 
took more than a year to find a teaching post outside China after he earned his 
PhD. Now he can only find a teaching post in one city in Guangdong. The low 
salary makes him very disappointed, but it is better than no job. In fact, he wants 
to be working in Hong Kong or Macau for a better future and well-paid salary. 
He cannot do something that ruins the reputation of his family. 
“If I find a low-paid job, I will ruin my family’s credit. I have 
pressure I need to please my parents. Now you can imagine how 
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frustrated I am...I will keep finding a prestigious job and 
well-paid job either in Hong Kong or Macau [near Hong Kong]. 
My family invests in me a lot and I cannot let them lose face in 
front of my relatives.” (Jiang, 31, professional) 
 
So it appears that middle-class parents tend to have more ambitions for their 
children because of having only child in the family. They therefore show a need 
to maintain or improve family and social status through that only child.  
Anxiety and uncertainty over generations 
This study finds that the Chinese new middle class have a kind of anxiety and 
uncertainty about how to reproduce their social status and privileges over 
generations. The younger generation no longer can fully utilize the favourable 
factors like the 1980s and all the businesses have been saturated in today’s China. 
It is more difficult for their children to do business since everything seems to be 
more institutionalized in post-reform China. Cultural capital (education level) 
will become the entry ticket but it means nothing if they don’t also have social 
capital (social networks). The younger generation  have a strong degree of status 
inheritance from their parents and are members of the Chinese new middle class 
in terms of academic achievements, occupation and career paths (Bian 2002a: 
104-105). Education serves to reproduce differentiated cultural patterns.  A 
dominant economic class is able to have better or higher education and so have 
access to higher culture (good taste). There is a high degree of anxiety and 
uncertainty over generations. Both generations think education is the best way to 
keep their status as middle class status (Gladney 2000).  
For many in the older generation, it can be a lifelong round of making 
investments to help their children study abroad so as to maintain the social worth 
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(‘face’) of the family. Uncle Fong considers sending his elder son to the USA in 
the future. He says,  
‘‘I don’t worry about myself but worry terribly about my two 
children because it’s pretty difficult to secure a good position or 
start to do businesses in China today. All the businesses are 
saturated [now] and have little room to do. What I can do is to 
provide good education and buy two apartments [author’s 
clarification: one for his marriage and one for rent] to my elder 
son [author’s clarification: his little son is only seven year-old in 
2008].” (Uncle Fong, 48, entrepreneur) 
 
In fact, the life of the average mainlander is laden with escalating costs for 
family needs like food, hospitalities and education. Furthermore, while China 
has something like ‘nine years of free education’ (as most Westernised countries 
do) children get schooled only if they have or can get urban residence.28  
In Shenzhen, for instance, tuition fees in state schools are half subsidised by the 
local government. Tuition in private and international schools are not subsidised 
and all fees are privately funded by the family. Uncle Yang and Uncle Lee share 
the same views about their children’s tuition fees.  
“I need to earn more and more money, which has to include 
expenses for children’s studies, expensive sponsorship fees. It 
costs me around RMB¥5,000 monthly [US$732 or £505] to feed 
my five-year-old son. He studies in one international 
kindergarten. I want him to speak fluent English and I am going 
to send him abroad if I can. If your child fails to get a university 
offer, which might possibly cost you even more than you could 
afford.” (Uncle Yang, 40, professional) 
                                                 
28
 The Chinese sociologist Li Peilin (2005) calculates that the cumulative cost of raising children 
in China from birth to sixteen years is no less than RMB¥250,000 (US$35,000 or £17,500) using 
only direct costs. Tuition fees just for secondary education could total as much as RMB¥48,000. 
The industrialisation of tertiary education is a cause of school fees to be at very high levels. Most 
Chinese parents are exceptionally demanding in their children’s education, and many are 
desperate that their children should be fluent in as many as eight languages. Even while income 
levels of the Chinese new middle class is constantly going up, they are not keeping pace with 
skyrocketing costs of living (Xiao Fen 2007). Xiao, Fen. (2007). “Ten Features of the Anxiety 
Disorders in the Chinese new middle class”; in Chinese; http://www.cnr.cn, retrieved 28 
November 2007). 
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“The annual investment in children’s schooling—like having 
them attend different kinds of courses and training 
programmes—can cost you as much as RMB¥55,000 (US$8,052 
or £5,565).” (Uncle Lee, 40, entrepreneur) 
 
That most of the older generations of new middle class [20 out of 35] need to 
keep financial reserves for their children’s education which explains why the 
older generations are apt to buy real estate rather than invest in equity or other 
relatively riskier securities. Most of the younger generations tend to have 
farsighted, broad horizons for their future. They also tend to have working plans 
in place to pursue higher degrees in Hong Kong or overseas at some point in the 
foreseeable future. The other reason why the younger generations are stressed is 
because their obligations to their parents becomes reciprocal over time. They 
will have to feed at least four elderly members (their parents, their grandparents 
or father or mother in law if they get married). King says,  
“I am stressful in feeding four old people in my family. I know I 
need to maintain competitive power in society since it is quite 
difficult to get and keep job in China today. I need to give my 
parents a comfortable life. This is my promise.” (King, 30, 
entrepreneur) 
 
Kong, 30, professional, he feels the stress though his parents had helped him to 
buy an apartment for his marriage. He says,  
“My parents have their pensions because both of them are cadres. 
They also have their own saving which is sufficiently enough for 
their retirement. They had helped me to buy one apartment. But I 
still have stress that I want to get married with my girlfriend next 
year. I need to sufficiently take care of my own family. Can I rely 
on my parents to feed my wife and children?’ (Kong, 30, 
professional) 
 
The parents of the older generation (the first cohort) were most likely employed 
by the state enterprises which can provide their pensions until they die. They had 
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their pensions and medical services with the existence of dānwèi system before 
1976. The second cohort of the older generation is most unlikely to have pension 
and medical services with their job. Therefore, they need to rely on their only 
son or daughter to provide their living after they retire, or rely upon their own 
accumulated resources (at least some of which they will have invested in that son 
or daughter).  
Summary 
While the younger generation of the Chinese new middle class construct for 
themselves a system of signs that codify social differences and human 
relationships (Baudrillard 1998), there is simultaneously a desire to be shorn of 
an air of provincialism and take up overt signs of modernness or culturedness or 
civility. 
The overt signs of modernness or culturedness or civility are largely provided by 
merchandise and services associated with foreign (or at least non-Chinese) 
cultures and lifestyles. The ability to consume at high quality and quantity 
creates and reinforces the appearance of conspicuous consumption because that 
is the easiest way to imply that you are more economically and culturally 
successful than other people and that you are more capable of success. 
Foreign merchandise and services are ready-made icons of modern life in China 
because (a) their availability is increasing in all parts of China because of 
globalisation and marketisation of the overall Chinese economy, and (b) the 
merchandise or services are so distinctively un-Chinese and therefore 
unconnected to possible Chinese provincialism. 
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The ever-increasing need to keep up a distinct social status for yourself as a 
means to emphasise economic ability and cultural aptitude in consumption leads 
to increasing levels of consumption, in both quantity and quality. 
In a globalising world, people in post-reform China are more market-oriented 
than before, and the younger generations are more so than the rest. Many 
Chinese living or who have lived abroad bring to China a more heightened sense 
of a globalised world. In this new world, the Chinese new middle class has a 
market-oriented identification, one that blends and emphasises instrumentalism 
and pragmatism in consumer choice (Yu 2005, Hung et al. 2007). In short, the 
globalising nature of China offers ample opportunities for the acquisition of 
cultural capital, social networks and economic capital for the younger 
generations to build their own careers and their hometowns. This provides a new 
challenge for the younger generation (Brown 2003, Cao 2001, Chen 2006). They 
need to maintain their competitive power in order to provide a comfortable life 
for their parents.  
In the next chapter (Chapter 6), I will explicate the details about the Chinese new 
middle class and guānxi networks. The guānxi network is a common survival kit 
for both the younger and older generations in today’s China.  
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Chapter 6 
 Guānxi networks and the Chinese new middle class 
 
“Max Weber [1951] considered the lack of trust in Chinese society to be 
a major factor in explaining why historically the development of China’s 
credit and commercial activities were considerably hindered. When 
trust remains only based on kin community and when personal links, 
reciprocity, moral obligation, and duty towards the community as a 
social capital remain essential, then the transaction costs for finding a 
reliable counterpart, negotiating a contract and enforcing it, become 
extremely high. A moral attitude prevails only within kinship or circle of 
friends and acquaintances.” 
(Faure 2008: 485) 
 
AS ARGUED IN PREVIOUS CHAPTERS, the way that institutional structures 
in China have evolved since 1978 has important consequences for the formation 
of the Chinese new middle class (Gilley 2008). The role of cadres remains 
important, influencing the collaboration with professionals and entrepreneurs. 
Institutional mechanisms of regulation are unbalanced and weak, and riddled 
with loopholes. The new middle class and others often exploit loopholes in the 
system for pecuniary or other gains, thereby reinforcing any grey areas that exist 
in the system. The rush to economic performance causes due diligence in 
governance to fall by the wayside.  
This chapter aims at investigating the importance of guānxi networks of the 
Chinese new middle class. Developing reliable personal connections with 
powerholders (cadres) becomes the overall business strategy for the 
entrepreneurs and professionals of the new middle class. Collaborations involve 
bargaining, negotiations and mutual accommodation through informal situations 
(social gatherings) but within an institutionalised setting (institutional polices). 
These help to maintain individual and group interest and advantages.  
Chapter 6 Guānxi networks and the Chinese new middle class  
 191 
Guānxi as an internalised process in China 
Bian (1994, 2002a, 2002b) provides the most relevant definition of guānxi with 
respect to the Chinese new middle class. Guānxi is the dyadic, particular and 
sentimental tie that has the potential to facilitate exchanges of favours between 
parties connected by the tie. The close relations (called affective or emotive 
guānxi) contain strong expectations of cooperation. The thickest of those 
relationships merge into family ties, making the parties ‘one of the family’ or 
‘one of us.’ Building and maintaining guānxi networks is a dynamic and lifelong 
process for every Chinese person (Lin 2001, Zhou & Pei 1997). 
Guānxi network building and rebuilding may well have become an internalised 
habitus for the Chinese (Bourdieu 1984). Collaboration to do business and make 
profits since the1980s provides a practical impetus and lubrication for cadres to 
meet professionals and entrepreneurs from other parts of China as well as the 
Hong Kong middle class in the same groups. Since it is now the way of 
post-reform Chinese society to be more business-oriented, guānxi networks 
appear everywhere.  Wank (1995 in Walder 1995:181) pinpointed “As markets 
develop, the resources requirements linked to bureaucratic discretion are also 
greater, obliging entrepreneurs to cultivate official patrons.” Therefore, Wank 
(1995) also places emphasis on the importance of institutional policies to do 
business since the economic reforms reinforce the development of informal ties. 
In building and using guānxi networks, the Chinese new middle class seems to 
rely on using different kinds of social capital to create what is called a “cultural 
nexus of power” (Duara 1988, Li 2001: 189). This phenomenon is generally 
seen in our samples in Guangdong. What has also been observed during the 
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course of the fieldwork in this study is that the most powerful guānxi networks 
are asymmetric personal connections with the police, local cadres and district 
officials who have direct control over land use, resources and the enforcement of 
statutory regulations. For example, if an entrepreneur operates without a 
business licence (and a ‘special business’ licence in particular), the institutional 
process will often regard that entrepreneur as a criminal and be subject to all 
sorts of harassment by the police and other authorities (Li 2001: 190).  
This study finds that local bureaucrats still exercise great authority in many areas 
of the economy in urban China, particularly in matters of contracts, investment, 
land and property, financing and taxation. Building relationships with 
facilitating cadres is often easiest with gift exchange. Material and non-material 
gift exchange helps launch reciprocal assistance and continuing indebtedness 
between parties. In that sense, gift exchange can be understood as a process of 
building interpersonal relationships to improve economic activities. Uncle Fong 
elaborates that pleasing the cadre’s family members is crucial as well as the 
value of the gifts:   
“If you want cadres to give assistance for your career, then you 
have to prepare more gifts, money and presents. You’re not only 
pleasing the cadre himself, but you need to please the cadre’s 
family members like his wife, sons or daughters. I and my wife 
[usually] go to Hong Kong frequently to buy some diamonds, 
bird’s nests, Rolexes, gold and brand-named handbags [like LV, 
Guccis and Prada] in order to please cadres’ wives, sons and 
daughters or even their relatives.....” (Uncle Fong, 48, 
entrepreneur) 
 
Uncle Beck and Uncle Moss echo Uncle Fong. The more expensive the wines 
and cigarettes, the more sincere and interested you will seem to the cadres. 
Uncle Beck says, 
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“The value or price paid for a dinner shows the sincerity you put 
to the connection. And the value also says a lot about the 
generosity of your sincerity towards the cadres. It is also quite 
common to spend a few thousand yuan on famous brand wines or 
cigarettes for the cadres.” (Uncle Beck, 56, entrepreneur) 
 
 
Uncle Moss updates me that you will have greater chance to succeed and 
maintain a good relationship with that cadre if you pay ‘gigantic’ laisee29. 
 
“Most of our buddies compare how much laisee or red packet 
money we give to the cadre for their birthday, for their family’s 
birthday, for their children’s marriage or even for their funeral. 
The more money you give, the more sincerity you have.” (Uncle 
Moss, 48, entrepreneur) 
 
Social connections call for social events, which provide the venue for ‘extra 
legal functions.’ In China, it is commonplace, almost trite, to pay respects and 
maintain or improve connections with local cadres by gift-giving (Yang 1989 & 
1994), especially during the Chinese New Year or the Mid Autumn Festival. 
Gifts are not just of mooncakes, or the like, but also contain cash inside. 
“One of the more influential cadres in Guangdong province 
always receives a lot of gifts from different kinds of people. But 
these people [cadres] are always too busy to take care of those 
gifts, which are processed by their domestic helpers, who put the 
gifts away for a while and then throw them out when the 
mooncakes are off. Those who scrounge mooncakes for a living 
may well be blessed with an unforeseen income, as there is 
nothing but money inside those gifts. Wine and cigarettes are 
among the popular items for this and red packets also.” (Uncle 
Tony, 50, entrepreneur) 
 
In such cases, guānxi goes beyond mere emotional bonding and becomes a 
formal structural element of the Chinese new middle class. Even as a special 
form of guānxi, interpersonal exchanges are still normally in terms of reciprocal 
                                                 
29
 ‘Red packets’ (hóngbāo 红包) are a uniquely Chinese feature in the exchange of gifts and gift 
money during times of festivities and celebrations. The practice of giving and receiving red 
packets is called song hóngbāo (送红包) in Putonghua. ‘Red packet’ is known in Hong Kong 
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obligations, where a cycle of gift exchange takes place to assure the value of 
wages, contracts or donations (Migone 2007: 182). Like the regular guānxi, the 
motivation for the exchange of favours is transacted through emotional 
expressions of sentiment (gǎnqíng 感 情 ), human feelings or compassion 
(rénqíng 人情) and face (miànzĭ 面子) (Yang 1989 & 1994). Interviewees never 
tire of pointing out that interpersonal relationships are of supreme importance in 
China since time immemorial (Anderson et al. 2008). In fact, many of the 
interviewees go on regular shopping sprees in Hong Kong, buying expensive 
merchandise that is meant for winning the favour with cadres and entrepreneurs 
back home. The maxim is, “The more gifts you provide, the more business 
opportunities you will get. The more you pay, the more you gain.” 
Judging from what my interviewees say, guānxi networks and gift-giving is 
rather intricate in practice. Gift exchange in the Chinese context is hardly as 
straightforward as buying privileges with cash. It takes a certain degree of 
cultural understanding to sense where the balancing point is and how the value 
of the gift is assessed in non-monetary terms. In many cases, non-material gifts 
are more valuable than material ones because somehow they express a higher 
degree of friendship or loyalty. What matters more is not the gift itself but the 
message conveyed by the gift-giving (Ong 1999: 153, Yang 1989 & 1994).  
For my own participant observation, some of the Hong Kong middle class claim 
that they have trouble in maintaining a long-term business relationship with 
some of the new middle class though they enjoy the same types of lifestyles and 
consumerism with them. The older generations are deemed the most inscrutable 
                                                                                                                                 
and the rest of the world by its more familiar Cantonese name of laisee (利是). 
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and inassimilable to the Hong Kong middle class because they have their own 
‘insideness’ (Wank 1999). ‘Insider categories’ through a sense of solidarity and 
mutual sentiments set up reciprocal relationships within the class boundary. The 
sense of solidarity and mutual sentiments comes from having the same forms of 
lifestyle practices, which in this context is having matching accents, matching 
dialects, similar kinship or blood relationships or even the same surname. In the 
context of the Chinese new middle class, one develops a connecting train of 
thought with a common acquaintance by infusing a common identity into two 
people and draws them into a single circle of ‘insideness’ (Wank 1999: 164). In 
the broad sense, whether or not the new middle class actually gathers together on 
their matching forms of lifestyle practices is a matter of 
circumstances—nevertheless these are all elements of culture and refer to 
cultural practices in everyday life. 
Since the guānxi network builds on common attributes of its members, it can be 
construed as the lifeblood of the development of private entrepreneurs 
everywhere in China (Tsai 2005). These guānxi-network relationships could be 
seen as a form of corruption or be rationalised more innocuously as a practical 
means of reducing transaction costs in a transitional economy. What is clear is 
that strong ties often exist between cadres and entrepreneurs. This is because 
guānxi embodies the idea of social closeness. A society that still operates on 
relationship networks almost in the way of an institutional process will have the 
kind of atmosphere that carries on with a rule-by-law spirit of governance.  
The problem is that institutional governance in China today is now largely 
skewed towards dependence on social bonding rather than on institutional rules. 
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Social bonding is now fully immersed in much of Chinese daily life and is 
manifested in a wide range of institutional activities that are otherwise regarded 
in liberal countries as a straightforward matter of procedure. For instance, 
applications for passports, residential permits, business registration or property 
registrations are now all done without much regard to actual regulations. It is no 
mistake to say that China has a weak ‘rule of law.’ 
Weber (1951) considers the lack of trust in institutions in Chinese society as a 
crucial factor in explaining why development of credit and commercial activities 
in China were considerably hindered for much of the time in Chinese history 
(Faure 2008: 485). The Weberian argument (1951) is that the transaction costs of 
finding a reliable counterpart and negotiating a contract is extremely high in 
China where social capital (based on personal links, reciprocity, moral 
obligation and duty towards the community) remains important. If a ‘proper’ 
system of governance like those in liberal democracies were ever to appear in 
China, an absolute majority of Chinese people would have to follow rules and 
guānxi networks would be diminished.  
How do the cadres understand guānxi 
In post-reform China, the cadres still play an influential and leading role. The 
bureaucratic hierarchy of the Chinese political system in many senses 
determines the personal interests of party or government officials in matters of 
power, promotion and, ultimately, corruption. Local protectionism is strong in 
many parts of China. The link between the fiscal revenue of the state and the 
personal interests of officials lies in the omnipresent and unchecked power of the 
Chinese state apparatus. But most of the cadres think that even if they have 
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received gifts from citizens or from their friends, they have integrity and are 
honest in upholding the doctrines of justice, equality and transparency as a local 
cadre. All cadres [11 out of 11] say their work units give them clear operating 
instructions and even run courses on how to avoid corruption. 
“My work unit often keep us informed about the integrity of the 
PRC and CCP. We cannot receive any gifts, presents, money and 
cash from the citizens.” (Aunt Monica, 60, cadre) 
 
 
“Our work unit is very transparent..... If someone wants to obtain 
a business registration certificate, it’s very easy to do in 
Guangdong without bribery. The residents come to our office to 




One cadre thinks China is actually moving towards democracy and the village 
election is the breakthrough for democracy in China (Shue 2004). 
 
“Now, villagers in many parts of China can exercise their right to 
elect their representatives. The pace of political development in 
China is not slow because the pace of the democratic 
development cannot be too fast. Political democracy should be 
achieved only step by step otherwise it would go out of control. 
China has already done a good job in improving democratic 
development.” (Uncle Leung, 48, cadre) 
 
From the aforementioned cadres’ conversation, they see that political 
development in China today is much better than in pre-reform times. Guānxi is 
not directly related to corruption since even the Western democratic political 
system has instances of corruption. They see that one-party rule is suitable for 
China, which has improved a great deal politically. 
The official account of the cadres is that they think government departments are 
increasingly transparent and more workmanlike, so that the average person is 
able to deal with officials directly without recourse to social connections or 
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giving gifts. Most of the cadres gave an official account about their integrity and 
honesty to the PRC or CCP. Uncle Fang, an influential cadre, usually receives 
gifts from professionals and entrepreneurs. Uncle Fang says, 
“My work unit often invite professors from Tsinghua University 
(very famous one in Beijing, it ranks No. 1 in China in 2010) to 
give lectures on socialism, politics and economics so that I can be 
up to date and keep up with what’s going on in society as well as 
in the current political and economic systems. They always 
educate us how to avoid corruption and say ‘no’ to gifts and 
money. The Communist Party gives us clear instructions. We 
vow not to receive gifts from our friends, partners, colleagues 
and relatives when we agreed to become Communist Party 
members. I remind myself repeatedly to follow these guiding 
principles. ” (Uncle Fang, 49, cadre) 
 
But when I asked Uncle Fang whether he will receive red packet or gifts or not, 
he said that cadres are not eligible to receive gifts from ‘citizens’, by which he 
means the ‘ordinary’ members of the public. Professionals and entrepreneurs are 
not classified as ordinary ‘citizens’; they are able to afford the expenditure and it 
also represents payments’ for the role of cadres in facilitating the businesses 
from which their incomes derive. With regard to the ‘ordinary citizens’, he is 
required to maintain the high morale of the integrity and honesty of the cadres. 
The cadres in Guangdong are sufficiently well organised and enthusiastically 
good enough to service ‘ordinary’ Chinese citizens without any bribery and red 
packets. He continually receives positive messages, education and 
indoctrination from CCP and his working bureau that corruption and bribery are 
serious offences. The participant observation with the interviewees helps us to 
clarify some arbitrary and ambivalent narratives received from some cadres.  
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The influential role of cadre-entrepreneurship 
As set out in Chapter 4, the older generation of the new middle class have 
significant common experiences that they draw upon in their interactions. 
However, what binds them together is not just that they have experiences in 
common and that most entrepreneurs and professional in the older generation 
were previously cadres, but also that, for this generation, the roles are not clearly 
distinguished. The rise of a hybrid élite of entrepreneurs and 
‘cadre-entrepreneurs’ (Nee, 1989, 1991, 1996) is particularly significant in 
post-reform China. Thus, cadres are frequently also entrepreneurs, at least part 
time, and professionals also engage in entrepreneurial activity. Equally, given 
continued state ownership, some positions – for example, in health – that in 
Western contexts would be identified as professional also overlap with cadre 
roles and provide opportunities for various kinds of private activities.  In this way, 
it is not simply an issue that entrepreneurs need to make contact with cadres, for 
example, but that in some contexts, the entrepreneur in question is also a cadre. 
In this way, the different groups have no difficulty in understanding the world of 
the other and its expectations, because they occupy that world not just in terms of 
common background, but also in terms of their everyday activities. When 
entrepreneurs talk about the qualities expected in a cadre they know what they 
are talking about not just in terms of their own entrepreneurial interests, but also 
because they have experiences themselves of occupying the role and facilitating 
similar entrepreneurial activities.  
This explains the continued significance of cadres in a system that might 
otherwise be seen to be moving in the direction of a market system in which their 
role is diminished. Cadres are the ones who have benefited the most from the 
Chapter 6 Guānxi networks and the Chinese new middle class  
 200 
economic reforms. They have job stability as well as officio and ex officio 
capabilities to mobilise resources that the state and the market both want. Aunt 
Jennifer is a veteran cadre and she frankly informs me about doing business in 
post-reform China. She says,  
“We cannot earn as much money as entrepreneurs and 
professionals, but we have certain powers in hand. We are not the 
influential cadre like the central government officials, but they 
need our referrals and information when they do some part time 
job or some consultancy with each other. Most of them need our 
help.” (Aunt Jennifer, 53, cadre) 
 
Uncle Robert, previously a cadre, echoes Aunt Jennifer:  
 
“On the criteria list of being a cadre, interpersonal network come 
first and then your personal achievements. The basic salary entry 
point is RMB¥5,000 [US$732 or £505 a month]. Pay rise is 
possible. But cadres have power. I also seek help from cadres..... 
As a famous saying goes, ‘It is beneficial for your business if you 
have connections at court.’ Corruption can also be found among 
officials of the Anti-Corruption Bureau. The reason is that their 
income is very low.....” (Uncle Robert, 50, entrepreneur) 
 
Another entrepreneur, a former cadre and vice-director of a factory in a 
collectively owned company, gained his networks in state-owned enterprises, 
and then it was easy for him to develop his ‘special business’ with guānxi 
networks before setting up business in Guangdong: 
“Luckily, for my established networks and connections with my 
existing colleagues (cadres), I chose here [Guangdong] as my 
foundation base. I had worked in the government bureau for 
fifteen years and have established networks with many cadres in 
Guangdong. I rented land and set up my cement factory in 1995. 
If your network ties are bad, officialdom will make trouble for 
you even if you’ve done nothing wrong.” (Uncle Henry, 50, 
entrepreneur) 
 
There are two types of cadre. Administrative cadres (xíng zhèng gànbù 行政干
部) are those in major government establishments at the municipal, town or 
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village levels. For want of a better term, they are civil servants or government 
officials. ‘Business cadres’ or operational/line cadres (shìyè gànbù 事业干部) 
(This is not the official differentiation, but I learnt from the interviewees of 
Chinese new middle class of the differences) are effectively state or government 
employees who operate in state-affiliated organisations such as hospitals, 
schools, public utilities and so on in a kind of semi-professionalised capacity.  
In theory at least, administrative cadres (much like any other civil servant around 
the world) are barred on penalty of dismissal from running private businesses or 
making personal gains from their activities. In reality, many administrative and 
business cadres have outside jobs and investments through unreported 
collaborations with outside entrepreneurs and professionals. This is no secret 
and they wanted to share this with the researcher. 
“I’m also engaged in capital construction with my 
secondary-school classmates—and there’s no need for us to 
[report] profits to our superiors. Besides [that], my wife and I also 
run our real-estate business. Actually, most cadres in China are 
engaged in their own businesses.” (Uncle Leung, 48, cadre)  
 
“I’m an engineer in a government department. I run my business 
in pile drivers and escalators, and I often take up different 
projects. This is my way to survive.” (Uncle Chan, 60, 
professional and cadre) 
 
“We always do some consultancy to some private corporations, 
including some land developers and some national enterprises. It 
is normal to have part time job. But you cannot be so greedy and 
obvious.” (Uncle Man, 40, professional and cadre) 
 
“My workplaces won’t prevent me from working part-time jobs 
or have other investments. No one will have time to check up and 
investigate whether or not you have additional investments 
outside of the workplace if you are not too greedy.” (Aunt Jane, 
40, professional and cadre)  
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Most of the cadre have part time jobs. The average basic salary of most of cadres 
is about only RMB¥5,000 (US$732 or £505) a month. If a cadre refuses grey 
income or laisee money, the question on the minds of most professionals and 
entrepreneurs is, how is it possible for the cadre to support his fairly well-off life? 
Indeed, the constant receiving of gifts and favours is the modus vivendi in the 
professional life of a cadre. It has been said that one of the traits of a successful 
cadre is in being greedy without being avaricious. Uncle Chung updates me on 
how the quality of the cadre has a direct relationship with the laisee money.  
“The quality of the cadre is very questionable. They cannot speak 
clearly and decently in the public. They even cannot organize 
their speech systematically. They get promoted is definitely not 
because of their talent but because of their guānxi with their 
supervisors. They give gifts like bird nests, diamond and branded 
goods to bribe their supervisors or other influential cadres in 
Guangdong.”(Uncle Chung, 56, entrepreneur) 
 
Most of our entrepreneurs and professionals echo the following set with the 
researcher: “Don’t you see that many regional cadres go to Hong Kong for 
shopping with cash only? They don’t like to use credit cards because they don’t 
want to have any record in black and white. They are afraid to reply to their 
email. We’ll meet face to face to settle every deal. All cadres are corrupt but it all 
depends on the degree of corruption. It’s normal to receive money and gifts from 
professionals and entrepreneurs. I can’t believe cadres are not corrupt.” 
(Informal interview with Uncle Victor, 11 June 2008) 
Deep and close relationships developed in this way also extend into business 
activities, as one entrepreneur brings to light about the sharing of work and 
costs:  
“I know many regional cadres spend RMB six hundred thousand 
yuan [US$87,796 or £60,605] on the purchase of a lychee garden, 
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while some regional cadres spent more than RMB six million 
yuan [US$877,960 or £606,050] on decorating two three-storey 
houses that are being built nearby it. Also, a dozen gardeners had 
already been hired to work on this lychee garden. Some regional 
cadres spent RMB a hundred thousand yuan [around US$14,631 
or £10,004) on improving transport links to a winding road to 
[the lychee garden], and another cadre spent more than a hundred 
thousand yuan on road renovations and repair like paving the 
road with cobblestones. Most of the money comes not directly 
from their salaries, but from the red packets they received in their 
work.” (Uncle Fong, 48, entrepreneur) 
 
Raymond, a doctor echoes Uncle Fong, he says,  
“The norm for both administrative and executive cadres is to 
moonlight and receive gifts from fellow doctors. The senior 
doctors spend the gift money on investments in Hong Kong or 
other places, otherwise they don’t know how to make all this 
money [look] right if the authorities start inspecting. That’s why 
so many mainlanders spend at least a hundred thousand dollars 
on buying flats and in consumption in Hong Kong. It is very 
common for doctors, lawyers and engineers to bribe cadres to 
buy houses. Usually they can buy a house at cheap price. 
Normally, for example, I’ll pay RMB ¥600,000 [US$87,777 or 
£60,313] when buying a house. Of the total cost, forty percent 
goes to the estate agent, forty percent to government officials and 
only twenty percent goes to buying the actual house itself.” 
(Raymond, 30, professional and cadre) 
 
The norm for both administrative and executive cadres is to moonlight without 
reporting the fact to their establishments. It is observed that if the cadres are not 
greedy, brash, obvious and over materialistic, neither their close colleagues nor 
friends will report to their supervisors.  
Professionals appeared abruptly on the scene in post-reform China. The 
Communist Party had long regarded the professional with political suspicion 
mainly because of Mao Zedong’s love-hate attitude towards intellectuals 
(Laliberte & Lanteigne 2008, Ryan & Musiol 2008). That stance turned around 
after Deng Xiaoping rose to power and the economic reforms started running in 
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the 1980s. Deng and other pragmatists took the view that it was possible and 
necessary for the party to make use of capitalism to strengthen its political 
legitimacy and also to fence off any negative political consequences (Zheng 
2004). The definition of the ‘professional’ in the post-reform era is somewhat 
different to Mao’ regime. The professional in the reform era shall possess a 
marketable skill based in knowledge that is organised and sanctioned by a 
corporate body. Those professionals in post-reform China should usually define 
themselves in meritocratic terms (expert, ‘zhuān’ 专) and by political affiliation 
(red ,‘hóng’ 红), but not only based on political affiliation (red).  
In the switch from a socialist economy to a capitalist one, professionals are 
mostly of the view that breaking free from the risks of poverty is only through 
industriousness and education. But many professionals know full well that 
cultural capital alone is not the magic wand to success. Of course, there is no 
denying that cultural capital (in the form of education) helps get people better 
jobs and work partners. In addition to the meritocratic requirement, it is also true 
that doctors, lawyers and academics normally get a job or work opportunities 
through social networking of old school friends. Therefore, social capital is a 
necessary ingredient to stabilise or safeguard the job (Goodman 2008: 167, Li 
2010, Hasan 2006). With this social capital, professionals, cadres and 
entrepreneurs form their class boundaries, based on laisee and guānxi networks. 
A doctor who works in the public/state sector is in fact a professional and a cadre 
rolled into one, and this is especially the case with senior-level medical 
practitioners. There is keen competition for professional appointments and 
doctors compete with one another for special treatment from superiors. 
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“Without any social connection, it’s very difficult for me to work 
in hospitals—and public hospitals especially. Thanks to my 
relative, I got a job as a doctor in this hospital. I do hope he will 
always help me. If you know a senior doctor and he wants to 
employ you, then he’ll put out a recruitment notice according to 
your personal particulars. The recruitment target, male or female, 
the required qualifications or working experience—these things 
will all be confirmed beforehand. There’s no such thing as 
‘transparency’—even the superiors emphasise that—it’s all crap, 
and a lot of information is kept well in the dark.” (Raymond, 30, 
professional and cadre)  
 
That is a usual storyline for doctors in China today. A careful use of social 
connections could help even an inexperienced or underqualified doctor get a 
hospital job without too much trouble. Good doctors but few little or no social 
connections could end up working in places like Hunan, Hebei or Sichuan where 
incomes are low even for doctors and lawyers. 
Back in Guangdong, however, incomes for public-sector doctors are relatively 
high. Moreover, many public-sector doctors supplement official incomes with 
grey income from outside official hospital work. It is quite common for them to 
work as private family doctors (i.e. general practitioners), run private clinics or 
other businesses, invest in the stock or property markets, or just teach at a 
college or university. Many doctors will take any opportunity to have a second 
income. Indeed, for many, the sideline often proves to be the gateway to personal 
fortune. As a professional and a cadre combined, the doctor is particularly able 
by position and training to earn extra incomes and mobilise resources for it. That 
ultimately becomes a motivator for many doctors to stay on in the government 
sector rather than break out into the private sector. 
In addition to the official and grey salary, public-sector doctors normally receive 
gifts and emoluments from fellow doctors as well as from patients. They 
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circumvent official auditing by spending or investing gift money outside the 
country, usually in Hong Kong. Evading traceability by supervising authorities 
may explain why so many of the Chinese new middle class are able to spend 
upwards of RMB¥1 million (US $146,316 or £99,796)  on buying a flat without 
needing a mortgage. 
Some Guangdong public hospitals already allow doctors to take up officially 
arranged or permitted secondary jobs because of the low official salaries. The 
health authorities let doctors give and receive red packets, so long as it only 
involves their own patients. However, sònghóngbāo is very necessary if you 
want to maintain good relations with your superiors. Most of the Chinese people 
usually give gifts to cadres or other influential people to help them to get things 
done during the Lunar Chinese New Year, Mid Autumn Festival, Labour Day  
(1st May) and National Day (1-3 October). We this type of corruption holiday 
corruption (jiăqī tānwū 假期贪污 ) which usually takes place in holiday). 
Holiday corruption is the hóngbāo, red envelopes that traditionally contain gifts 
of money. 
You can get other good benefits in the workplace. A doctor says, 
“If you can maintain a good working relationship with your 
supervisor, you’ll be assigned to a better job with bonuses and 
commissions. You’d be asked to buy medicinal products, 
medicines or equipment. Not only will you get repaid for what 
you’ve paid out, but also be repaid ten to fifteen percent extra as a 
bonus for your hard work. But not every doctor gets such a 
privilege. This goes to those who are on good terms with their 
superiors.’ (Aunt Jane, 40, professional and cadre) 
 
Chinese citizens enjoy by right many forms of free medical treatment in public 
hospitals. The cultural norm among the Chinese is to try and get a higher quality 
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of treatment by incentivising others with red packets.  If you are rich, you could 
expect to have a doctor specially assigned to you, in which case you are 
compelled to do sònghóngbāo. 
Conversely, your inability to sònghóngbāo suggests that you might be in some 
sort of financial difficulty. No hóngbāo and you get rude and apathetic attitudes 
from a lot of medical personnel. Put out hóngbāo and their attitudes will be 
patient, serious and honest. The hóngbāo money becomes an additional 
allowance or commission for the doctor and, in fact, the extra cash can figure as 
a major portion of the monthly income. Aunt Jane is a senior doctor in 
Guangdong and the health authority she works for permits her to work part time 
outside of the official workplace and also to make personal investments. She 
runs private clinics with her husband (also a doctor) who runs other clinics, a 
transport company and a dockyard. Her father was a former director-in-charge in 
one hospital in Guangdong: 
“With allowances and commissions from song hóngbāo my basic 
monthly income is actually RMB¥10,000 [US$1,463 or £999]. 
My husband and I have two clinics. Also, we’re medical 
consultants in government sectors and to private corporations. 
Only rich people will call us for treatment. My patients will be 
grateful to me because I’ve treated their illnesses well. I have 
investments in transport companies, property and land 
speculation and own some shares. These extra investments 
become the major proportion of my monthly income.” (Aunt 
Jane, 40, professional and cadre) 
 
Lawyers face a similar situation to that of doctors. They need to have their own 
guānxi networks so that they can do their job efficiently. This is evident in the 
way in which land transactions are dealt with. When an entrepreneur seeks to 
buy land rights, he or she hires a high-level lawyer or senior lawyer to deal with 
land transaction procedures (Michelson 2007: 400). The latter will use their own 
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social capital from the government sector like the Bureau of Justice. Some of 
them were former bureau chiefs and deputy bureau chiefs from the Bureau of 
Justice. They left the government sector and set up their own law firms in 
Guangdong. Therefore, they have close relationships with the police, 
prosecutors and law courts at the local level. Most of the professionals make full 
use their own social networks to enjoy preferential access to the land transaction 
procedures in Guangdong.  
Uncle Man, a lawyer in one governmental sector, updated me about the situation 
of a lawyer in China today.  
“I need to maintain good relationship with my colleagues in 
various sectors in order to visit my clients (suspects or defendants) 
to have some convenience (fāngbiàn 方便). If I don’t have a 
network, I don’t know how to help my clients. You don’t know 
how to start to do things.” (Uncle Man, 40, professional and 
cadre) 
 
Most of the professionals and entrepreneurs will pander to and ingratiate 
themselves with the cadres, and lawyers are no exception. Private developers 
may outsource private law firms to host the contract procedures. The legal 
institutions do not consist of any independently legitimated lawyers. Even with 
the so-called lawyers present to sign the contract, it is hard to guarantee that they 
received formal training. There are terms used to describe this situation:  
contains ‘black lawyers’ (hēi lǜshī 黑律师), ‘fake lawyers’ (jiǎ lǜshī 假律师) 
and ‘underground lawyers’ (dì xià lǜshī 地下律师) (Michelson 2007). The 
post-reform context is that the local policies are unsystematic and no authorised 
organisation exercises the formal power of the implementation of the existing 
land and property policies (Michelson 2007: 401).  
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Second, the land market, structured by ambiguous property rights, has helped 
produce a great growth in physical urbanisation in the coastal regions since 1988. 
That in itself has helped encourage the emergence and evolution of the Chinese 
new middle class in those regions. China had no property developers before the 
1980s. By 2001, there were 29,552 registered developers (State Statistics Bureau 
2002 in Zhu 2005: 1378). 
“The ambiguity of the land reform makes me so confused. But I 
don’t bother to know what the revisions are. I receive some 
updated news from my buddies who are my ex-colleagues at the 
state-owned enterprises. They keep me updated and informed 
where is the best place to invest. They will reserve the ‘gift’ 
[means land or apartment] to me before formal tendering. But 
they still go ahead the whole procedures of the so-called formal 
tendering.” (Uncle Billy, 56, entrepreneur) 
 
Uncle Cheng, an entrepreneur, who is not an ex-cadre but with the 
consumption patterns and lifestyles with his business partners like 
entrepreneurs, cadres and professionals, can buy an apartment before the 
formal procedures of land transaction.  
“This is no actual formal procedures of public tender or public 
auction. What is the most intriguing part is whether you know the 
cadre or not. The so-called formal procedures of land transactions 
are only ‘the show’ for the regional officers [in Guangdong] to 
demonstrate that they are justice, equality, professional and 
transparent. This is the ‘show’ and ‘face’ party only. I live here 
and I know what’s happened.....” (Uncle Cheng, 40, 
entrepreneur) 
 
Land-use rights (LURs) are a somewhat murky area following changes to 
socialist Chinese land law. Prior to 1980, there was no investment or speculation 
in land in China. Article 10 of the 1982 State provides that all urban land belongs 
to ‘the State’ (i.e. the central government) and that suburban and rural land is 
under collective ownership unless the law specifies state ownership. The state 
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and the collective own the lease of the land usually for 20 years. Therefore, 
collectives own residential land and family land plots, so no individual and 
family is legally permitted to transfer land on their own to third parties unless 
proper conveyancing permissions are obtained first. But the State and the 
Collectives (dānwèi) still own the lease of the land though some of the cadres 
can manoeuvre via loopholes in the land law.  
The situation changed by around 1988. In that year, the National People’s 
Congress passed a constitutional amendment that “the right of land use can be 
transferred in accordance with the law” (Zhu 1999, 2002, 2005). Two years prior 
to the amendment, the Ministry of Land Management was set up in 1986 to 
coordinate the use of state-owned urban land nationwide. The ministry operates 
in each local government through a Bureau of Land Management. Each bureau 
coordinates national policy on land use in the local jurisdiction and its work 
includes preparing yearly land-use plans, allocating quotas of farmland 
converted for non-farming use, issuing land-conversion permits, monitoring the 
sale of land-use rights and collecting tax on land transactions (Ma & Wu 2005: 
173).  
The 1988 constitutional amendment legalised the leasing of public land such that 
urban land now becomes leasable to developers or users for a fixed term on 
payment of a lump-sum rent to the central state (Zhang 1988). That means 
land-use rights are derived property rights. The state does not formally recognise 
these derived rights but it does not actively deny them. Therefore, land-use 
rights never automatically replaced the longstanding system of administrative 
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allocation of land. In fact, both systems coexisted with each other throughout the 
1980s and 1990s (Ma & Wu 2005: 169, Zhu 2005). 
The PRC seems to have systematic institutions to monitor the land reform but 
these do not work in practice. There are still many collaborations among cadres, 
professionals and entrepreneurs that have been recorded, involving 1.2 billion 
square metres (1,200 square kilometres or 436 square miles) of urban land (Sun 
2004b: 36). The loss of state land assets through illicit land-use transfers has 
been estimated at around US$1.4 billion per annum since the late 1980s (Sun 
2004b). It is really the revenue from the asset that is lost, rather than the asset 
itself, since the leases remain state-owned or collectively owned enterprises.   
The Chinese government invented land-use rights chiefly to counteract the 
problems faced by the public housing sector in an emerging market economy. 
Housing shortages began to surface in the 1980s soon after the economic 
reforms started. For a long time previously, the dānwèi was the primary housing 
provider in Chinese cities. Dānwèi built or provided affordable housing to 
employees usually at one-fifth the cost of commercial housing because dānwèi 
were able to acquire cheap land through administrative allocations. Bigger 
problems started appearing by the early 1990s. Many state enterprises went into 
financial trouble because of various episodes of global economic downturn. 
Many state enterprises in Guangdong started to sell their premium city-centre 
landholdings in a bid to rejuvenate their business or to stave off bankruptcy. 
Other state entities such as universities or even military or government 
establishments followed suit. Some state enterprises have been given land 
through administrative means on the basis of capital investment plans (Ma & Wu 
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2005: 168). Some sold their landholdings by forming joint ventures with 
established property developers or directly to multinational companies (Ma & 
Wu 2005: 171).  
“I and my wife were the workers of the state-owned enterprises 
since 1988. We got two apartments. I bought the two apartments 
(1 is 60sq meter and another one is 80sq meter) which cost me 
around RMB¥80,000 (US$11,705 or £8,003) and RMB¥100,000 
(US$14,631 or £10,004) [respectively] from our dānwèi [his 
state-owned enterprise] in 1993. Then I sold one apartment at a 
relatively high price in 2005.  The other one we have been leasing 
out since 1999.”(Uncle Ho, 49, entrepreneur) 
 
Uncle Yuen seems to concur with Uncle Ho.  
“I think this was the privilege to be the former cadre. I buy the 
apartments with cheaper price [£15,003 for 100sq meter] with 
our dānwèi in 1992. Then, I sold it out in 2005 with some profits 
[at least triple profits than the buying price since the market at 
that time in 2005 is keeping soaring and burgeoning].” (Uncle 
Yuen, 56, entrepreneur) 
 
Most of the housing price was chéngběn (cost 成本) price but not biāozhǔn 
(standard 标准) price before 1998. Most of the cadres benefited from the 
chéngběn price. The cadres or ex-cadres were heavily protected by the chéngběn 
price to buy their apartments. They gained extra discounts to buy public flats 
(10-20 percent of market prices) from their dānwèis (Lee & Zhu 2009, Li 2009).  
In addition, before 1998, there was the so-called Existing Housing Stock 
Subsidy (EHSS) to the cadres. EHSS refers to the lump sum housing subsidy 
which was provided to the cadres before 1998. The subsidy was based on the 
rank and number of working years to multiply cadres’ wage level in 1998 (Li 
2009:48-49). Therefore, most of the Chinese new middle class worked in the 
state-owned enterprises for more than 10 years, and they gained some 
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substantial subsidies from their dānwèis according to this calculation. This 
largely explains why they are the winners in post-reform China.  
To alleviate the disparities between the poor and the rich in urban China, the 
housing monetarization policy (HMP) was announced in 1998 by the State 
Council (Lee & Zhu 2009, Li 2009). The dānwèi were not allowed to buy or 
build housing from the market for any rental or development purpose. Instead 
cash subsidies would be given to the cadres to encourage high income groups to 
buy private housing, while medium and low income groups are encouraged to 
buy low-cost housing (Lee & Zhu 2009: 39).  
However, the so-called the ‘recommodification of urban housing’ (meaning that 
the dānwèi has the need to provide the housing function to its staff was replaced 
by the market, details see Davis 2003) of the HMP is only eligible for the 
state-owned enterprises. The staffs from private sectors and collective 
enterprises are totally excluded from HMP. The HMP is being regarded as the 
marginalization of city residents outside of the state system (Li 2009:54). 
Therefore, the so called cadre-entrepreneur I addressed in Chapter 2, are the 
winners under the land reform.  
Dānwèi to a certain extent regulate the land price. Some dānwèi leased out 
housing units to parties unaffiliated with any dānwèi at 
higher-than-state-stipulated or even market prices, violating the applicable rules. 
The dānwèi and other state entities were able to do all this mainly because of a 
definitional uncertainty over ownership. Urban land constitutionally belongs to 
the public—but who is the public? And who represents the public? In the 
absence of any clear-cut answer, many dānwèi just went ahead and set up land 
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development companies to take advantage of their tax-exempt status with 
respect to their landholdings. These dānwèi-based companies often earn 
substantial profits when they transfer the land-use rights to commercial 
developers in the secondary land market (Ma & Wu 2005: 172). In the process, 
the dānwèi passes de facto rather than de jure property rights in state land to third 
parties (Macuse 1996)—a situation of ultra vires any lawyer could recognise. 
Uncle Chan is familiar with this transition because his job closely relates to land 
transaction.  
“I bought my house from my dānwèi in 1989 with RMB¥100, 
000 [£10,004] for 100sq meter. This price [I think] is a least 50% 
lower than the marketing price in 1989 for the similar quality and 
size. But when I bought them in 1989, we still thought it was a 
little bit expensive. Now, I sold this house in 2004 and at the same 
time, I used this money to buy other private houses. Of course, I 
can contact some of my ex-colleagues to buy the apartment with 
relatively lower market price. The regulation is not serious here 
[Guangdong]. It seems my dānwèi used their names as a 
state-owned enterprise to earn profits by transferring land use 
rights to the private commercial developers....but I don’t know 
the further details…This is what I can tell…nothing can tell you 
further… ” (Uncle Chan, 60, professional and cadre) 
 
The ability to behave ultra vires ultimately comes down to the power of the 
cadre operating in conjunction with entrepreneurs and legal professionals. If the 
cadre has the proper jurisdiction, he or she is the validator of the conveyancing 
of land-use rights. If not, he or she can fairly easily to find the proper cadre to 
arrange for the desired result. The desired result comes in a number of ways, 
depending on which way best fits the interests of the transacting parties. In 
China today, leaseholds are acquirable by public tender [zhāo biāo 招标 ] or by 
public auction [pāi mài 拍卖]. Both are formal and transparent methods. Of 
course, transactions are also done through private negotiation [xiéyì cuōshāng 协
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议磋商], which are not formal or transparent (Ma & Wu 2005). Predictably, 
most land in China is leased or transacted through negotiation. Table 9 (below) 
presents the full picture about land allocation, mainly by private negotiation, but 
not by pubic tender or auction. 
Table 9: Land allocation by different land-leasing methods 
 Guangzhou Shantou Shenzhen 
Lessor and period 1992-2002 1992-99 1998-99 
Area leased 251 sq. km 17 sq. km 36.4 sq. km 
By private negotiation 57% 98.8% 97.7.% 
By public tender 2% 
By public auction 
42% (combined) 1.2% (combined) 
0.3% 
Sources: Shenzhen Bureau of Statistics (in Zhu 2005: 1372), Shantou Bureau of Statistics 
(2000), Li (2009). 
 
Guangdong province authorities do in fact have strict prohibitions on the sale 
and purchase of unfinished buildings in order to maintain social and market 
stability. The problem is that the government at the national and regional levels 
has at best weak control over the private sector. The government has little 
control over its many quasi-state enterprises because they operate more like 
privately held enterprises in a marketised economy. 
“My friends also do it the same way. They spend RMB millions 
yuan [US $146,316 or £99,796] buying quarries, petrol stations 
and real estate on mortgage in most cases. With the help of a 
friend of a cadre, I placed a reservation on a building land. Some 
dealers placed bids of RMB ten million yuan [US$1.6 million or 
£1 million] on that desirable land. But RMB three hundred 
thousand yuan [£30,367] out of RMB five million yuan 
[£506,130] must go to local officials. This was a big deal but this 
guaranteed I could buy the land. Also, the bidding activities in 
Guangdong are not open to others. Once the local authority 
spreads the news on this, what you bid for is unwanted building 
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land.” (Uncle Fong, 48, entrepreneur) 
 
In fact, quite a number of our entrepreneur interviewees managed to obtain 
low-priced apartments from ex-cadres. Many cadres got apartments from SOEs 
and sold them off to commercial developers in the early 1990s. 
However, if you don’t have any connection and rich information from your cadre 
friends, you are the loser. Sunny is an entrepreneur and he shares his experience 
below.  
“I needed a house urgently in 2006. I followed the formal 
procedures to approach the property agency nearby my office. I 
spent RMB one million [US $146,316 or £99,796] yuan for 
100sq meter. After buying that house, I learnt from my friends 
that 40% (of my total budget) goes to land and property 
developer; 40% (of my total budget) goes to government officials 
and 20% (of my total budget) goes to contractor. If I have 
network to know the cadre first, I can save up my 40% of my total 
budget. How come that is a huge difference? That’s unfair, isn’t 
it?” (Sunny, 34, entrepreneur) 
 
It is a recurring storyline from our entrepreneur interviewees. Some who owned 
suburban farmlands in the province became obviously rich, mainly from 
converting farmland into residential buildings that they let out. Uncle Pan was 
previously a cadre before. He comes from a peasant family and his family has 
owned some lands at the peripheral area in Guangdong. He says,  
“Developers contact me about my farmland. I’m a native, got 
some (but later know that many) farmland in my village that 
belongs to the suburban area in 2000 but now all became 
cosmopolitan shopping malls or resident areas [in Guangdong]. I 
was lucky [and couldn’t believe my millionaire dreams were 
coming true] and thanks to the help from my buddies [ex-cadres]. 
After I sold all of my farmland, I quit the job in [state-owned 
enterprises] and teamed up with my partners to set up my own 
property investment company here [in Guangdong].” (Uncle Pan, 
40, entrepreneur) 
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The peasants living in the cities in China are the ones who benefited from the 
burgeoning economy in post-reform China (Zhou 1996, Ho 2001). They sell 
some farmlands to the government. Uncle Pan’s recollection concurs with 
depictions in the literature by many sociologists, such as Ma & Wu (2005), Zhu 
(1999, 2002, 2005), Ho (2001) and Li (2009). Cadres have taken on a leading 
role in stimulating the market for private property in Guangdong. Most land and 
private properties sold in situations described by Uncle Pan are almost never 
sold by public tender or auction but by behind-the-scene negotiation facilitated 
by meals and gift giving. Officials and ex-managers of land-owning dānwèi are 
in fact among some of the more successful landbrokers. Those officials and 
ex-managers, like Uncle Pan himself, have connections to government agencies 
with responsibility for approving development projects or hold details about the 
availability of land lots. It is through such landbrokers that premium land parcels 
owned by dānwèi went to commercial developers (Ma & Wu 2005: 172).  
With regard to housing units, some were later leased out at higher-than-market 
prices (Market prices tend to be the highest price, but some cadres can lease out 
even higher than the market price) to people or establishments unaffiliated with 
any dānwèi, violating the applicable rules.  
That explains why some cadres and ex-cadres such as Uncle Pan have become 
powerful personalities in land and housing acquisition in post-reform China (Ma 
& Wu 2005: 171). With their political capital, cadres and ex-cadres are able to 
acquire land through behind-the-scenes channels at lower-than-market prices 
and then sell them to private developers at a steep profit. But not all the peasants 
have been benefiting from the transformation of urbanization in Guangdong. If 
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they don’t have any friendship ties with the regional cadres they can’t benefit. 
Uncle Pan’s story is a lucky one because he has close friendship ties with some 
cadres. But there are still many peasants who cannot receive profits though they 
want to sell their lands to the private developers just like Uncle Pan. The close 
ties to regional cadres become the crucial factor for the peasants (if they have 
their lands) to get profits.  I believe that to avoid the ambiguities of land polices, 
it is the responsibility of the central or local government to closely monitor the 
implementation of land policy and administration so that it can guarantee its 
social credibility (Ho 2001:421). But there is still considerate room for 
improvement in land and property restructuring in Guangdong.  
‘Special businesses’ 
‘Special businesses’ include hotels, tour agencies, fitness centres or salons, 
karaoke bars, massage parlours, sauna baths and various entertainment 
establishments. These are quota-restricted business, so licences are difficult to 
obtain from the Licence Registration Bureau. In Guangdong province, it is not 
difficult to run a ‘normal’ business, but running a ‘special business’ (tèzhǒng 
hángyè) is exceptionally difficult. Local authorities specify quotas on the 
number of entertainment clubs, hotels, travel agencies, bars, discotheques, 
restaurants, coffee shops and massage salons. The only way to launch these lines 
of business is through social connections with important people, i.e. regional 
party cadres. 
A cadre explains the formal process of how a major government department 
such as the Industry and Commerce Bureau in Guangdong issues business 
licences: 
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“Industry and Commerce Bureau will carefully investigate the 
nature of the business. If the business contains prostitution or 
other ‘exotic’ elements, the bureau will absolutely ban these 
illegal practices and crack down on prostitution in karaoke 
lounges, bars and nightclubs. Simultaneously, the Police Bureau 
will check to see if karaoke sessions contain prostitution and 
exotic business. Moreover, they will also check sanitary 
situations, fire alarms and safety facilities whether they fulfil 
specified regulations by the Industry and Commerce Bureau. The 
final decision of issuing special business licenses isn’t decided by 
one person but it is approved and decided by all of the committee 
members in the Bureau.....” (Uncle Fang, 49, cadre) 
 
Guangdong provincial regulations prohibit the establishment and operation of an 
entertainment venue of a commercial performance nature until issued with no 
fewer than four different licences: ‘business operation licence’ by the 
Administrative Bureau for Industry and Commerce, ‘licence for entertainment 
business operation’ by the Ministry of Culture, ‘inspection certificate of 
fire-fighting facilities’ by the Fire Department, and ‘special business operation 
licence’ by the Ministry of Public Security. The process of getting just one 
permit could take months or even a year or two. 
However, ownership of a licensed ‘special business’ is a sure indicator that the 
business owner enjoys strong guānxi with the local authorities. A connection 
with a strategically placed cadre is the most effective and efficient way to 
circumvent compliance. Our entrepreneur interviewees confirm that such 
activities are quite usual in business licensing matters. 
“Although getting business licences isn’t difficult, it can be very 
troublesome and complicated. The procedures are pretty 
complicated and bureaucratic. I tried for ten years before 
successfully getting one with the help from one of my very good 
friends. He introduced me to a cadre. Everything can be settled 
through referrals and meals. The tradeoff is to give red packet and 
gifts to the cadres. The cadre helped me by arranging all matters 
about the setting up of the factories in a smooth, efficient way. If 
you want to get licenses for special industries in Guangdong, it is 
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top difficult.” (Uncle Cheng, 40, entrepreneur) 
 
Part of the collaborative strategies involved is by reference to common tastes in 
everyday life practices in matters of food, fashion, entertainment, travel, cultural 
activities, smoking and drinking, and developing guānxi. 
A cadre confirms as such: 
“I [always] receive gifts and banquet from my buddies and 
partners. I have the power to access certain documents related to 
setting up business in Guangdong. Everything about setting up a 
business should be directed to the Industry and Commerce 
Bureau. Some clients will buy airtickets and provide hotel 
accommodation for me because they want to handle everything 
in a smooth, efficient way and do away with [formal] 
bureaucratic procedures. But I need to receive gifts selectively 
since I have received so many requests.....” (Uncle Yip, 48, 
cadre) 
 
Most entertainment venues are to be found on upstairs premises, thereby 
creating a complication in terms of property rights for the premises, and quite a 
number of them do not hold occupation permits. That is why many of these 
venues are unlicensed in their operation. The authorities generally tend not to 
investigate licensing status, contrary to specified regulations. By virtue of the 
existence of unlicensed establishments and the concurrent failure of the 
authorities in enforcing health and safety requirements, that state of affairs 
points to a potentially significant level of collusion between local officials and 
interest groups. Owners of such venues are impatient, business-wise, to go 
through the massive red tape and instead dodge the system by dealing directly 
with people in the government establishment who have the discretion to shelve 
or delay regulatory oversight. 
A ‘special business’ is often put into operation while licensing registration is still 
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pending. Official inspection teams would be told that the venue is ‘on the 
pending list of registrations’ or, even more expediently, temporarily shut down 
while inspections are imminent. It is also highly likely that inspection team 
members (who are cadres themselves) are recipients of bribes and so turn a very 
blind eye to things. The problem is quite insidious within the ‘special business’ 
sector, and it is something of an open secret that many such venues are partly 
owned by government officials (Ming Pao Daily 2008). 
On one occasion I was invited by a member of the new middle class to a karaoke 
session. It soon transpired that prostitution and other ‘exotic’ business was going 
in the venue. Women in heavy makeup and low-cut dresses half exposing their 
cleavage were sent in to ‘work the floor’30 there (Zheng 2005 in Lee 2005). The 
venue had been licensed as a ‘special business’ and subject to regular inspections 
by the police and the licensing authorities (usually once or twice a month). One 
can infer that the venue owner is well-connected. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the authorities have long known about 
prostitution and other unlawful activities in many entertainment centres. They 
have taken no action and instead treat the activities as non-existent. As one 
regional cadre says:  
“If my friends need my help, I would help them wholeheartedly. 
It’s awful for me to reject their demands or have to cancel their 
special business licences if and when their entertainment places 
contain prostitution or erotic business. I should have to depend on 
their help when I want to set up business.” (Uncle Yip, 48, 
cadre) 
 
Uncle Yip’s conversation (above) confirmed that the Chinese new 
                                                 
30
 That is, to wait around for and solicit customers or be solicited by them with a view to paid sex. 
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middle class have a common social circle in their everyday lives. It’s a 
reciprocal relation and trust for their friends and business partners. The 
Guangdong Police Bureau is the most powerful of all in the province and 
is the one under particularly heavy pressure for bribery. Uncle Fong says: 
“When you report cases of prostitution and erotic business in 
entertainment places, the police will come quickly—within five 
minutes after you report it. The reason is that the police will be 
receiving bribes from the entertainment owners. The owners will 
cope with the bad situation immediately. Usually, the owner will 
bribe the police with money to prevent them from disclosing the 
scandal to the public. Otherwise, their reputation will be affected. 
However, when you report cases like robberies and theft, the 
police are late in coming because they need time to handle and 
solve problems, which are regarded as redtape. These cases don’t 
affect an individual’s reputation and prestige. Therefore, the 
police require more effort to solve problems. So they come late 
normally.....” (Uncle Fong, 48, entrepreneur) 
 
We can infer from our interviews and dialogues with cadres that they are nearly 
always the first port of call to solve problems. Cadres would be bribed to keep 
scandals from erupting into the open. Cadres in leading government departments 
would not intervene if prostitution or serious criminal activities could be 
established in entertainment centres. The standing operating procedure among 
cadres is to maintain the status quo, unless the central government orders 
otherwise. The authorities know full well what is happening, where it is 
happening, by whom and with whom. They will do nothing, certainly nothing on 
their own initiative. No licence will be revoked and no police will come calling. 
If cadres’ hands have been greased, action is even less forthcoming. Bribing 
regional cadres is the best ticket out of trouble. 
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The privileges of the cadre-entrepreneurship   
As economically important as entrepreneurs are, they need close relationships 
with cadres and professionals to upkeep their businesses. Currying favour is a 
two-way street: cadres also want to develop good relations with entrepreneurs, 
especially those connected with multinational corporations. The only awkward 
part is that relationship building with cadres is less straightforward than with 
entrepreneurs or professionals. The reason is that the cadre is the human 
interface of the state and that makes the work nature of the cadre a sensitive one. 
Therefore, building relationships with a cadre relies more on having a prior 
trusted introduction. The status, integrity and credibility of the introduction 
could be crucial. As one interviewee explains: 
“I’m used to maintaining good relations with regional cadres like 
the police bureau, tax bureau, industry and commerce bureau and 
licence registration bureau. Our relationships between 
professionals and regional cadres are interdependent and 
intertwined. If a reliable and trustful person isn’t introducing you, 
the regional cadre won’t dare to take your red packet and gifts. 
Regional cadres are now very cautious simply because they don’t 
know your background. They don’t know whether you’re a spy 
from the central government or from other Western countries to 
test the waters or the honesty of the regional cadres in China. It’s 
useless for you to have in-depth interview with regional cadres. 
They won’t tell you the truth.” (Uncle Fong, 48, entrepreneur) 
 
Uncle Bryan who was previously a cadre (as vice director of a factory) says he 
built his networks over the years when he worked in various state enterprises. He 
updates me on the differences between guānxi in China and the western 
countries.     
“We need to maintain good relationship with each others [cadres 
and professionals]. You don’t know when will you need their 
helps? I think everywhere is the same, even western countries 
still practice guānxi but with different contexts and contents, I 
think…I usually will eliminate any fox in my business 
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partners….” (Uncle Bryan, 40, entrepreneur) 
 
 
It seems it is universally true that human relationships (guānxi) are of 
instrumental importance in everyone's career development, particularly (if not 
only) in China. Most of the Chinese new middle class [40 out of 59] update me 
that you may not have to have close business partners or friends, but the primary 
caveat is that you don't have any foe in your class boundaries of the Chinese new 
middle class. Guangdong is such a small place and any foe will hinder their 
business expansions. But the major difference between western countries and 
China is that guānxi is a formal and institutionalized habitus in China. The 
Chinese new middle class relies on guānxi as a ‘code of law’ or ‘rule by law’. 
The advantage of cadre-entrprepneruship is a crucial factor for them to form 
business partners within their same class boundaries as I argued in Chapter 4.   
Most of the entrepreneurs are former cadres. They have close connections with 
remaining cadres in Guangdong province. The collaboration among Chinese 
new middle class is the result of shared lifestyles, tastes, collective memories 
and shared profitmaking. The most important aspect, however, is that most of 
the Chinese new middle class are members of the Chinese Communist Party 
(dăngyuán 党 員 ) and membership is the entry point for collaborations. 
Entrepreneurs and professionals have typically made fortunes by colluding with 
influential cadres, or took advantage of market chaos to get away with the 
ambiguity and incompleteness of institutional polices (Li 2009).  
Only forty-six out of more than two thousand representatives of the Ninth 
Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference in 1998 were private 
businesspeople (Zheng 2004: 74, Li et al. 2006). The state is effectively the 
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single largest employer in the country. There are all together 30,000,000 cadres 
in China in 2008 (China Statistical Yearbook 2009). The state (and therefore the 
party) is still prominent in managing the country’s flow of funds, from loans for 
foreign investment to subsidies via local banks. The state is a major source of 
capital and the chief controller of the use of capital throughout the country at all 
levels. The corporatist and exclusionary relationship between politics (the state) 
and economics (the business world) is forged by the economic reforms and 
restricts the autonomy of capital. Therefore, private entrepreneurs are compelled 
to cooperate with the state in their risk management strategy to protect 
investments (Li 2003: 78). 
The Chinese middle class is in a good position to borrow money from the 
Chinese government to take big projects like collaborating with different parties 
to build entertainment establishments and shopping streets in Guangdong. 
Broadly speaking, private companies in China have a hard time getting bank 
loans. Having the right kind of public sponsors and the proper cooperation with 
bank officers significantly eases the difficulty. 
In China, local banks are considered to be administrative agencies because they 
are delegated the work of dispensing state subsidies to state enterprises and 
collectively owned corporations under the guise of loans. If you have the right 
connections with administrative cadres, one (as an entrepreneur or professional) 
could probably collaborate on difficult kinds of investments or business areas at 
the provincial level. Some cadres interviewed for this study say that they have 
had business ventures with professionals and other cadres since the 1980s using 
bank loans that were secured through their well-established network of fellow 
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cadres in the local government and local banks. Our example of Uncle Tang will 
show the general situation with reference to entertainment establishments and 
shopping streets. 
Uncle Tang is a cadre who went into business with another entrepreneur and his 
former entrepreneurs back in 1993. They were partners in a joint project with a 
Japanese company to set up a resort and entertainment centre somewhere in 
southern China. The all-inclusive facility has hotels, parks and gardens, farms 
and stables, a golf course, bars, restaurants, nightclubs, message salons, 
karaokes, pools and sports and recreational centres, all amid a beautiful 
landscape. The resort resembles the famous Country Garden (Biguiyuen 碧桂
园)31 and other famous property development in Guangdong (not undertaken by 
Uncle Tang). Uncle Tang’s group of principals borrowed RMB¥5 million 
(US$731,689 or £504,212) from local banks and another RMB¥5 million from 
the local government, investing around RMB¥9 million (US$1,317,041 or 
£907,582) in the project. The bù (部 the regional administrative level of the 
government) in Guangdong approved their development plan. 
Although the principals on the Chinese side have to repay the loans before even 
making a return on investment, Uncle Tang says it was very easy for a regional 
cadre in Guangdong like him to obtain resources such as loans, investment rights 
and priority processing of licensing documentation. Apart from that project, 
Uncle Tang also borrowed RMB¥5 million [£504,212] from the local 
government to invest in another joint project, this time a complex of commercial 
and residential buildings elsewhere in Guangdong province. Uncle Tang’s case 
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  It is a very well-known private developer in China, Guangdong province in particular..  
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is a fine example of the high degree of autonomy cadres and ex-cadres have 
when they engage in business or other activities that are otherwise restricted or 
banned by their workplace regulations. Uncle Tang is a cadre of a land-owning 
dānwèi. His close relationship with the local government and banks stems from 
his having been a party secretary in the 1980s and son of a former cadre. In our 
example above, he sets up an outside company and simply transfers the land-use 
rights of the dānwèi-owned land to developers in the secondary property market 
for a large profit (Ma & Wu 2005: 172). Uncle Tang says, if he were not a cadre, 
he would be unable to make outside investments or engage in outside business or 
qualify to borrow from the local government or the local banks. He reaffirms the 
opinions of many that cadres today have more advantages than ever before, 
especially in Guangdong province where already-ambiguous local policies or 
regulations are more laxly enforced to regulate relationships between cadres and 
entrepreneurs.  
Many entrepreneurs have set up local Chambers of Commerce as an 
institutionalised way to assure and enhance self-sufficiency and to seek to 
formalise relations with the state (Cheng et al. 2000: 70). This then accounts for 
the heavy schedule of formal annual meetings, publication sponsorships and 
exchange of information that goes on in most Chambers of Commerce in 
Guangdong. Many private entrepreneurs and professionals are eager to set up or 
join work-related institutions because good relations with the state stimulate 
improvements in their moneymaking potential. There is a feeling of 
vulnerability to political shocks among the new middle class after the 
vicissitudes of the 1989 Tiananmen emergency. The numbers of private 
enterprises in China fell sharply following that event (and after the Asian and 
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global economic crises of 2003 and 2008). The Chinese new middle class is 
more concerned about consistency of official policies for the private sector and 
seeks whatever few political means are at hand to protect and advance 
commercial or social interests. This explains the eagerness of many 
entrepreneurs and professionals to join business associations and meet cadres, 
since officials exercise substantive power over commercial destinies. 
Professionals and entrepreneurs therefore prefer to wear the ‘red hat’ of a party 
member. They build or strengthen channels of communication for expressing 
concerns. 
What is absent is a well-functioning system of courts to regulate relations. Most 
of my respondents stated that they have never used the national or provincial 
court systems to enforce contracts or solve problems. The Chinese court system 
is in fact quite rudimentary, and officers of the court are amenable to corruption 
and influence-peddling because their job positions are low down in the 
government hierarchy and their educational backgrounds quite basic. Courts are 
also seriously compromised from an operational point of view in having to 
enforce sometimes-contradictory statutes that are haphazardly enacted by 
several different conflicting legislating bodies. Because courts are generally 
seen as ineffectual and their officers corruptible, the partiality of the new middle 
class to use gifts is perhaps a more efficient and effectual problem-solving 
technique. Personal ties to officials in government departments that supervise 
their areas of business activities can prevent administrative harassment. Gifts 
and favours to cadres in the police force can forestall investigations. 
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Limits of guānxi networks for the younger generation 
Guānxi networks have become the main mechanism to do businesses. The 
younger generation thinks that jobs are hard to come by and harder to hold down. 
They try to solidify their footing in society by acquiring very high levels of 
cultural capital (education) and also political capital. However, they also seem to 
find that social capital is slowly diminishing in value for getting jobs. 
Uncle Leung deeply understands the importance of cultural capital. He earned 
his MA through part time mode.  
“Now, education is an important threshold for your admission to 
any government institutions. Lack of educational qualification 
means no guarantee for a promising career prospect. Pursuing 
further studies is the critical factor for a successful career 
prospect in today’s China [He did his MA through part time 
mode]. Now we need written test for recruiting regional cadre. 
That means more considerations will be given to your ability and 
skills, but less importance is attached to your interpersonal 
network.” (Uncle Leung, 48, cadre) 
 
The younger generation need to be more independent than the older generation 
in their career, in that it has unprecedented autonomy in employment matters. 
The ‘iron rice bowl’ system that operated in the old days of state planning came 
to an end when the labour market became more market-led since the 1990s 
(Sheng & Settles 2006). Occupational mobility became more common and job 
security reduced. The country no longer operates on the socialist package of 
lifelong employment, automatic job assignments, fixed salaries, housing, 
healthcare, retirement benefits, ration coupons and so on (Hoffman 2006a). 
Guānxi is important in jobhunting but it is not for the younger generation the 
magic wand (Guthrie 1998). There are two debates about the importance of 
Chapter 6 Guānxi networks and the Chinese new middle class  
 230 
guānxi. One version is that guānxi is becoming less significant in the hiring 
process in the sense that employers in China today are putting more weight on 
merit-based hiring policies. Recruiters are increasingly using more formal, 
standardised and transparent recruitment procedures. Recruiters are increasingly 
able to design procedures that safeguard the integrity of the hiring process. 
One entrepreneur from a multinational enterprise says roughly the same thing: 
“We got the accountant and administration officer posts in our 
company. I’ve been invited to dinner by different kinds of people 
in order to entice me to give offers to their sons or daughters. 
There are many candidates applying for the posts. Finally, I gave 
the offer to the brightest candidates who are proficient in both 
English and Chinese and have good analytical and logical skills. I 
rejected some candidates who tried to bribe me since they don’t 
perform well in the written test and interviews. I think 
performance on the written test, group interview and individual 
interview is much important but at least a bachelor degree is must. 
Guānxi network is important but it’s not the magic wand at all.” 
(Uncle Jimmy, 49, entrepreneur) 
 
Today, job interviews often involve a variety of writing and aptitude tests plus 
one-on-one and group interviews. Many of the third and fourth generations of 
the Chinese new middle class express the same storyline that this interviewee 
recounts. Kong, a programmer in one multinational enterprise, he says,  
“Though my parents know some cadres, they couldn’t help me 
find a good position in foreign enterprise companies. I am not 
competitive enough to speak fluent English and I don’t have a 
good ground in English. Then, I had to take courses to improve 
my oral English. Then I had sent out more than 1,000 application 
letters to aim for a trainee post in some multinational enterprises. 
From the outset, I didn’t receive news from my applications. It 
takes me more than half a year to have the first written test. A 
standardised and strict recruitment process had been done. 
Finally I got the job after being shortlisted for different kinds of 
interviews, both individual and group interviews.” (Kong, 30, 
professional) 
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The other version of the importance of guānxi is that it still plays an influential 
role for jobhunting. Jiang, a professional, updates me on the new development of 
guānxi networks in China. He says,  
“Education is an entry ticket only, but the most important is 
guānxi network. It seems that everyone has a bachelor degree 
now. Someone get well-paid job from the state enterprises or 
national enterprises without any interview or they have assigned 
one candidate but they still asked you to go to interview….” 
(Jiang, 31, professional) 
 
Guānxi sometimes is important only when the legal system related to the labour 
market is weak or non-existent. Many of the Chinese new middle class accept 
guānxi ethics and apply them consciously or unconsciously in interactions with 
others. This is because guānxi ethics arise from internalisation processes, such as 
from socialisation in the family unit and throughout the life course of the 
individual. Therefore, guānxi building and rebuilding becomes a habitus for 
most Chinese people (Huang 2008). It is clear that education is of paramount 
importance or at least it is an entry ticket in today’s China. But at the same time, 
social capital or other relevant capitals pointed to Chapters 1-2 are still important 
for job hunting and securing career development for the younger generation. 
Summary 
In ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics,’ national as well as local official 
policies are unclear or even non-existent. The lack of clarity gives rise to some 
degree of decentralisation and regionalism in urban China. Incompleteness and 
fuzziness of institutional policies results in unique development and features of 
the new middle class, and this facilitates its collaborations within and outside its 
class boundary. 
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The ambiguity of reforms or restructurings in the land, property and dānwèi 
segments is still important to the Chinese new middle class because it provides 
its manoeuvring room in the market. Some state-owned enterprises had closed 
down or even transferred to private or multinational enterprises, and many 
cadres have used their positions as insiders to become wealthy (Chen 2003: 54, 
Roberts 1999, Anderson & Lee 2008). Agents of state-owned enterprises take 
more responsibility for making decisions for loans and land sales by negotiations 
than by tender. A reciprocal relationship becomes established among cadres, 
professionals and entrepreneurs. The ambiguous property rights are to the 
advantage of local growth coalitions and at the expense of the land revenue 
income of the central government. Cadres are clear beneficiaries (Zhu 2005: 
1377) and become the leading targets for collaborations with professionals and 
entrepreneurs. 
There are still some professionals and entrepreneurs who do not want to rely on 
guānxi networks. They prefer to rely on their credentials to find jobs by 
themselves or through headhunters. However, they also need connections to 
form special business, entertainment establishment and shopping centres. They 
get close connections through the channel of Chamber of Commerce and lychee 
orchard or others. While the importance of business principles and credentials 
also helps to accomplish things and reliance on guānxi is no longer sufficient by 
itelf, the latter remains important. The unsystematic nature of most institutional 
structures in China today, and in the foreseeable future, simply encourages 
guānxi networks to fill the gap. 
In the next chapter (Chapter 7) will explicate more details about the identity of 
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the Chinese new middle class and its political development. The Chinese new 
middle class are in the vanguard of consumption, but they are not the vanguard 
in democratic advocacy.  
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Chapter 7 
Class formation and political development 
 
“There is no hope for Chinese politics. What is the meaning of mín zhǔ 
[民主 democracy]? The citizen is mín (民 people) and the state is zhǔ 
[主 master]. We need to obey in the footsteps of the state. I took part in 
the June Fourth movement when I was a university student. We 
couldn’t say the June Fourth incident was a massacre—otherwise we’d 
expect to spend the rest of our lie lives in gaol. It is extremely useless to 
advocate and democracy. If there is the promise from Chinese 
government to promote democracy, they are telling lies and the reality 
will never come true.”  
 
(Uncle Yang, 40, professional) 
 
WHAT ROLES OR EFFECTS DO economic reforms and globalisation have in 
the process of deconstructing political hierarchies in Chinese society today? My 
study finds that there are distinctive differences between the younger and the 
older generations in term of class culture. The younger generations are 
individualistic, materialistic and moneymaking in attitude, while moving away 
from traditional cultural values like frugality, modesty, self-restraint and 
upkeeping of family reputation (Hui 1988, Faure 2008: 475). The older 
generations are tending to be more collective in terms of personalised networks, 
but their distinctive solidarity is far from being a form of class consciousness, as 
normally understood. There are some similarities shared by both the younger 
generations and older generations. The fact that my interviewees, by and large, 
do not recognise themselves as members of the Chinese new middle class (or 
any other kind of middle class) speaks volumes of that self-image and cultural 
identity still in flux. 
One major reason right now is the Chinese new middle class has no channel to 
express political sentiments and has no desire to pursue political democracy 
(Diamond 1999, Burnell 2006, Putnam 1993, 2000, 2002). Their advantages 
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seem strongly tied to those of cadres and they have always been the main 
beneficiaries of economic reforms. The non-confrontational policy of the new 
middle class vis à vis the party-state indicates that any radical change in civil 
society or in governance in China has not even progressed beyond a minimal 
level yet (Goetze 2008, Ma 2006: 208, Pye 1999 & 2001). There is no 
observable sign that the Chinese government is anywhere near moving in the 
direction of greater political liberalisation or the emergence of a civil society (Lu 
2001, Hooghe & Dietlind 2003) notwithstanding the emergence of the Chinese 
new middle class.  
Reconceptualising the Chinese new middle class culture 
It cannot be said that the Chinese new middle class will act in a way resembling 
the middle classes of the West in the near future. It is not a pillar of society to 
advocate social and political change in China. The regime discourages and 
suppresses challenges to its rule from any quarter as well as expressions of 
political opinion. The Chinese new middle class is not, and does not see itself, as 
the vanguard for democratic advocacy. Whatever the Chinese new middle class 
might or might not be, it is a strong supporter of ‘socialism with Chinese 
characteristics’ and therefore an ally of the government. 
All this explains why the Chinese new middle class is unable to form a uniquely 
‘new middle class’ political culture. As China still lacks a progressive 
middle-class element in its social stratification, the question here is how the 
future of that new middle class will evolve and whether it will produce a 
middle-class political culture of the kind associated with the middle class in 
western societies. Ever-widening income disparities, the waning capacity of the 
Chapter 7 Class formation and political development 
 236 
state to redistribute income fairly among its population and the inability of social 
institutions to deliver timely and equitable public services all raise serious issues, 
but, on the basis of the attitudes of those interviewed in this study, the new 
middle class is hardly the agency likely to address them.  
The weak degree of class awareness and class-based socialisation means that the 
Chinese new middle class are less prominent in Chinese society than is the 
middle class in Western societies.  
The middle class culture of the older generation 
The older generation have shown strong collective sentiments, but their 
collective identity is in terms of personalised networks rather than what might 
properly be though of as a class consciousness. They are strongly oriented in 
terms of their collective experiences, but they are generally flexible (at least not 
static) in their ways, as social, business and other conditions around keep 
changing in the post-reform era. Some have acquired additional marketable 
skills in order to maximise their personal and organisational competitiveness. 
The older generation are quite cautious about the future. The sense of 
uncertainty and anxiety about the status of Chinese new middle class is found in 
the older generation. They don’t have higher cultural capital, and they think that 
if processes are institutionalized they will have little room for manoeuvre. They 
are quite anxious about their future.  
“I cannot imagine if my factory collapses or gets bankrupt. I 
don’t have higher educational level and marketable skills, what 
can I do? Most of the jobs require master degree, I only finished 
senior high school and I only know how to do infrastructure. Can 
I become an employee? I don’t think so.....” (Uncle Henry, 50, 
entrepreneur) 
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The comparatively wealthy older generation in fact show the greatest extent of 
anxiety. They claimed their businesses are potentially an anachronism. They do 
not have the business acumen to try another new business in a globalizing China 
if their factories are forced to shutdown. They don’t know how to invest in the 
newly-developed industries like IT, shares, funds and investment business. They 
don’t have any marketable skills and foresight in accordance to the social change 
in society. They are winners and generated profits by relying on a cheap 
workforce, and favourable tax concession since the early 1990s. Self interest 
dictates a cautious attitude toward the future and a reliance on the Government to 
maintain the conditions for their continued success. Greater economic 
liberalisation, and further changes in the wake of globalisation, is among their 
fears, and, in so far as political liberalisation and economic liberalisation are 
perceived to go hand in hand, the older generation is no advocate of the former. 
In its approach to the risks that the future may bring it is defensive. 
Today, the Chinese invest in a diverse range of financial products at home and 
abroad. Real estate is a major investment area for the older new middle class, 
despite its having endured a long history of market downturns. It is very 
common to find the older generation investing in as many as eight shop premises 
for the sole purpose of earning profits on appreciating property values.  
“I know only how to do garment manufacture. I buy some 
properties because I am scared. I don’t want to be poor again. It 
wasn’t any fun to be poor. I need to rely on my former colleagues 
[cadres] and former classmates to have some new developments 
if my factory closes someday.” (Uncle Chris, 49, entrepreneur) 
 
The central government started to implement macroeconomic regulatory 
measures around 1993 to control the continual overheating of the property 
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market. Before then, many of the Chinese new middle class bought property at 
high prices, and when the property bubble burst, many suffered huge losses or 
had their investments wiped out. 
“Most of our types were poor before. We’re now rich, but no one 
can guarantee you won’t become poor in future. I’ve lost money 
in the stock markets in the 1990s and now I’m more than cautious 
in managing my wealth and finances. The disaster of financial 
tsunami doesn’t directly affect only me, but it affects the whole 
family. I’m not young anymore. Luck won’t always be with me. I 
have to be conservative and prudent in managing my finances.” 
(Uncle Victor, 50, entrepreneur) 
 
Some of them never recovered from the property or share market fiasco in 
2005-2006. Those who did survive the mess became extremely cautious about 
matters in general—a fear that ranks only second place to a primal fear of 
returning to a life of poverty from whence they came. Therefore, the older new 
middle class cadres and entrepreneurs in particular, are marked by a very 
cautious mentality towards investment matters in general, but especially about 
securities, bonds, insurance, mortgages and other financial instruments. The 
objective is to multiply the wherewithal for their retirement years and preserve 
money and asset value for future generations. Their orientation to the future is 
concerned with personal security and the most important experiences governing 
their attitudes lie in the past. 
The middle class culture of the younger generation 
The younger generations show class identity in individualised, mobile ways 
rather than in collective ways (Mendez 2008). For want of a better description in 
today’s China, the younger generations show characteristics of a 
‘post-communist personality’ (Wang 2002, Faure 2008: 476). That personality is 
Chapter 7 Class formation and political development 
 239 
apt to be individualistic and materialistic and moneymaking in attitude (Ting & 
Chiu 2000, Ting et al. 1998, Sun 2004), while moving away from traditional 
cultural values like frugality, modesty, self-restraint and upkeeping of family 
reputation (Faure 2008: 475). Although family reputation and personal social 
status may be important enough, they are inadequate on their own within the 
materialistic orientation of the personality so a moneyminded attitude takes 
more prominence. To prevent any possible demotion along the social strata, the 
Chinese new middle class resorts to ‘extensive investment in’ its social station 
and way of life.  
Generally speaking, the younger generation are good consumer targets for a 
wide range of retailers and service providers in China because of their relatively 
high purchasing power relative to the rest of the population. The consumption 
patterns of the younger generation of the class tend to be on a pleasure-seeking 
principle, fed by a growing need to be seen as modern and up to date with the 
world outside China (Wang 2002, Faure 2008: 476). High purchasing power and 
pleasure-seeking consumption needs mean that there is a rising trend for the 
younger Chinese new middle class to buy real estate, invest in various financial 
instruments and gambling. They usually have mortgages and enjoy their 
lifestyles, rather than seeking an active role in politics. Indeed, the shift from 
production-oriented state-centred socialism to market-centred reforms is 
directed a developing China as a consumer economy. In this way, the younger 
generation is at the vanguard of consumer society, but that consumerism replaces 
political ambitions. They do not seek to be cadres (except where it might be a 
personal advantage), but they have not developed a different kind of political 
sensibility oriented to extending economic reforms into the political area. 
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The younger generation, as I have explained in Chapter 5, need to work hard to 
maintain their competitive power. There is a kind of circularity to their life: work 
hard for needs, show off superiority to others, and then work hard again to 
sustain that superiority. In time, they seem to develop a sense of and also an 
anxiety about the origins and destinations of their lives. Ironically, they also 
develop an almost outright adherence to sensual pleasures, a need for excitement 
and sensationalism from all-night outs. Night after night, they congregate 
around town after a hard day of work.  
“Personally, I think I was indeed ‘poisoned’ unconsciously. I was 
born in a competitive society in China and I learned that the result 
of a task is much more essential than the process. For majority of 
the society, money comes along with a nice job. The diploma of a 
famous university, certifications and awards of competition are 
somewhat the boss of enterprises concern. The boss [in China] 
will consider whether you graduate from a famous university or 
got high GPA or not. I studied very hard for my undergraduate 
and master degrees with higher GPA. Now I have my job but it is 
not very stable. I usually go shopping twice per week. No one 
will see the effort you paid and pressure you suffered. That is 
indeed a vicious circle and I am sick of this sort of livelihood.....I 
don’t think we can do anything to improve this vicious circle… ” 
(Melody, 28, professional)  
 
 
The other interviewees pinpointed the contract-based nature of employment as 
the other reason to explain why the younger generations practice lavish 
consumption. The so called brand-named university and brand-named company 
are ingrained in the younger generations. This phenomenon makes people 
nowadays more utilitarian and pragmatic. They think that grades represent 
everything and employers only focus on their results and grades.  
“The contract-based nature for my job makes me insecure. I 
always work for an unknown future. I was forced to work hard to 
enter to the brand-named primary school, secondary school and 
university. Now I need to work in a not too bad company so that I 
can maintain a good quality of life to feed my parents or even my 
grandparents. The society won’t pay much attention on the 
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process and endeavour they are somehow neglected. Then, even 
if I don’t like my job, but with good prestige for my parents to 
show off in front of our relatives. This explains why I always 
have my crazy shopping of brand names.” (Ivy, 26, professional) 
 
Society rapidly changes and most of the younger generation feel powerless and 
desperate to control their future. The contract-based job gives them a sense of 
insecurity (Liu 2008). Most of the younger generation have well-organized plans, 
but unconsciously feel that they cannot control their future. The market in China 
is burgeoning and soaring, it is impossible for them to have such a frugal life and 
they will spend lavishly as a means to reduce their stress and get rid of 
uncertainty.  
As argued in Chapter 4, the younger generation knows that today’s China is 
potentially moving to be more institutionalized and formalized. Initially laws 
and political policies allowed for a relatively more permissive or depoliticised 
enforcement of the hùkǒu and dānwèi systems. The reforms made it possible for 
the country to operate in a more deregulated mode and the younger generation 
perceive this to be changing. Dan, a PhD holder, informed me that it is very 
difficult to get a full-time teaching post though he wants to work in China. 
Currently, he can only find a part time job in one university in China. He says,  
“Four and five years ago, if you graduate from abroad, no matter 
from Hong Kong or afar (the UK or the USA), your salary will be 
triple than the local Chinese. But now, all the academia has been 
saturated, I cannot get a full time teaching post in China after 
many failed attempts for job hunt. There are many PhD holders 
who study from the USA and the UK. They huge and enormous 
quantities make my PhD is futile..... Now I only get a part time 




Higher external competition and the ever-growing competitive nature of modern 
Chinese life meant that social connections and the ability to use social networks 
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for non-political purposes are both less effective and perceived to be of great 
significance. Fai informed me that he belongs to the so-called post 80 generation 
group (was born after 1980s). In China this group is well-planned, flexible to 
change, individualistic, ambitious and aspiring in their career planning. He 
reasonably cares about his future, therefore, he is reasonably stressed. The post 
80 generation groups need to be well-equipped themselves to face the challenges, 
both from their careers and political development in the future. He says,  
“I need to be tough and independent. I got used to this sort of 
livelihood when I was a customer officer two years ago. The job 
market is daunting in today’s China. This explains why I want to 
be a boss [author’s clarification.  He resigned after working 2 
years at one Service Company and becomes entrepreneur since 
2006]. Most of the university students can only live in a container 
house (tiny house like a container (wōjū 蜗居, huòguìwū 货柜屋
32 )) in Guangdong. Although they get a job, their low-paid 
salaries cannot maintain their living standard here [Guangdong]. 
This is extremely hard to get a post in today’s China. For myself, 
I need to have mortgage every month. I don’t dare to have 




Fai’s conversation reasonably explains how the younger generation put great 
emphasis on the self and one’s ‘interior’ life (Faure 2008: 476): on the individual 
level there is actual effort to enhance personal development and achievement. In 
other words, members of the younger generations think only on a personal 
interest level rather than on a higher level of contributing personal successes 
back to general society.  
                                                 
32
 wōjū (蜗居) or huòguìwū (货柜屋). It means the tiny house like a container. This is a very 
popular phenomenon in Guangdong. Most of the university graduates hardly get a job, but once 
they get the job which is low-paid. It is very difficult for them to maintain high living standard in 
Guangdong. They rent the house called container house which costs around RMB¥6 per day. 
Details refer to http://www.cna.com.tw＜大陸底層工蟻抗漲深圳打工族「蝸居」＞ 18 March 
2010. Retrieved 21 April 2010. 
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A Chinese middle-class culture in the making? 
The transition to a market economy has allowed a Chinese new middle class to 
emerge but it has yet to develop its own identity as a politically significant group. 
For the younger generation, their very consumption orientation seems to be an 
obstacle to such an identity being formed.  At least part of the problem is that 
many respondents compared themselves to what they supposed (unrealistically) 
were the lifestyles and circumstances of their counterparts in Western societies. 
Mary is a twenty-five-year-old Guangzhou native who works for an advertising 
agency. She is overseas educated at a renowned tertiary institution and holds a 
master’s degree from the United Kingdom. She makes around RMB¥100,000 
(US$14,631 or £10,004) a year, owns an eighty-square-metre flat and an 
imported car, and is artistically accomplished.  
“All my salary will be gone to pay for my mortgage (flat and car). 
The mortgage period lasts for more than 10 years. Holiday is a 
luxury to me. But anyway, I relax myself whenever I can. The 
name of middle class is something high sounding but nothing for 
me [‘zhōngchăn, duō hăotīng de míngzì 中产，多好听的名字’]. 
If I only get the name, but I don’t have the real lifestyles like the 
western one, I don’t want to exploit the name of the middle 
class.” (Mary, 25, professional) 
 
Mary is handsomely paid in her work by most mainland Chinese standards and 
her parents enjoy high social prestige. However, high income is not necessarily 
equated with the kind of life that she believes similarly highly paid individuals 
have in the West. Like most people of the Chinese new middle class, pace of life 
for Mary is hectic and intense, with very large daily costs. To upkeep her high 
quality of lifestyle, she perceives herself as having to work harder and harder all 
the time. 
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Some members of the older generation make similar statements. Uncle Man is a 
professional and cadre, and Chinese new middle class identity seems too 
abstract to him. He says,  
“Do I belong to the Chinese new middle class? I doubt it. I can’t 
afford to buy a [residential] unit or a flat with my savings so far. I 
bought a house of about 80 square metres and that cost me about 
RMB¥800,000 [US$117,154 or £80,938]. I need to mortgage it 
for thirty years. Now I have my own flat and car, but I find myself 
in heavy debt.....” (Uncle Man, 40, professional and cadre) 
 
Of course, a mortgage is the typical pattern of the emerging culture of the 
Chinese new middle class shared with the western middle class. Equally, many 
members of the Western middle class regard themselves to be ‘time poor’. Many 
of the Chinese new middle class grumble about their stressful life and always 
being under great pressure. That China today is deficient in not having a 
comprehensive social-welfare policy accounts for quite a lot about the lack of 
leisure time or leisure activities for most people; many individuals are concerned 
about raising sufficient resources to secure their future in old age and possible ill 
health.  
Lamont (1992) finds that the American middle class is far less willing than the 
French are to establish class boundaries on the basis of cultural factors such as 
taste. The Americans prefer to establish moral boundaries instead. By contrast, 
the cultural and moral boundaries of the Chinese new middle class are different 
from either the Americans or the French because it has yet to develop anything 
concrete in this respect (Mendez 2008). In Guangdong, most of its cities are in 
the early stages of adopting global forms of cultural appreciation and 
sophistication (Tsui et al. 2006: 666). Cultural activities for the Chinese new 
middle class are still in flux and still indistinct. When I conducted my fieldwork 
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in Guangdong, it was noted that the Chinese new middle class [except some 
intellectuals] as a whole rarely visit bookshops, libraries, museums or art 
galleries. I can suggest that the transition of China to a market economy shows a 
weakening of traditional Chinese and socialist culture without replacing it with 
anything distinctive (Jim & Chen 2009). 
It appears from my interviews that the Chinese new middle class is still 
developing its moral boundaries. Ethics are weakly developed in China at 
present and that is largely caused by the weak development of civic education 
there. The rigid educational curriculum and syllabus make the Chinese new 
middle class themselves say there is room for improvement in moral 
development. They do not share any common imagery of the middle classes in 
advanced capitalist societies such as a stable lifestyle, mainstream values and 
active political participation (Bian 2002b: 297-298, Wright 1997: 23-26). Also 
absent are a developed middle-class identity value system (So 2001, 2003) and 
an internal political motivation to encourage the rise of a civil society (Pearson 
1997). 
The Chinese new middle class is still very unsure of its identity within the 
middle-income bracket. Strongly individualised endeavours as opposed to 
collectivistic efforts typify the social behaviours of the middle-income bracket 
(Wang X. 2008). However, some of the professionals believe that the role of the 
Chinese new middle class, like those in Western countries, should have the 
initiative and motivation to pursue democracy and freedom, human rights and 
civil society (Fewsmith 2007). 
“.....I don’t have any sense of cultural superiority to be the 
Chinese new middle class. I question that the Chinese new 
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middle class must have its own political advocacy, enjoying a 
distinct and unique social status and prestige. But I don’t think 
we’ve got these functions and we still want to keep the status quo. 
We don’t want to provoke any riots, protests or demonstrations to 
betray China.....” (Uncle Yang, 40, professional) 
 
 
Ken concurs with Uncle Yang. He believed that the Chinese new middle class is 
an integral part of a society of high stability, which might lapse into a state of 
chaos if there’s no such social class.   
“I don’t have any feeling becoming the members of middle class 
in China. But I don’t think that I am so powerful that we could 
keep the balance between the poor and the rich. Also, middle 
class are not capable of maintaining a stable political system in 
today’s China. Middle class means nothing to me except I want 
to show off in front of my client.....” (Ken, 30, entrepreneur) 
 
Paradoxically, the Chinese new middle class is somehow quite self-conscious of 
its class identity even while that class identity is still quite fragmented in nature. 
Even so, the individuals who make up that class do indeed make a special point 
of distinguishing themselves from the rest of society—especially in terms of 
higher living standards and education (Brown 2003, Cao 2001, Chen 2006).  
Debate on Chinese political development 
Up to now I have suggested that the Chinese new middle class is generally 
unable to contribute anything constructive to the political development of the 
country. It has almost no room to raise political democratisation under the 
current political arrangement of the country. 
However, since the time China joined the WTO, the Party has gradually been 
repositioning itself as responsive to social demands instead of just shaping the 
social arena. This trend to reposition basically started around 1989 in the 
aftermath of the Tiananmen emergency. Broadly speaking, the voices for and 
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against political progress are manifold and conflicting. Cadres generally think 
China is heading in new political directions. Professionals and entrepreneurs are 
conservative and realistic about political progress. It seems that all groups accept 
the determining role of the Party and that cadres, professionals and 
entrepreneurs alike adapt to it, while cadres are required to be more positive in 
their endorsement. 
Cadres follow rules set for them by the party and state. They cannot express 
anything that diverges from the party line and that is to be expected of party 
bureaucrats anywhere in the world. Yet, cadres are the most optimistic group 
about political developments in China. The majority of my cadre interviewees [9 
out of 11] indicate that they are passionate public servants. 
Why do cadres regardless of age admire the party and the glories of the People’s 
Republic so much in their daily life? Like most other people in the country, 
cadres receive a fair dose of political indoctrination through their schooling in 
formative years. Most mainland Chinese history schoolbooks are replete with 
tales of the Eighth Route Army, that it was an army of, and for, justice for the 
common masses in the Sino-Japanese War and the Chinese Civil War, and the 
glorious achievements of Chairman Mao and other revolutionary heroes. It is 
quite easy to appreciate that the more politically disciplined individuals like 
cadres would tow the party line. Indoctrination becomes internalised and 
reinforced by key socialising agents in everyday life.  
“The Communist Party I work for is the most democratic party in 
the world. China is improving in political development. I 
personally think that is pretty much enough for Chinese political 
development.” (Uncle Hui, 60, cadre) 
 
The reality is that China has none of the human resources that allow it to 
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fast-track political developments in ways that Western countries did (2009). 
Jacques (2009) pinpointed that whether China is a developed or developing 
country “is a matter of fine print, depending on which side of the definition you 
want to define yourself with.” In fact, the physical standards of much of the 
infrastructure in China surpass that of many developed countries. The quality of 
the financial stimulus package that Beijing carried out in 2009 to save the 
national economy was better designed and better implemented than the one put 
out by Washington for the American economy (Bloomberg News 2009). In 
politics and human rights, China has some way to go (TVB Pearl News 2009). 
Most of our entrepreneur and professional interviewees believe that political 
developments currently in China will see no major change anytime soon. The 
confused state of regulations mean that it becomes quite normal for a cadre to 
accept laisee money and gifts from citizens as part of official duties (Liu 1983). 
Indeed, our entrepreneurs [25 out of 31] and professionals [8 out of 11] are of the 
opinion that the Chinese bureaucracy is rife with nepotism, favouritism and 
corruption (Liu 1983). They see that the Chinese leadership has never claimed 
the country is actually carrying out different forms of capitalist activities, so in 
effect it is unwilling to legitimise capitalism in the country (Zheng 2004: 65). 
The party at an abstract level retains a prestige that is denied in terms of local 
implementation of its policies, but the new middle class is able to negotiate those 
local difficulties and secure advantages for itself in the process. 
Many of our entrepreneurs and professionals see that the party-state still tends to 
be heavy-handed on the citizenry. Probably the best example is the violent 
ending of the 1989 student movement (Tiananmen Incident). Since then, there 
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have been open elections in some select provinces but only at the village level. 
The government still subdues separatist movements among ethnic minorities of 
the country. It performs censorship of the mass media and restricts Internet 
access. It is active in the management and monitoring of the educational sector. 
In all fairness, though, the Chinese government has also relaxed its control over 
the economy for the sake of general wealth-building of the nation, and this has 
allowed many people at all levels to have a chance at prosperity. China is still 
taking baby steps on the road to democratisation driven by a value 
change-induced legitimacy crisis (Zheng 2003). However, the legitimacy crisis 
is primarily internal to the Party in terms of its need to recruit and reproduce 
senior cadres, rather than between the Party and the emergent new middle class 
outside it. The dependence of entrepreneurs and professionals upon facilitation 
by local cadres keeps them tied to a system that secures their economic 
advantages. As long as the latter is secured, the new middle class appears happy 
to be de-politicised. 
Cadres and their work are largely unregulated and unsupervised. Corruption and 
unlawful activities among officials are fairly widespread, but the central 
government has carried out countermeasures. Scandals and corruption of cadres 
often compromise the administrative and legal systems. No institutional 
organisation exists to monitor the integrity and alliances of cadres. No direct 
elections are held for the heads of towns and townships. Indeed, there is no such 
thing as an ‘accountability system of principal officers’ in China. This is the 
overwhelming consensus of opinion of the interviewees found by this study. 
They see there is much room for improvement on an everyday level that does not 
necessarily challenge the government in the mildest way. 
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For most members of the Chinese new middle class, the topic of human rights is 
a taboo. Most of them are more content to talk about current economic trends 
and how they can make money. The more widely read and intellectual members 
of the new middle class (like college professors) are guarded in speaking their 
minds on political reforms (Zweig & Chen 2007). In China, sometimes you pay 
with your life if you speak your mind, as exemplified by the PRC v. Ching 
Cheong 程翔  (2005) case33 . However, those at risk do not belong to the 
particular categories of the new middle class that were the object of my study.  
Indeed, they want nothing like the Hong Kong model of governance because that 
is so well organised that there are practically no exploitable loopholes. Zheng 
(2004) found that, after the strict measures of discipline after the 1989 student 
protests, the leadership deliberately constructed an interest-based social order 
for the country. This order had brought much stability and rapid development. 
People from all walks of life turned their main attention to the private economic 
arena when political passions were transformed into economic ones (Zheng 
2004: 82). The result was political indifference. They prefer the status quo. 
“I can safely say that the road to democracy in China is hopeless 
after I made unfailing attempts to participate in the June Fourth 
incident when I was a university study twenty years ago. I don’t 
want to improve the current tense situation and difference 
curbing the understanding of each Chinese. I only want to 
maintain status quo after the unfailing attempts to fight for 
democracy twenty years ago. To me, change may mean a 
challenge than an opportunity to my life.” (Uncle Yang, 40, 
professional) 
 
“I wrote something to express my opinion about the June Fourth 
incident. I expressed my concern that the central government 
                                                 
33
 Ching Cheong was a China-based journalist for The Straits Times of Singapore. In 2005, he 
was arrested in Guangzhou and held almost incommunicado for several years for reporting on 
‘state secrets.’ He was released in 2007 on health reasons and with the help of the Hong Kong 
SAR government. See casenotes in Appendix 4 for details. 
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should stop censoring some websites in China. As people knew 
more about the facts of the June Fourth incident, then the Chinese 
could judge the nature of the event. This article appeared on my 
university homepage. When I was studying my undergraduate 
degree in Hong Kong in 1999, I got an ‘invitation’ from the China 
Liaison Office [Zhōngliánbàn中联办. It is the organ of the PRC 
and its base is in Hong Kong. It is responsible for People’s 
Liberation Army Hong Kong Garrison and the Office of the 
Commission of the Foreign Ministry in Hong Kong. It is also 
responsible for liaisons with Chinese companies in Hong Kong]. 
I almost freaked out because I was now probably seen as an 
anti-communist. I couldn’t help picturing the awful 
consequences for my future. I blamed myself, too, for probably 
involving my family. At that time, I was all nervous and upset, 
and I told myself I shouldn’t do that kind of stupid thing again.” 
(Ken, 30, entrepreneur) 
 
 
“Even we want to improve political freedom and democracy in 
China, the existing polices and system does not allow us to do. 
We see the truth that all activists advocate democracy and justice 
in China, all of them failed. They either put in the jail or lose their 
freedom. Who can against the CCP, we can only work for the 
CCP.” (Uncle Lam, 40, entrepreneur) 
 
The excerpts (above) help explain why the Chinese new middle class in my 
study is less sensitive to politics as middle-class people in other countries are. 
The overall surveillance has become tighter since the Tiananmen events of 1989, 
and now extended from traditional media to the Internet. Under the current 
political set-up, our professionals cannot see themselves as having any 
influences on the decisions of the country, although many of them are in fact 
active party members. My interviews reveal that many of my respondents have 
foreign passports. While they live and work in China, their children live abroad. 
Many hold overseas bank accounts in their own names as well as in those of their 
children and relatives. They are well-prepared in case something drastically 
wrong occurs in China. 
Capitalism has certain peculiarities in China. Tsai (2007) points out that 
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socialism with Chinese characteristics has become a structural constraint for 
democracy to develop—capitalism without democracy. Gallagher (2005) 
describes the situation in China as ‘contagious capitalism.’ If there is no 
legitimacy crisis, there is no democratisation in China (Welzel 2006). Many 
people (including the Chinese new middle class) will not advocate anything 
radically different from the status quo for fear of arrest by the authorities. 
Indeed, quite a number of political or ideological reforms that took place in 
China even with the blessings of the government never actually took off. Such as 
was the case, public attention simply turned to economic matters, especially 
after 1989. 
“This is no hope for Chinese politics. What is the meaning of mín 
zhǔ [民主 democracy]? The citizen is mín [民 people] and the 
state is zhǔ [主 master]. We need to obey in the footsteps of the 
state. I took part in the June Fourth movement when I was a 
university student. We couldn’t say the June Fourth incident was 
a massacre—otherwise we’d expect to spend the rest of our lives 
in gaol. It is extremely useless to advocate and democracy. If 
there is the promise from Chinese government to promote 
democracy, they are telling lies and the reality will never come 
true.” (Uncle Yang, 40, professional) 
 
 
“I appreciated Zhū Róngjī34. He was so capable of getting rid of 
part of the corrupted official or syndicates in China. But we don’t 
have too many Zhū Róngjī in China, regrettably. Right? There are 
too many corrupted officers in our country. How to completely 
get rid of them? Only one Zhū Róngjī is not adequate enough.” 
(Peter, 34, entrepreneur) 
 
 
For over twenty years, the Tiananmen shootings have been a no-talk zone for 
discussions about democracy in China (Zheng 2003). There is a noticeable 
pattern of ‘don’t tell, don’t ask’ about the event at all echelons of state organs as 
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 Zhū Róngjī (朱镕基) became the vice-premier of the State Council in 1993-1998. Then, he 
was promoted to the fifth Premier of the People's Republic of China from March 1998 to March 
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well as in general society in China. The authorities divulge no details, admit no 
wrongdoing and expunge any references to the event. In the public eye, the 
government exercises a wilful loss of memory. Behind closed doors, participants 
and survivors from the event are just now starting to be released from 
incarceration. Two interviewees offer their views: 
 
“…I think there is no hope for democracy taking roots in China 
before I die. I have never received cases on human rights and 
political issues in Guangdong. It’s very hard to say but politics is 
a very dark area in China. But China won’t let things become 
transparent and totally unveil them.....” (Uncle Man, 40, 
professional and cadre) 
 
“Some foreigners think that we have lost freedom. I know what 
the government did and what they are trying to hide from us. But 
we won’t break this peaceful atmosphere. We won’t go against 
the government unless the government gives us no space to live. 
One ruling party—it is hard to make any actual change. We can 
do nothing but we had better to make own advantages [in this 
globalising China]…But I think China could achieve more in 
political development [now].” (Sung, 30, professional) 
 
By all standards of the West, the Chinese new middle class has not come of age 
yet insofar as politics is concerned. The fact of the matter is, the new middle 
class is largely apolitical and unconcerned with appeals for the government to 
improve human rights and freedom of speech since, to them, the cold reality of 
life in China is to maintain the status quo. The new middle class poses no 
challenge, political or otherwise, to any level of government. 
Uncle Yuen’s conversation (below) lively concludes the three presidents in the 
PRC. Most of the Chinese new middle class get the impression that Mao Zedong 
was an uncorrupted leader. He could maintain justice and integrity since he 
                                                                                                                                 
2003. Details see glossaries.  
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aimed at egalitarian society or even communist society, but in fact it proved to be 
a utopia. Deng Xiaoping had loose policies to deal with outrageous corruption in 
China though he led China to the road of prosperity. Jiang Zemin has no 
particular political and economic contributions but he only followed the 
footsteps of his predecessors. The major contribution for Jiang was to close 
down many state-owned enterprises since the 1990s. Hu’s regime mainly 
focuses on economic development but little progress in politics. Hence, the 
Chinese new middle class reiterated that they need to maintain the status quo in 
politics.  
“I don’t know how to say Chinese politics at this moment.....but I 
am not optimistic. I think Chinese politics like this: Mao Zedong 
(1st President of the PRC) likes the sun who shines the brighter 
future in China [Mao Zédōng xiàng tàiyáng zhàodào nàlĭ nàlĭ 
liàng 毛泽东像太阳，照到那里那里亮]. Deng Xiaoping [2nd 
President of the PRC] like the moon, who makes the society more 
extravagant and corrupted, people always go to karaoke lounges 
[Dèng Xiăopíng xiàng yuè liàng, kă lā  OK dào tiānliàng 邓小平
像月亮，卡拉 ok 到天亮]. Jiang Zemin [3rd President of the PRC] 
likes the star who makes many laid-off or redundant workers 
since 1990s [Jiāng Zémín xiàng xīngxīng xiàgăng gōng rén 
shù bùqīng 江泽民像星星，下岗工人数不清]. How about 
Hujiantao? I have no more fantasies and hope in politics.....” 
(Uncle Yuen 56, entrepreneur) 
 
Uncle Moss concurs with Uncle Yuen. He says,  
“Mao Zedong advocated everyone need to be self-reliant. He also 
advocated the integrity in society. I remember one famous 
proverb like ‘wŏyŏu yīshuāngshŏu; bùzài chéng lĭ  chī  xiánfàn 
我有一双手，不在城里吃闲饭’ [Literally, I have my own hands. 
I can work and don’t want to wait for government subsidies. 
Everyone needs to work and find a job to make their own living]. 
We had a strong sense of integrity in Mao period. At Mao time, 
everyone even doesn’t bother to bribe their supervisor to have 
free lunch. The society at that time was so poor but egalitarian, 
equal and justice. But the corruptions get worse when Deng 
[Xiaoping], Jiang [Zemin] and Hu [Jiantao] become the President 
in PRC. ” (Uncle Moss, 48, entrepreneur) 
 
Stockman (1992) says ‘the power of the Communist party-state is weakening’ in 
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its control over Chinese society during the reform era, while Nee (1989) 
suggests that the power of cadres is declining. Stockman’s (1992) contention 
rests mainly on economic reasons: devolution of power to managers; 
encouragement of foreign investments over which the party has minimal control; 
declining capacity of the state to restrain corruption; the reduced capability of 
the state to extract financial resources in a market-led economy; the 
commercialisation of the state coercive apparatus; and the general rise in crime 
across the country. This does not quite seem to be the case in China today. In fact, 
less than 5% of the research sample indicates any remotest inclination to 
challenge the central or local authorities. Indeed, theirs is a desire for a stable, 
safe and secure life within the status quo in a booming economy and prosperity. 
A few intellectuals and professionals might go so far as to espouse ideas about 
freedom of expression and association, but, all in all, they are still comparatively 
more enthusiastic about enhancing their economic and occupational potential 
than about democratic pursuits (Li 2006). There is no loss of power of the 
Communist Party in modern Chinese society. 
Bruce Dickson (2003: 134) seems to be closer to the mark: “the priority given to 
political stability is one of the strongest and most enduring features of the 
Chinese political culture, and seems to be shared by both state leaders and 
members of society.” The leadership and the average person are unwilling (at 
least at present) to be advocates of radical political changes; instead they prefer 
incremental democratisation. 
In the Chinese context, there is at least some logic to the argument that some 
kind of authoritarian rule is required to prevent massive chaos and disintegration 
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during periods of rapid economic growth (Li 2006). Bluntly speaking, prudent 
progress is difficult enough with the support and encouragement of the 
government, let alone dramatic progress. Democracy is a fearsome prospect for 
China. For the local party authorities, alignment with the rich has long been a 
reality: for instance, local governments typically take the side of capital in labour 
disputes. It is a hardly veiled symbiosis in which the business world provides 
much of government revenue through tax and employment and contributing to 
local economic development that is one of the key criteria for cadre promotion. 
In return, cadres offer tax breaks and government contracts or loans, often 
deriving from them not only career boosts but actual shares of private profit 
(Chen 2003: 58). 
The Chinese new middle class wants to get rich and not meddle in politics. It 
tries to profit from the economic reforms of the country by cooperating with, not 
challenging, the government (Li 2003: 77). As that class is roundly seen to be the 
biggest winners of the economic reforms of the past thirty years, it desires the 
status quo and is very unlikely to speak or do anything that might jeopardise its 
position in society and its interests. Therefore the Chinese new middle class will 
be unlikely to be the communication bridge between powerless groups in society 
and the government. 
Summary 
The Chinese new middle class is a small fraction of Chinese society. It forms 
only 12% of the Guangdong province and less than 7% of the national 
population of China (CASS 2007, Zhou 2005). The class is far tinier than is the 
middle class in Western countries. As such a very tiny community, the Chinese 
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new middle class does not have a well-formed recognition of its own self-image 
and cultural identity (Tomlinson 1990, 1999). The Chinese new middle class is a 
new concept and it takes time to establish the Chinese new middle class culture. 
Despite three decades’ worth of economic reforms and economic growth of the 
country, the Chinese new middle class is still heavily geared to gain the 
maximum possible economic benefit from society. This causes a shift in focus 
away from politics and general social responsibility and towards educational 
qualifications to secure better careers (Fladrich 2006, Flew 2006, Hannum 2005). 
The result is that the Chinese new middle class as a whole has a low sense of 
obligation to contribute back to the social development of the country. 
I could hazard a prediction that China will be an icon of capitalism under the 
official name of ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics.’ China will remain open 
and progressive economically but closed in political, cultural and ideological 
matters to the world. Political connections are not diminishing in significance as 
they are becoming more opaque. The problem of corruption and nepotism within 
guānxi networks are still dominant in the foreseeable future. The guānxi network 
is the formal institution in society for people to get help in most cases. Of course, 
it is also a fact that the Chinese new middle class is a flexible lot and its attitude 
may change with time. However, the most likely against of political 
democratisation lies with the Party itself and its expedient policies, or in social 
forces other than those represented by the new middle class. The latter are 
indeed ‘laggrds in politics’ and likely to remain so for the foreseeable future, and 
especially if Chinese consumer society retains its upward trend. 
 






THE PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY has been to apply a sociocultural perspective 
to the rise of the new middle class in post-reform China.  
In Chapter 1, I argued that the established class theories or class analyses from 
the West address class as an economic formation and are not directly helpful to 
understand the transition from communism to capitalism evident in China. In 
many ways, China provides a new twist to the meaning of class. The transition 
seen in Chinese society diverges from Marx’s trajectory of societal development. 
However, Weberian and neo-Weberian (John Goldthorpe) approaches can be 
applied to China more readily. 
The Chinese new middle class brings together the concepts of class, status, party 
and political determinism in ways that allow us to think about the special nature 
of market situation that applies to ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics.’ At 
the same time, I suggested that Bourdieu’s sociocultural approach is also 
applicable to China (Jacksons 2008, Robbins 2000, Webb et al. 2002), albeit the 
situation with the Chinese new middle class goes beyond taste, habitus and field 
in Bourdieu’s French-centred work. In China, class positions are tied to 
economic, cultural, political and social capitals. All these capitals follow the 
mode of consumption that acts as a normative mechanism and also demarcates 
the tastes shared by the same group inside a relatively similar class boundary.  
In Chapter 2, I developed this sociocultural approach further, applying it 
specifically to the nature of the transition undergone within China and the role of 
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residues from the state-centred period of Chinese economic development. This 
sociocultural approach contributes to the originality of this study (Ryan & 
Musiol 2008). There are not many studies in the literature about Chinese class 
dynamics, and almost none take a sociocultural line. Post-reform China is no 
longer solely reliant on production. Producing for consumption has become one 
of the more lucrative means of profitmaking (Fraser 2000), particularly when 
inflows of international capital into China are now ever more numerous today. 
These developments are working to start a new chapter in the cultural 
globalisation of China. The everyday social and cultural practices seen in China 
today exhibit the form of heterogeneity as opposed to homogeneity. Such a 
heterogeneity (or fragmentation, if you will) challenges the traditional concept 
of class. Class should now be included in the repertoire of sociocultural 
terminology because the case of China shows that lifestyles and consumption 
patterns function to define the class boundary of the Chinese new middle class.  
In Chapter 3, I explored how to do research with the Chinese new middle class 
by using existing understandings of methodology within a Western context to 
guide the interpretation of qualitative data which is primarily based on in-depth 
structured interviews, participant observations and informal but in-depth 
conversations. Since it was the objective of this study to provide inside 
information on the Chinese new middle class, this study in effect becomes an 
insider research with Chinese characteristics (in keeping with a society of 
‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’). Therefore, research ethics are 
particularly important in doing the research with the Chinese new middle class. 
Collecting qualitative data in the field reveals the need to consider some 
sociocultural practices when working as an ‘insider’ researcher. Guānxi social 
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networks and personal connections are keys to success when using in-depth 
interviews and other qualitative methods. Research ethics with the Chinese new 
middle class are important, especially for the cadres. This field study done in 
Guangdong province shows that both a cultural sociology approach and a 
qualitative methodology with high local specificity are required when 
investigating the lifestyles, consumption patterns, cultural identity and social 
networking of the Chinese new middle class. 
In Chapter 4, I presented the older generation as largely pragmatic, politically 
apathetic, and conservative in personality and desiring of the status quo (as 
vested in the ambiguities and incompleteness of institutional changes and 
political reform in urban China). The older generation has often been seen as the 
biggest winner in post-reform China. Part of its ‘winnability’ is in being able to 
collaborate with others inside class boundaries. The fact that the old generation 
is able to exploit the system is in itself indicative of the resourcefulness to 
operate in transitional conditions. The sharing of past memories help the older 
generation to build up a sentiment (gǎnqíng 感情) of being in the same group 
(zìjǐrén 自己人  ‘our own people’). Gatherings and leisure activities act as 
important socialising agents for them to form class boundary and class 
admission within the same circle of ‘insideness’ and identity. 
In discussing the ongoing consumer revolution in  China and the emergence of 
the younger generation in post-socialist China, Chapter 5 demonstrated that the 
younger generation practises conspicuous consumption patterns owing to the 
fast pace of impacts brought on by globalisation forces and the ‘spaces’ of 
consumption in Guangdong. They are gradually moving toward late marriage, 
Chapter 8 Conclusion 
 
 261 
independence, a lack of leisure time, and being individualized, egocentric, and 
westernized in their everyday life practice.  
In Chapter 6, I presented different types of collaborations and utilisations of 
guānxi network within the middle class groupings of entrepreneurs, 
professionals and cadres. When the current economic reforms began a quarter of 
a century ago in China, everything was done through guānxi network. 
Sociologists such as Weber (1951), Faure (2008) and Shirk (1993: 346-350) 
argued that the transaction costs of finding a reliable party and negotiating a 
contract are extremely high in China where social capital (based on personal 
links, reciprocity, moral obligation and duty towards the community) remains 
highly significant. In economic activities, a shared insider identity can enhance 
trust among persons. This then results in reducing the cost of negotiating and 
enforcing contracts (Shirk 1984, 1993). The ‘insider categories’ (same group) 
within the new class boundary develop reciprocal relationship through the same 
tastes in lifestyles and consumerism (Sulkunen & Holmwood 1997). 
A defective and deficient monitoring system of governance in China drives 
many professionals and entrepreneurs to put more weight on social connections 
with cadres and vice versa. Institutional structures conducive to the existence of 
guānxi networks are flourishing in China. Gifts and mutual reciprocities are 
culturally deep-rooted in Chinese society and are employed as pragmatic 
survival tactics to build interpersonal connections for defending or advancing 
economic interests. Altogether, they impede the progression of a civil society in 
China. 
In Chapter 7, I argued there is no real and definite middle-class culture in China 
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yet. The younger generations are gradually more individualized, westernized, 
and independent. The older generation are more collective in nature. But they 
both show no strong class awareness and culture as the members of the Chinese 
new middle class. Instead, they both show a high degree of anxiety and 
uncertainty about the future. The political landscape is unlikely to change, even 
minimally given that, firstly the current regime provides for the best-possible 
climate to maximise profitmaking and maintain social stability. Secondly, the 
second is there is a substantive need to associate with government officials in 
fostering economic benefits. Thirdly , there is a need to cultivate guānxi network 
because mutual relationships are important in a society that is often described 
empirically as a ‘low-trust society.’ Finally the new middle class mostly prefers 
to maintain the status quo because it works to its own advantage.  
The theoretical framework incorporates a spatial-temporal dimension to current 
Western-oriented approaches to debates on class analysis, consumption patterns 
and institutional changes in post-socialist China. Up to now, most research on 
class structure and formation has been based on Western European concepts 
originating within a classically conceived Western experience of modernity. 
This is because Europeans were the first to write about the development of 
modernity and, therefore, took their own experiences as ‘normal’ from which 
others provided ‘deviant’ cases.  
For this reason, as I have set out at the start of this thesis, the classical Marxist 
point of view is conventionally the starting point for analyzing class formation. 
However, notwithstanding the role of Marxism in the ideological 
self-understanding of Chinese (socialist) modernity, Marxism provides a poor 
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resource for understanding a society in transition from state-centered socialist 
modernity to market-based modernity. The Chinese transition complicates the 
Marxist analysis by including a trajectory not recognised by Marx. Moreover, if 
market capitalism tends to be a class society, it is not a class society in the 
Marxist sense. I argued that Weberian and neo-Weberian approaches will 
provide a better fit, albeit by drawing on different aspects of the Weberian legacy 
than those normally utilised in Western sociology. It is not only that the Chinese 
Communist Party remains important in determining class relations, perhaps 
especially those within the new middle class given the continued significance of 
cadres and professional employment within the state sector, but also that 
significant political and cultural ‘formations’ remain from the state socialist era.  
Thus, I have referred to how residency status or hùkǒu continues to structure not 
only the labour market for unskilled labour, but also structures the new middle 
class. In addition the dānwèi remains a significant institution providing 
opportunities (eg in terms of access to development land) for the new middle 
class. There were few members of my sample who were entrepreneurs outside 
those structures; moreover, all entrepreneurs required access to what those 
structures provided and, therefore, were embedded within them in terms of how 
their business affairs were conducted. In post-reform China, the same 
occupation (in class terms) is rewarded differently in different regions because 
of how hùkǒu and dānwèi operate. Hùkǒu creates spatially distributed inequality. 
Dānwèi continues to be significant on class and class distinction in urban China. 
Both hùkǒu and dānwèi create differences in work situations by forming guānxi 
networks inside the boundary of the new class. 
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The received wisdom of traditional class theories, then, requires adaptation 
when we try to analyse contemporary Chinese society. The emerging ‘Chinese 
new middle class’ departs from the standard developmental pathways explained 
in Western-oriented middle-class theories. The new class emerging in China is 
more diversified and heterogeneous than would be its equivalent in most 
Western societies. The culture and social identification of the Chinese new 
middle class operates mainly through cultural practices and consumption 
patterns.  
The work of Bourdieu also has an important bearing on how the new middle 
class is formed as a cultural entity alongside its economic formation. He 
extended the traditional studies by including first cultural capital and then social 
capital into the accounts of economic inequality and social stratification. In the 
West, education is a key institution by which the established order is maintained 
and reproduced. There is evidence that a similar pattern is emerging in China. 
However, in the meantime class formation is as much an issue of cultural factors 
such as lifestyles and consumption patterns. With the rise in standards of living, 
it is argued, Chinese people’s consumption and lifestyles rather than simply 
occupation and ownership play an increasingly important role in shaping one’s 
social attitudes and behaviour.  
In the consumer revolution that is happening in China today, using branded 
products, wining and dining and various other entertainment practices are a 
distinctly public phenomenon. Consumption of fashionable commodities is the 
key element whereby the Chinese new middle class creates new public spaces 
for the images of the Chinese new middle-class membership. The new public 
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space is a consumer space of commoditised objects, services and information.  
The Chinese new middle class is embracing the global marketplace as eager 
consumers. Consumption serves as a very important cultural aspect of class 
analysis in post-reform China. Consumer goods are the new social currency. For 
the Chinese new middle class, consumer goods are necessary both as an element 
of claim and a new communicative medium. Consumption and trend-chasing are 
no longer options but now necessities in China today. Mutual tastes, lifestyles 
and consumption practices form the new class boundary and the means of 
admission thereof. Consumption practices form a circle of class distinction by 
incorporating class privilege into the cultural spaces. However, as I have argued, 
this consumption ethos does not constitute a form of class conscious in the 
western sense and I found no evidence of the internal differentiations of 
distinction that was such an important feature of Bourdieu’s own account of 
class reproduction of the middle class.  
Contributions of the study 
To be the author of an unusual thesis is something quite exciting. There are 
plenty of research studies done about the Chinese new middle class but most are 
piecemeal efforts and not particularly well organised. Indeed, quite a number of 
people in China are inclined to think that there is no middle class in China, only 
the rulers and the ruled. The goals of this study were to provide a conceptual 
approach to theorizing class analysis in post-reform China. I have chosen to rely 
on first-hand field data more and theoretical inferences from class-theoretic 
models less. Then I have taken a sociocultural perspective to explain the whys 
and wherefores of that class because it is so patently obvious that the 
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sociological literature on this particular class is in need of an alternative 
perspective. The current data on the middle class of China is overwhelmingly 
from quantitative research methods. The data and findings of this study help to 
narrow the gap somewhat and provide an alternative kind of approach for 
subsequent research on the middle class (or classes?) of China.  
What are the roles of the Chinese new middle class in the foreseeable future? 
Undoubtedly, the Chinese new middle class is at the vanguard for consumption 
in urban China. At the same time, they are laggards in politics. They do not 
function as a bridge between the government and the citizen and promote 
democracy and civil society. The present political set-up leaves little if any room 
for the new middle class to flex political muscle. The chief reason is that the CCP 
puts economic performance as the top priority and that is unlikely to change 
anytime soon. Indeed, the new middle class relies on and puts a great deal of 
trust in the party-state like nothing seen anywhere in the rest of the world. For 
that class, the status quo is paramount. 
China is now at a crossroads on its road to prosperity. Present-day consumption 
in China sways between the traditional and modern ends of the consumption 
spectrum—that is to say, it is moderate and extravagant in the same breath. In 
terms of cultural and social identity, the new middle class mostly have yet to 
recognise themselves as a class. Compared with Western middle classes, the 
Chinese new middle class are nowhere near a Western level of formation. Yet, 
cultural appreciation and a leisured life are what these people like the most about 
Western life. To many of them, the Western middle classes appear mostly 
blessed with internal assets like cultural capital nurtured and accumulated over 
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time. The Western middle classes appear to involve themselves with activities 
that carry a strong flavour of cultural appreciation and social etiquette. However, 
that is not the story for the Chinese new middle class. The Chinese class model is 
still missing a system of true middle-class values (So 2001). Politically very 
conservative, it is very ambitious and assertive about career building prospects 
and economic status. Its unambiguously utilitarian and pragmatic traits may or 
may not cause it to have any commitments or missions as regards a civil society 
in China, depending perhaps on whether a civil society serves the needs and 
interests of that class. Still without a clear-cut class culture to define standards of 
ethical behaviour, the Chinese new middle class personifies the Chinese model 
as lacking the political motivation to sow the seeds of civil society (Pearson 
1997). China is on the road to becoming a nation of middle-class people. The 
current state of politics in China hinders the Chinese new middle class from 
forming the real and full-fledged middle class culture (TVB Pearl News 2009). 
My research journey is at an end for the time being. Other, hopefully more 
exciting, journeys will come. The work here has truly turned out to be a learning 
process—about the subject matter and also the actual research work and, most 
certainly, the trials and tribulations of writing it. To paraphrase Ceglowski (1997: 
188-201): 
If I could redo the study, I might well have done it differently—or not, as the case 
may be. Everything could be done differently in hindsight. Be that as it may. 
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This glossary is provided for the convenience of the reader and 
does not form part of the professional content of this thesis. 
Sources are at the bottom of each entry. Any unattributed entry 
is an original contribution by the author. Information herein this 
part of the thesis is believed to be accurate at the time of 





Words in boldface have separate entries in this glossary. This glossary uses 
simplified Chinese characters as the default. Round brackets give traditional 
Chinese characters for terms that have applicability or understanding in Hong 
Kong or countries that uses traditional characters. Those not indicated are 
identical in both written forms. Pronunciation is according to Putonghua 
(Mandarin). Other dialectal pronunciations are included where appropriate. 
 
3S  
Single (单身 (單身, ‘dānshēn’), Seventies (多生於上世纪七十年代 ‘duōshēng 
yú shàngshìjì qīshí niándài’), Stuck (被卡住了 ‘bèi kăzhù le’). Single refers to 
those ladies who still not yet get married; Seventies means those ladies who born 
in 1970s; Stuck refers to those ladies who cannot find boyfriends or husbands. 
 
báixié 白鞋 
White shoes, i.e. plimsolls 
 
bālùjūn 八路军 (八路軍) 
Eighth Route Army  
An army of, and for, justice for the common masses in the Sino-Japanese War 
and the Chinese Civil War, and the glorious achievements of Chairman Mao and 
other revolutionary heroes. It is quite easily to appreciate that the more 
politically disciplined individuals like cadres would toe the party line. The army 
needs to absolutely comply with the obedience of the CCP and PRC.  
 
bāshíhòu 八十后 (八十後) 
This term refers to those younger generation who born after 1980s.  
 
Basic Law  
Usually in reference to the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region of the People’s Republic of China (中華人民共和國香港特別行政區
基本法), or simply the Hong Kong Basic Law (香港基本法). The Basic Law 
serves as the constitutional document of Hong Kong. It was adopted on 4 April 
1990 by the Seventh National People’s Congress, and went into effect on 1 July 
1997 (replacing the Letters Patent and the Royal Instructions) when the former 
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colony of United Kingdom was handed over to China. Technically, any law 
passed by the National People’s Congress is called a ‘basic law.’ 
 
běnkēshēng 本科生 
It means bachelor degree. 
 
biānzhì 编制 (編製) 
[personnel/manning quota + authorised strength or establishment] 
The Chinese term for the nomenklatura mechanism. 
 
biāozhǔn 标准 (標準) 
It refers to standard price. It means the price bases on market equilibrium price 
when there is land auction or tendering.   
 
bìguìyuán 碧桂园 (碧桂園) 
Country Garden 
It is a very well-known private developer in Guangdong.  
 
bóshìshēng 博士生 
It means PhD candidate.  
 
bù 部 
[ministry, department, section, division, part]. A suffix to indicate the regional 
administrative level of the government. 
 
bù xíng jiē 步行街 
[pace + walk + street] 
A ‘shopping street,’ typically a commercial and residential complex with a 
number of retail outlets in food, fashion, computers and entertainment. 
 
CCP 
Chinese Communist Party [中国共产党 Zhōngguó Gòngchǎndǎn]. Also known 
as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). It is the founding and ruling political 
party of the People’s Republic of China and the world’s largest political party 
with over 70 million members. While the country’s constitution does not 
recognise it as a governing body, the party’s position is supreme in political 
authority, which is realised through its control of the entire state apparatus and of 
the legislative process. The party was founded on 1 July 1921 (official) or 23 
July 1921 (de facto). 
 
In the context of describing official positions of people, the term ‘CCP’ usually 
denotes party positions and ‘PRC’ to denote state (government) positions since 
many top cadres hold state and party positions at the same time. For example, Hu 
Jintao is president of the PRC (state) and secretary-general of the CCP (party), 
and is also chairman of the PRC Central Military Commission (state) and 
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CEPA 
The Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement 更紧密经贸关系 (更緊密經貿
關係) [Gēng Jǐnmì Jīngmào Guānxì].  
A series of economic and trade treaty implemented in 2003 between the two 
separate customs territories within the People’s Republic of China. There are 
two separate arrangements in effect under CEPA, one with Hong Kong and the 
other with Macau. The one with Hong Kong is statutorily called the Mainland 
and Hong Kong Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (內地與香港建立
更緊密經貿關係的安排) [2003]. It was implemented with the aim of lessen the 
effects of Hong Kong’s economic recession following the SARS outbreak in the 
same year. 
 
chāo A huò 超 A 货 (超 A 貨) 
It means counterfeits with nearly 99% genuine to the real product. 
 
chéngběn (成本) 
Cost price  
It means the price that someone pays for something that they are going to sell.  
Source: Longman Dictionary of contemporary English 
 
chéng zhèn hé xiāng cūn qǐ yè 城镇和乡村企业 (城鎮和鄉村企業) 
Township and Village Enterprises (TVE)  
TVEs are market-oriented public enterprises under the purview of local 
governments based in townships and villages. They initially built on commune- 
or brigade-run industries that had been set up to serve the rural areas during the 
Great Leap Forward. During that time, TVEs had a limited role and were 
restricted to the production of iron, steel, cement, chemical fertiliser, 
hydroelectric power and farm tools (Saich 2001). However, the reforms of 1978 
changed this and TVEs became the most vibrant part of the Chinese economy as 
they experienced significant expansion in the 1980s and early 1990s. Farmer 
income was stagnating by the mid-1980s and TVEs provided an excellent means 
to stimulate non-grain and non-agricultural production. The development of 
these enterprises also meshed with the political requirements of local 
governments, which saw TVEs as a regular source of revenue in an environment 
of constrained resources. TVE employment grew from 28 million in 1978 to a 
peak of 135 million in 1996 (Naughton 2007). In provinces such as Jiangsu and 
Shandong they employed some 30% of the rural workforce (Saich 2001, Park & 
Shen 2003). 
 
TVEs were notable for their unique ownership and corporate governance set-up 
(Naughton 2007). Many of these firms were ‘collectively owned’ in the sense 
that theoretical ownership rested with the collectives, either as a legacy of earlier 
sponsorship, or because township and village governments took the lead in 
establishing new TVEs after the breakup of the agricultural collectives. Ultimate 
‘ownership rights’ stayed with the collective, while ‘use rights’ were delegated 
to managers. The complexity of this arrangement led to the labelling of TVE 
property rights as ‘fuzzy.’ This system of property rights was able to 
accommodate numerous stakeholders, adapt to a wide range of situations, and 
produce effective organisations. 
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TVEs were very flexible in organisational structure. While local governments 
ran some, others were more genuinely independent in nature. Throughout the 
1980s, most of the supposedly collective TVEs operated as private enterprises in 
practice (Wong 1988). In this sense, the use of the term ‘collective’ masked the 
privatisation of rural enterprise at a time when it was ideologically subversive 
(Kung & Lin 2007). 
 
 TVEs thrived from 1978 to 1996 and there are a number of reasons given for 
their success (Kung & Lin 2007). The political institutional environment 
favoured these ‘public’ enterprises during the early reform years, since private 
businesses faced severe restrictions and discrimination in terms of resources and 
regulations. Also, the fiscal decentralisation of the early 1980s gave greater 
decision-making power to local governments and linked fiscal revenue to the 
career potential of local officials, creating strong incentives for them to promote 
these enterprises (Oi 1992). The pent-up demand in China for a host of products 
provided ample profitmaking opportunities for enter-prises operating at this 
early juncture. Moreover, the state banking system helped TVEs with massive 
loans. 
 
Massive changes in TVE sector took in 1995-1996. Retrenchment of the 
economy caused many TVEs to go out of business, with some estimates 
suggesting that about 30% have gone bankrupt. In addition, there has been a 
massive trend toward privatisation (Park & Shen 2003). After the mid-1990s, 
TVEs were forced to restructure substantially. With increased market integration 
and competition, TVEs lost their protected position; the changes in the economic 
environment gradually reduced the benefits of public ownership and increased 
its costs. As competition intensified and credit became harder to obtain, the 
collectively owned TVE sector shrank. Rural industries today are less tied to 
their local government and community and have taken on new forms and roles. 
One of the most striking developments has been the rise of ‘industrial clusters’ of 
small firms both competing with one another and cooperating to form a 
relatively complete industrial chain (Naughton 2007). Similar industrial clusters 
have also emerged in places such as Brazil and Italy. 
 (Source: Kung and Lin 2007) 
 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
See CCP. 
 
City Planning Bureau 市规划局  (市規劃局) 
[Shì Guī Huá Jú] 
In Guangdong province, the City Planning Bureau enforces land-use regulations 
with the assistance district-level governments. 
 
City Planning Law of the People’s Republic of China 中华人民共和国城市
规划法 (中華人民共和國城市規劃法) 
It promulgated (enacted) on 26 December 1989. That statute delegates (rather 
than devolves) responsibility to the local government in urban planning, general 
enforcement of development control and land-related administrative matters 
such as issue of construction and land-use permits.  
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Cultural Revolution 文化大革命 
Formally the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution 无产阶级文化大革命 (無
產階級文化大革命) [Wúchǎn Jiējí Wénhuà Dà Gémìng; literally Proletarian 
Cultural Great Revolution; often 文化大革命 wénhuà dà gémìng, Great Cultural 
Revolution, or 文革 wéngé, Cultural Revolution). 
 
The Cultural Revolution was the nationwide political upheaval, social chaos and 
economic disarray that engulfed Chinese society between 1966 and 1976. 
Launched by Mao Zedong on 16 May 1966 to a bid to remove rogue liberal 
bourgeoisie elements through class struggle by mobilising the thoughts and 
actions of China’s youth, who formed bands of Red Guards that roam around the 
country. After Mao’s death in 1976, forces within the Chinese Communist Party 
that were antagonistic to the Cultural Revolution gained prominence. The 
political, economic, and educational reforms associated with the Cultural 
Revolution were terminated. The Cultural Revolution has been treated officially 
as a negative phenomenon ever since. In its official historical judgment of the 
Cultural Revolution, the Party in 1981 assigned chief responsibility to Mao, but 
also laid significant blame on Lin Biao 林彪 (1907-71) and the Gang of Four 
(most prominently its leader, Jiang Qing) for causing its worst excesses. Prior to 
the Cultural Revolution, most of the intimidation tactics were already 
established from the earlier Yan’an Rectification Movement (延安整风运动). 
The political changes after the 1949 Communist takeover also resulted in 
sweeping social changes, particularly the labelling of much of the former ruling 
class and intelligentsia as rightists and ‘revisionists,’ ‘black elements’ or ‘black 
gang elements.’ (Meisner 1999, Andreas 2009) 
 
dăngyuán 党员 (黨員) 
It means party member. In mainland Chinese context, dǎngyuán means member 
of the Chinese Communist Party, usually but not necessarily a party cadre. 
 
dānwèi 单位 (單位) 
Work unit. A ‘work unit’ is the name given to a place of employment. The term 
dānwèi remains in use today, though it is more properly used to refer to a place of 
employment in the context of state-owned enterprises. The term is also used 
equally properly in the context of the pre-reform period when the Chinese 
economy was still more heavily socialist. Prior to the 1978 economic reforms, a 
work unit acted as the first step of a multi-tiered hierarchy linking each 
individual with the central party infrastructure.  
 
Work units were the principal channels for implementing party policy. Workers 
were bound to their dānwèi for life. Each dānwèi created its own housing, 
schools, shops, childcare, healthcare and other services. The dānwèi system was 
crucial to the implementation of the misnamed ‘one-child policy’ as the 
reproductive behaviour of workers could be monitored through work units. 
Workers not complying with policy could have their pay docked, incentives 
withheld or living conditions downgraded. Increasing liberalisation of the 
Chinese economy led to state-owned enterprises being put into competition with 
private enterprises, thereby altering the role of dānwèi. Much of the work unit’s 
power had been removed or lost by 2000 (Source: Saich 2001). 
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dàzhuān 大专 (大專) 
[大 major, great + 专 monopolise, specialist, professional] 
Polytechnic or higher-level university studies. The term is often associated with 
the three-year dàzhuān diplomas in China. Dàzhuān diplomas are equivalent to 
non-honours bachelor degrees in the British system whereas the Chinese 
four-year ‘degrees’ are equivalent to honours bachelor degrees. 
 
dàzìbào 大字报 (大字報) 
Big-character posters  
Literally, it refers to ‘big-character report’. These are wall-mounted posters 
handwritten in large Chinese characters, used as a means of protest, propaganda 
and popular communication. They have been used in China since imperial times, 
but became more common when literacy rates rose after the 1911 revolution. 
They often incorporate limited-circulation news-papers, excerpts of press 
articles and pamphlets intended for public display. 
 
A key trigger in the Cultural Revolution was the publication of a dàzìbào on 25 
May 1966 by Nie Yuanzi 聂元梓 and others at the Beijing’s Tsinghua University 
Middle School, claiming that the university was controlled by bourgeois 
anti-revolutionaries. The poster came to the attention of Mao Zedong, who had 
it broadcast nationally and published in the People’s Daily. Dàzìbào were soon 
ubiquitous, used for everything from sophisticated debate to satirical 
entertainment to rabid denunciation; being attacked in a big-character poster was 
enough to end one’s career. One of the ‘four great rights’ in the 1975 State 
Constitution was the right to write dàzìbào (Meisner 1999, Andreas 2009). 
 
Big-character posters sprouted again during the Democracy Wall Movement, 
starting in 1978; one of the most famous was The Fifth Modernisation, whose 
bold call for democracy brought instant fame to its author, Wei Jingsheng. 




It refers to the married couple who are double income, no kids. 
 
díquèliáng 的确涼 (的確涼) 
Literally, ‘really cool.’ Chinese name for Dacron, the synthetic substance similar 
to polyester. Dacron during the Cultural Revolution was a fairly costly material.  
 
dìxià lǜshī 地下律师 (地下律師) 
Underground lawyers  
It means some of the lawyers are not formally operated in China, they are be 
regarded as corrupted in China.  
 
Dongmen Walk 东门街 (東門街)  
It is located at Shenzhen and famous for selling cheap and counterfeit products.  
 
Down to the Countryside Movement 上山下乡运动 (上山下鄉運動) 
[Shàngshān Xiàxiāng Yùndòng] 
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[上 shàng, up + 山 shān, mountain + 下 xià, down + 乡 xiāng, hometown, 
village + 运动 yùn dòng, movement, exercise] 
 
 Literally, ‘up to the mountains and down to the villages.’ This was the 
nationwide ‘sending-down’ policy or campaign in the late 1960s and early 1970s 
during the Cultural Revolution that mobilised millions of youth to go ‘up to the 
mountains and down to the villages’ in an effort to alleviate urban 
unemployment and boost rural development (Bernstein 1977). As a result of the 
anti-bourgeois thinking prevalent then, Mao Zedong declared certain privileged 
urban youth would be sent to mountainous areas or farming villages in order that 
they could learn from the workers and farmers there. Mao’s policy differed from 
Liu Shaoqi’s (early 1960s sending-down policy for its political context. Liu 
instituted the first sending-down policy to redistribute excess urban population 
following the Three Bad Years and the Great Leap Forward. Mao’s use of the 
policy sent down the Red Guards who had risen up at his beck and call, sending 
China into chaos. Essentially, Mao used the ‘up to the mountains and down to 
the villages’ to quell unrest and remove the embarrassment of the early Cultural 
Revolution from sight. As a result, many fresh secondary-school graduates were 
forced out of the cities and effectively exiled to remote areas of China. Some 
commentators consider these people China’s ‘lost generation’. (Source: 
Bernstein 1977, Meisner 1999) 
See also LǍO SĀN JIÈ. 
 
Existing Housing Stock Subsidy (EHSS)  
EHSS refers to the lump sum housing subsidy which is provided to the cadres 
before 1998. Details see Li (2009).  
 
extra legal functions, ~ activities 
English umbrella legal term or euphemism for illegal, illicit, non-legal, 
semi-legal, quasi-legal, non-legitimate or pseudo-legitimate activities or any 
activities contrary to law or in legal limbo. The phrase ‘extra legal functions’ 




It means some of the Chinese people are requested to have some networks with 
some cadres at local level, so that they can be easily to get something done. 
 
FDI 
Foreign direct investment, otherwise direct foreign investment.  
 
gànbù 干部 (幹部) 
Cadre  
This French word means the backbone of an organisation, usually a political or 
military organisation. Generally, the expression is applied to a small core of 
committed and experienced people who are capable of providing leadership and 
of training newer members. Because cadres are well-developed in terms of 
knowledge, experience and agreement with the organisation’s goals, they should 
be able to adapt and rebuild the organisation’s structure and ideological direction 
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even if the organisation has been weakened (e.g. through other members being 
killed or imprisoned). In the socialist party-state context, cadres are professional 
revolutionaries and are subject to the discipline and self-discipline of a political 
vanguard party model. The concept of professional revolutionaries is in origin a 
Leninist concept used to describe a body of devoted communists who spend the 
great majority of their time organising their party towards proletarian revolution. 
This core is usually very small, and as a consequence is sometimes cited for 
being the cause of the return to capitalism of the so-called ‘Communist states.’ In 
Lenin’s original work, the purpose of the cadre is to educate the masses and 
essentially bring the entire population to the level of ‘professional 
revolutionaries.’ 
 
Gang of Four 四人帮 (四人幫) 
[sìrénbāng] 
The Gang of Four was the name given to a leftist political faction composed of 
four principal Chinese Communist Party officials. They came to prominence 
during the Cultural Revolution and were subsequently charged with treason and 
other offences. The members consisted of Jiang Qing, Mao’s last wife and 
leading figure of the group, and her close associates Zhang Chunqiao, Yao 
Wenyuan and Wang Hongwen. 
(Source: Lu & Perry 1997, Saich 2001, Meisner 1999) 
 
gǎnqíng 感情 
Sentiments or feelings in the sense of compassion. 
 
GDP 
Gross domestic product. The total or aggregate value of goods and services of a 
nation less elements connected with foreign trade. Each nation calculates its 
GDP differently. 
 
gètǐhù 个体户 (個體戶) 
[individual + body + account, standing]  
Service or production workers who do not employ others and have a small 
amount of capital assets. 
 
GNP 
Gross national product. The total or aggregate value of goods and services of a 
nation including elements connects with foreign trade. Each nation calculates its 
GNP differently. 
 
gōngfū  功夫 
Martial arts in China. 
 
Great Leap Forward 大跃进 (大躍進) 
[dàyuèjìn] 
An economic and social programme in 1958-61 aimed at using the China’s vast 
population to rapidly transform the country from a primarily agrarian economy 
of peasant farmers into a modern communist society through the process of 
agriculturalisation and industrialisation. Mao based this programme on the 
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Theory of Productive Forces. It ended in catastrophe as it triggered widespread 
famine and (most historical accounts put it) 24-30 million deaths (Meisner 
1999). 
 
guānxi 关系 (關係) 
Literally, ‘relationship’ or ‘connection.’ A combination of business and personal 
relationships in which the parties enhance their ability to do business by building 
a bond with personal favours. Guānxi is the basic dynamic driving personalised 
networks of influence in Chinese society. Sociologists have linked guānxi with 
the concept of social capital (it has been described as a Gemeinschaft value 
structure). Guānxi has been exhaustively described in studies of Chinese 
economic and political behaviour. Concepts similar to guānxi exist in other 
cultures, such in Italy (raccomandato, raccomandazione), the Middle East 
(wasta) and the Philippines (utang na loob, ‘inner debt’ or ‘debt of gratitude’). 
  
Chinese social relations are social relations typified by a reciprocal social 
network. Often social obligations within the network are characterised in 
familial terms. The individual link within the social network is known by guānxi 
and the feeling within the link is known by the term gǎnqíng. An important 
concept within Chinese social relations is the concept of face, as in many other 
Asian cultures. A Buddhist-related concept is yuanfen 缘分. 
 
As articulated in the sociological works of leading Chinese academic Fei 
Xiaotong, the Chinese—in contrast to other societies—tend to see social 
relations in terms of networks rather than boxes. Hence, people are perceived as 
being ‘near/far’ rather than ‘in/out.’ 
(Saich 2001) 
 
hēi lǜshī 黑律师 (黑律師) 
black lawyers 
‘Black lawyers’ are not formally operated in China. They are usually regarded as 
corrupted and receive profits from their clients.  
 
Home Return Permit 
Home Return Permit constitutes Chinese citizenship as shown in the case of 
PRC v. Ching Cheong (2005). 
 
hóng 红(紅) 
Political affiliation, focus on political capital. They have close connection with 
the CCP. (See CCP) 
 
hóngbāo 红包 (紅包) 
Literally, ‘red packet.’ In Hong Kong and most of the world, the usual term is the 
Cantonese laisee. 
See also SÒNG HÓNGBĀO. 
 
In Chinese and other East Asian societies, a red envelope or packet is a monetary 
gift that is given at social and family gatherings (such as weddings) or on 
holidays (such as the Chinese New Year). Red packets can also be used in 
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delivering bribes. While bribery is illegal in Asian countries, government 
employees, doctors and religious practitioners continue to receive red packets in 
exchange for favourable service. 
 
The red colour symbolises good luck and is supposed to ward off evil spirits. The 
amount of money contained in the packet usually ends with an even digit, in 
accordance with Chinese beliefs; for instance 88 and 168 are both lucky numbers, 
as odd-numbered money gifts are traditionally associated with funerals. But 
there is a widespread tradition that money should not be given in fours (or the 
number 4 should not appear in the amount) as the pronunciation of ‘four’ 
resembles that of the word ‘death,’ and it signifies bad luck for Chinese. 
  
At weddings, the amount offered is usually intended to cover the cost of the 
attendees as well as goodwill to the newlyweds. During Lunar New Year, mainly 
in South China, red packets (in the North, just money without any cover) are 
typically given to the unmarried by the married. The amount of money is usually 
a single note to avoid heavy coins, and to make it difficult to judge the amount 
inside before opening. 
 
The origin of the red packet tradition has no clear literary sources. In China, 
during the Qing (Ch’ing) Dynasty, the elderly would thread coins with a red 
string. The money was called yāsuì qián 压岁钱 (壓歲錢), meaning ‘money 
warding off evil spirits,’ and these traditional gifts of money were given to 
children during the Spring (Ching Ming) Festival and was believed to protect the 
elderly from sickness and death. Red packets replaced yāsuì qián when printing 
presses became more common. Red packets are also referred to as yāsuì qián. 
 
Similar customs also exist in other countries in Asia. 
 
In Vietnam, red packets are called lìxì (similar to the Cantonese pronunciation 
laisee) or, in some cases, phong bao mừng tuổi (‘happy new age envelope’). Lì xì 
are given to those who are younger as long as they do not have children. When 
the couple have children, all the lì xì go to the children. 
 
 In Thailand, they are known as ang paw (the pronunciation of the Chinese 
characters for ‘red packet in the Hokkien/Fujianese dialect) or tae ea among the 
Thai Chinese. 
 
 In Myanmar (Burma), the Burmese Chinese call them as an-pao, and South 
Korea’s packets are called saebae-ton (‘bowing money’) and are white, not red. 
 
In Japan, a monetary gift called otoshidama is given to children by their relatives 
during the New Year. However, the Japanese use white envelopes instead, with 
the name of the receiver written on its obverse. A similar practice is observed for 
Japanese weddings, but the envelope is folded rather than sealed, and decorated 
with an elaborate bow. 
 
In the Philippines, Chinese Filipinos exchange ang pao (from the Hokkien 
pronunciation, as most Chinese in the Philippines are of Hokkien descent) 
during the Chinese New Year. For non-Chinese Filipinos, ang pao is an easily 
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recognisable symbol of the Lunar New Year holiday and, in some places, the 
envelopes are also appropriated by non-Chinese in giving monetary gifts on 
other occasions such as Christmas and birthdays. 
(Source: Lu and Perry 1997; Saich 2001) 
 
Hongtashan 红塔山 (紅塔山 ‘Red Pagoda Mountain’) 
This is a domestic brand of cigarettes from the southwestern province of Yunnan 
and highly popular in Guangdong  
 
Housing Monetarization Policy (HMP)  
It had been announced in 1998 by the State Council. The dānwèi were not 
allowed to buy or build housing from the market for any rental or development 
purpose. Instead of, the cash subsidies will be given to the cadres to encourage 
the high income groups to buy private housing, while medium and low income 
groups to buy low-cost housing (Details see Lee & Zhu 2009: 39, Li 2009).  
 
 
Huáng-róng 黄蓉 (黃蓉) 
She is beautiful, intelligent and easy to communicate. Huáng-róng is the major 
character and comes from the Chinese gōngfū (功夫)  novel《射鵰英雄傳
shèdiāo yīngxióngzhuàn》. 
 
huàtí 话题 (話題) 
It means conversation. The same topics shared by the same class or similar 
background and lifestyles.  
 
hùjí 户籍 (戶籍) 
The formal name for the system of nationwide household registration and 
residency permits within the public administration structures of China. The 
system officially records and identifies a person (a) as a resident of a 
geographical area (i.e. domicile) and (b) by administrative category (rural or 
urban). It confers the residency status known as hùkǒu. The law requires every 
person and household to register. It is similar to systems still running in Japan, 
Vietnam, North Korea and (until recently) South Korea. 
 
Hùjí was set up according to the Regulation on Hùkǒu Registration of the 
People’s Republic of China [1958]. The statute was designed to control internal 
population movement by binding a person to his or her native or indigenous 
geographical location, especially during pre-reform times when the dānwèi 
controlled practically all essential services and provisions such as food, 
education, healthcare and so on. Hùjí became entrenched by the early 1960s and 
is most associated with the nationwide famine that followed the failure of the 
Great Leap Forward. 
 
The system dates back to ancient times in China. It is roughly similar to the 
system of family or genealogical registers that previously existed in some 
Western European countries, as das Familienbuch of Germany and le livret de 
famille of France. 
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The Soviet propiska (прописка; full term Прописка по месту жительства, ‘the 
record of place of residence’) is closer to the Chinese hùjí (hùkǒu) in that both 
served nearly identical politico-administrative functions. The propiska was a 
registration in the place of living and designated the right to live in the locality 
(or the apartment in the case of the Soviet Union). Permanent registration in a 
state-owned apartment over time received the meaning close to that of property 
right. For foreigners, it was called ‘migration control’ and stamped on the 
migration card and/or coupon approximately one-third A4-size paper, which are 
returnable to officials before departure. 
 
Hong Kong has never had any such system in its entire history and hùjí has not 
been applied to the territory after its 1997 retrocession to China. 
 (Sources: Lu & Perry 1997: 43) 
 
hùkǒu 户口 (戶口) 
The official translation of this term is ‘registered permanent residence’ (i.e. 
domicile). This is the registered residency status required by law in China. It is 
given by hùjí. Hùkǒu is more commonly used in everyday speech. When 
Western media and governments first referred to this system, they chose the 
name hùkǒu by mistake to refer to both the system and the status. At the same 
time, a hùkǒu can refer to a family register in many contexts since the household 
registration record is issued per family, and usually includes the births, deaths, 
marriages, divorces and movement of all members in the family. (Saich 2001) 
 
Individual Visit Scheme 
See IVS. 
 
jí tǐ suǒ yǒu zhì qǐ yè集体所有制企业 (集體所有製企業) 
collectively owned enterprise 
An economic (i.e. business) unit whose assets are owned collectively by the 
workers or managers (or both) of that unit. 
(Source: China Data Online 2005) 
 
jiǎ lǜshī 假律师 (假律師) 
It means fake lawyers. Fake lawyers who are not formally operated, they are 
corrupted. 
 
Jiang Qing 江青 
[Jiāng Qīng] 
[Wade-Giles: Chiang Ch’ing] 
Jiang Qing (14 March 1914 – 14 May 1991) was the pseudonym used by Mao 
Zedong’s last wife and major Chinese Communist Party power figure. She went 
by the stage name Lan Ping 蓝苹 during her acting career, and was known by 
various other names during her life. She married Mao in Yan’an in November 
1938, and is sometimes referred to as Madame Mao in Western literature, 
serving as Communist China’s first lady. Jiang Qing played a major role in the 
1966-76 Cultural Revolution and for forming the radical political alliance 
known as the Gang of Four. She was named the ‘Great Flag-carrier of the 
Proletarian Culture’ 无产阶级文艺伟大旗手. 
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(Source: Lu and Perry 1997; Saich 2001) 
 
jiăqī tānwū] 假期贪污 (假期貪污) 
holiday corruption  
Holiday corruption usually takes place in holiday like the lunar Chinese New 
Year, Mid-autumn festival, Labour Day and National Day. Holiday corruption is 
the hongbao, red envelopes that traditionally contain gifts of money.  
 
jìnguò  xiánshuĭ  浸过咸水 (浸過咸水) 
It means students who study from abroad and earn degree from abroad. 
 
Jīnyōng 金庸 
Well-known Chinese gōngfū (功夫) novel writer in Hong Kong and China.  
 
jiǔshíhòu 九十后 (九十後) 
This term refers to those younger generation who born after 1990s.  
 
Kuomingtang (KMT 中国国民党 (中國國民黨)) 
The Kuomintang, translated as the Chinese Nationalist Party, commonly known 
as the Nationalists of the Republic of China. It is the political counterpart and 
rival to the Chinese Communist Party. The KMT was founded as a moderate 
democratic socialist party in Kwangtung (Guangdong) province on 25 August 
1912 (New Style) from several revolutionary groups that had successfully 
overthrown the Qing (Ch’ing) Dynasty in the Hsinhai (Xinhai) Revolution (辛亥
革命 Xīnhài Gémìng) (also known as the 1911 Revolution or the Chinese 
Revolution). The party traces its roots to the Revive China Society founded in 
1895. 
 
Note that Guómíndǎng 国民党 is the Pinyin spelling and a localised usage in the 
People’s Republic of China. It is sometimes used in reference to the 
Revolutionary Committee of the Chinese Nationalist Party, a splinter KMT 
group that sided with the Communists in the Chinese Civil War and now part of 
the United Front Work Department of the Communist Party of China. 
(Sources: Lu and Perry 1997; Saich 2001) 
 
kù酷 
It means cool and gorgeous. It usually refers to physical appearance, facial 
expression, dress codes and feelings.  
 
laisee 利是 or 利事 
[lucky, auspicious, , providential, good for business] 
This is Cantonese term always used in Hong Kong (and most of the world) for 
‘red packet,’ which is otherwise called hóngbāo in mainland China. 
 
Lányìn 蓝印 (藍印) 
blue-stamped  
This is the new type of hùkǒu. It was instituted in 1992 and quite widespread 
throughout the 1990s. It provides a migrant with a right of abode in city areas 
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and a particular set of welfare provisions. The applicant making a large 
investment or a high-priced home purchase, in addition to the usual criteria like 
age, education and skills. Most rural migrants are ineligible for this type of 
hùkǒu and basically cannot afford one. 
 
lǎopáizì  老牌子 
It means ‘the old brands’ like Kent, followed by Winston, Marlboro and other 
brands such as 555 (Davis 2000: 275).  
 
lǎo sān jiè 老三届 (老三届) 
[老 old + 三 three + 屆 period] 
‘Three old classes.’ Collective moniker for those secondary-school graduates in 
mainland China in the three years of 1966, 1967 and 1968 during the Cul-tural 
Revolution. At the height of the revolution in 1966-68, universities stopped 
enrolments and senior secondary-school graduates of those three years were 
collectively branded as the ‘youth intelligentsia’ (知识青年 ‘intellectual youths’) 
and sent down to villages under the Down to the Countryside Movement 上山下
乡运动 (Yang 2003).  
 
Essentially, Mao used the movement to quell unrest and remove the 
embarrassment of the early Cultural Revolution from sight. As a result, many 
secondary schoolers were forced out of the cities and effectively exiled to remote 
areas of China. When national university entrance examinations were restored in 
1977, these secondary schoolers were too old to be eligible as examination 
candidates. It was not until 1979 that these people were allowed to sit the 
examinations. Therefore, they were dubbed ‘the three old classes.’ Likewise, 
those who entered university between 1977-79 were dubbed ‘the three new 
classes’ 新三屆 [xin sān jiè]. Some commentators consider the lǎo sān jiè (many 
of whom lost the opportunity to attend university) as China’s ‘lost generation.’ 
Famous authors who have written about their experiences during the movement 
include Jiang Rong and Zhang Chengzhi, both of whom went to Inner Mongolia. 
(Source: Hung & Chiu 2003) 
 
liǎn 脸 (臉) 
A more literary term for ‘face’ or ‘front’. It may also refer to face party to the 
influential people like cadres in Chinese society.  
 
liáng piào 粮票 (糧票) 
Food coupons or tickets. Liáng piào were a feature of urban life in Maoist times. 
Food coupons were issued to people by their work units (dānwèi) or workplaces 
because even people with money in those days were unable to buy food or other 
necessities without coupons. Rural domiciliaries had no need for liáng piào as 
they were self-sufficient in food provisions. 
 
Liang You良友 
It is a kind of cigarettes. It means Good Companion, a Hong Kong-made 
premium brand made from blended American tobacco and priced around 
RMB¥5 [less than £1] a packet, was popular with entrepreneurs in the 60s. But 
now it sells around ¥20 [less than £2] a packet in China today.  
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Lĭ Mò-chóu李莫愁 
Lĭ mòchóu is the major character comes from the Chinese gōngfū (功夫) novel 
called《shéndiāo xiálǚ 神雕俠侶》.She is intelligent but quite difficult to get 
along with other people. 
 
Mao Zedong 毛泽东 (毛澤東) 
[Máo Zé Dōng] 
Pinyin transliteration of the Wade-Giles spelling Mao Tse-tung, which is the 
spelling most commonly used in Western literature. 
 
Maozédōng xiàng tàiyáng, zhàodào nàlĭ nàlĭ liàng; Dèngxiăopíng xiàng yuè 
liàng, kă lā OK dào tiān liàng; Jiāng zé mín xiàng xīngxing, xiàgăng gōng 




This was the slang used by some older generation of the Chinese new middle 
class. They are most likely having nostalgic feelings to the past, particularly in 
Mao China. Mao Zedong (1st President of the PRC) likes the sun who shines the 
brighter future in China. Deng Xiaoping (2nd President of the PRC) like the 
moon, who makes the society more extravagant and corrupted, people always go 
to karaoke lounges. Jiang Zeming (3rd President of the PRC) likes the star who 
makes many laid-off or redundant workers since 1990s.  
 
miàn 面, miànzi 面子 
These are the more common terms for ‘face’ that also covers ‘surface,’ ‘outside,’ 
‘feelings,’ ‘self-respect’ and ‘honour.’ 
 See also LIǍN. 
 
Mièjué shītài 灭绝师太 (滅絕師太) 
Mièjuéshī tài is the major character and comes from the Chinese gōngfū (功夫) 
novel called《倚天屠龍記 yĭ tiāntúlóng jì》. She is very good at gōngfū (see 
gōngfū) but she is weird. She is superbly terrible to talk and communicate. 
 
National People’s Congress (NPC) 
全国人民代表大会 (全國人民代表大會) 
[Quánguó Rénmín Dàibiǎo Dàhuì] 
Abbreviation: NPC 人大 [Rén-Dà] 
The NPC is the highest state body and the only legislative house in the People’s 
Republic of China, although the NPC is not the only lawmaking body of the 
country. Often dubbed by the Western media as the rubberstamp parliament of 
China, in reality it is neither a parliament nor a rubberstamp body that endorses 
decisions of the nation’s leadership. The NPC meets yearly in Beijing’s Great 
Hall of the People, along with the People’s Political Consultative Conference 
(CPPCC) whose members are from a broader background. NPC and CPPCC 
together are often called the lianghui (‘two meetings’) and make important 
national-level political decisions. 
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The core of the NPC is the Standing Committee of the National People’s 
Congress (NPCSC) 全国人民代表大会 常务委员会 (全國人民代表大會常務
委員會 [Quánguó Rénmín Dàibiǎo Dàhuì Chángwù Wěiyuánhuì]. The NPCSC 
is a 150-member committee of the NPC that convenes between plenary sessions 
(i.e. full or general assembly) of the NPC. The NPCSC has the constitutional 
authority to modify legislation within limits set by the NPC, and thus acts as a de 
facto legislative body. It is led by a chairman (and, therefore, China’s top 
legislator) who is conventionally the third-ranking person in China’s political 
ranking system (after the General Secretary and President, which is usually one 
person). The current (2009) chairman of NPCSC is Wu Bangguo, a Politburo 
member (Saich 2001). 
 
nóng zhuǎn fēi 农转非 (農轉非) 
[农 nóng, agricultural + 转 zhuǎn, shift + 非 fēi, not : lit., ‘agricultural shifts to 
not,’ i.e. from agricultural to non-agricultural sector] 
The bureaucratic programme tightly controlled by quotas to convert a rural 
hùkǒu to an urban hùkǒu (Lee & Yang 2007a: 13).  
 
NPCSC 
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress. See NPC.  
 
pāi mài 拍卖 (拍賣) 
It means public auction.  
 
pǎobùjī  跑步机(跑步機)   
It also refers to ‘walking machine’ and it means no progress in study or other 
things.  
 
pīdòu 批斗 (批鬥) 
Red Guards fess up family members who were regarded as rebellious and 
against PRC or Mao Zedong.  
SEE also hóngwèibīn Red Guards 红卫兵 (紅衛兵) 
 
Politburo 中国共产党中央政治局 (中國共產黨中央政治局) 
[Zhōngguó Gòngchǎndǎng Zhōngyāng Zhèngzhìjú] 
The Politburo of the Communist Party of China. Also Political Bureau of the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. Formerly as Central 
Bureau (中央局) before 1927. The Politburo is a group of 19 to 25 people who 
oversee the party. Unlike politburos (political bureaus) of other communist 
parties, power within the Chinese Politburo is centralised in the Politburo 
Standing Committee. The party’s Central Committee nominally makes politburo 
appointments. The practice since the 1980s has been that the Politburo is 
self-perpetuating. 
 
The power of the Politburo resides largely in the fact that its members generally 
simultaneously hold positions within the nation’s state positions and with the 
control over personnel appointments that the Politburo and Secretariat have. In 
addition, some Politburo members hold powerful regional positions. How the 
Politburo works internally is unclear, but it appears that the full Politburo meets 
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once a month and the standing committee meets weekly. This is believed to be 
much more infrequent than the former Soviet Politburo had been. The meeting 
agendas appear to be controlled by the General Secretary and decisions are made 
by consensus rather than by majority vote. 
 
The Politburo was eclipsed by the Secretariat of the CCP Central Committee in 
the early 1980s under President Hu Yaobang, but has re-emerged as a dominant 
force after Hu’s ousting in 1987. 
 
Members of the current (17th) Politburo in 2009 are (alphabetic order of 
surnames): 
 
 Bo Xilai, party chief of Chongqing. 
 Guo Boxiong, executive vice-chairman of the Central Military 
Commission. 
 He Guoqiang, (PSC member), Secretary (i.e. head) of CCP Central 
Commission for Discipline Inspection. 
 Hu Jintao (PSC member), PRC President, General Secretary of CCP 
Central Committee, and chairman of the PRC and CCP Central Military 
Commissions. 
 Hui Liangyu, PRC Vice-Premier. 
 Jia Qinglin (PSC member), head of the PRC People’s Political Consultative 
Conference. 
 Li Changchun (PSC member), ‘propaganda chief.’ 
 Li Keqiang (PSC member), PRC Executive Vice-Premier. 
 Li Yuanchao, head of the CCP Organisation Department. 
 Liu Qi, party chief of Beijing, head of Beijing Olympics organising 
committee. 
 Liu Yandong, state councillors. 
 Liu Yunshan, Media and Communications Minister, secretary of CCP 
Central Secretariat. 
 Wang Gang, Vice-Chair of CPPCC. 
 Wang Lequan, party chief of the Xinjiang Autonomous Region. 
 Wang Qishan, PRC Vice-Premier. 
 Wang Yang, party chief of Guangdong. 
 Wang Zhaoguo, Vice-Chairman of the NPC. 
 Wen Jiabao (PSC member), PRC Premier. 
 Wu Bangguo (PSC member), Chairman of the NPCSC. 
 Xi Jinping (PSC member), PRC Vice-President, top-ranking member of the 
CCP Secretariat in charge of Hong Kong and Macau Affairs. 
 Xu Caihou, Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission. 
 Yu Zhengsheng, party chief of Shanghai. 
 Zhang Dejiang, Vice-Premier. 
 Zhang Gaoli, party chief of Tianjin. 
 Zhou Yongkang (PSC member), head of the Political and Legislative 
Affairs Committee. 
 
The Politburo’s core is the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) of the 
Communist Party of China 中国共产党 中央政治局常务委员会 (中國共產黨 
中央政治局常務委員會 Zhōngguó Gòngchǎndǎng Zhōngyāng Zhèng-zhìjú 
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Chángwù Wěiyuánhuì, abbreviated 政治局常委 Zhèngzhìjú Chángwěi). The 
PSC is a committee whose membership varies between 5 and 9 people, usually 
men, and includes the top leadership of the party. The inner workings of the PSC 
are not well known, although it is believed that decisions of the PSC are made by 
consensus. Formally, the Central Committee approves the membership of the 
PSC. In practice, PSC membership is the result of negotiations among the top 
leadership of the party. 
 Currently the PSC acts as the de facto highest and most powerful 
decision-making body (i.e. cabinet) in China. Both the national media as well as 
political watchers abroad closely follow its membership. Historically, the role of 
the PSC has varied and evolved. During the Cultural Revolution, for example, 
the PSC had little power. 
 PSC members in 2009 are (in order of protocol): 
 
1. Hu Jintao. 
 Party positions: General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee, 
 Chairman of the CPC Central Military Commission. 
 State positions: President of the PRC, Chairman of the PRC Central 
 Military Commission. 
2. Wu Bangguo. 
 Party position: nil. 
 State position: Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National 
 People’s  Congress. 
3. Wen Jiabao. 
 Party position: nil. 
 State position: Premier of the State Council. 
4. Jia Qinglin. 
 Party position: nil. 
 State position: Chairman of the People’s Political Consultative Conference. 
5. Xi Jinping. 
 Party position: Vice Chairman of the CPC, Principal of the Central Party 
 School, top-ranked member of the Secretariat of the CPC Central 
 Committee. 
 State position: Vice President of the PRC. 
6. Li Keqiang. 
 Party position: nil. 
 State position: First Vice Premier of the State Council. 
7. Li Changchun. 
 Party position: “Propaganda Chief.” 
 State position: nil. 
8. He Guoqiang. 
 Party position: Secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline 
 Inspection. 
 State position: nil. 
9. Zhou Yongkang. 
 Party position: nil. 
 State position: nil. 
  (Source: Saich 2001 
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PRC 
The People’s Republic of China (中华人民共和国). In the context of describing 
official positions of people, the term ‘PRC’ usually denotes state positions and 
‘CCP’ or ‘CPC’ to denote party positions since many top cadres hold state and 
party positions at the same time. For example, Hu Jintao, president of the PRC 
(state) and secretary-general of the CCP (party), is also chairman of the PRC 




Standing Committee of the Politburo, the de facto cabinet of the Chinese 
government. 
 
Red Guards 红卫兵 (紅衛兵) 
[Hóng Wèi Bīng] 
Red Guards were a mass movement of civilians (mostly students and other 
young people in China) who were mobilised by Mao Zedong in 1966 and 1967 
during the Cultural Revolution. The first people to call themselves ‘Red Guards’ 
were a group of students at the Tsinghua University Middle School who used 
that name to sign two ‘big-character posters’ issued on 25 May and 2 June 1966. 
The students believed that the criticism of the play Hai Rui Dismissed from 
Office was a political issue and needed greater attention. The students, led by 
Zhang Chengzhi 张承志 (張承志 born 10 September 1948) and Nie Yuanzi 聂
元梓 (聶元梓 born 1921), originally wrote the posters as a constructive criticism 
of Tsinghua University’s administration, which was accused of harbouring 
‘intellectual élitism’ and ‘bourgeois’ tendencies. However, the school 
administration and fellow students denounced the student writers as 
‘counter-revolutionaries’ and ‘radicals’ and forced them to meet secretly among 
the ruins of the Old Summer Palace. Nevertheless, Mao ordered that the 
manifesto of the Red Guards be broadcast on national radio and published in the 
People’s Daily newspaper. This action gave the Red Guards political legitimacy 
and student groups quickly began to appear across China and caused massive 
havoc, denunciations of persons and destruction of many historical relics in the 
name of pidou 批鬥 (‘struggle’).(Source: Lu and Perry 1997; Saich 2001) 
 
rénqíng 人情 
Human emotions or compassion. Also means social relationship or ‘favour’ or ‘a 
good turn.’ 
 
restraint of trade 
The WTO euphemism for market-cornering or illegal or illicit manoeuvres in 
times of market chaos. 
 
rule of law 
The term means the supremacy of law, a feature attributed to the UK constitution 
by Dicey (Law of Constitution, 1885) that embodied three concepts: (a) absolute 
predominance of regular law, so that the government has no arbitrary authority 
over the citizen; (b) the equal subjection of all (including officials) to the 
ordinary law administered by the ordinary courts; and (c) the fact that the 
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citizen’s personal freedoms are formulated and protected by the ordinary law 
rather than by abstract constitutional declarations. 
 
In Chinese, the usual translation is fǎ zhì 法治 (literally, legal rule) but that has 
different nuance in meaning. There is no analogous equivalent for ‘of’ in the 
Chinese language since ‘rule of law’ and ‘rule by law’ are both the same in 
Chinese (fá zhì). Even law lecturers and students in China are still apt to say or 
write in English ‘rule by law’ (which has a completely different, negative 
meaning) under the impression that ‘of’ is somehow a grammatical defect in the 
English language. 
 
Meanwhile in Hong Kong, ‘rule of law’ is statutorily translated as 法律原
则  (pronounced faat lut yuen tsak in Cantonese) and that is the prevailing legal 
Chinese term in common currency. However, the legal term is not exactly 
Standard Chinese (because the Chinese words literally mean ‘the principle of 
law’) and more like English legalese shoehorned into old-fashioned Chinese 
using anglicised Hong Kong Cantonese. Therefore we have the bizarre and 
unsatisfactory situation of the prevailing Chinese translation for ‘rule of law’ 
making little if any impact in linguistic or legal or even an everyday meaning to 
most Chinese mainlanders. 
 Paradoxically, the answer might be recourse to an ancient Chinese axiom that 
‘no man or Son of Heaven is excepted from the law of the land’.(Source: Oxford 
Dictionary of Law 1997). 
 
shàng de xià de, zuǒ shǒu yī de de, yòu shǒu yī gè qīn ài de 上 ‘的’下 ‘的’，
左手一‘的的’，右手一个亲爱 ‘的’ (上 的 ‘下’ ‘的’，左手一 ‘的的’，右手一
個親愛 ‘的’) 
This was the slang used by some older generation to have nostalgia to Mao 
China. That which is on top and bottom, that which is on the left hand, and that 
which is a loved one on the right hand’. The ‘truism’ (actually a running joke 
making the rounds in Chinese society in the 1960s and 1970s) has it that, if a 
person had the means to own good clothes, it would have been made of Dacron. 
And if one had Dacron clothes, then it would be quite easy for one to find a good 
and good-looking wife (or husband!). 
 
shānghén wénxué 伤痕文学 (傷痕文學) 
Trauma literatures about our harsh childhood 
 
shānghuì 商会 (商會) 
Chamber of commerce or trade association. 
 
Shàngshān xiàxiāng yùndòng 上山下乡运动 (上山下鄉運動) 
See DOWN TO THE COUNTRYSIDE MOVEMENT. 
 
Shataukok 沙头角 (沙頭角) 
The cross-border town on the Hong Kong side. 
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shìyè gànbù 事业干部 (事業幹部) 
It means business cadre.  
Cadres are not in the principal government organs. Perhaps best translated as 
‘executive cadre’ or ‘operational cadres’ or ‘line cadres,’ these are bureaucrats in 
other ‘minor’ or ‘sub-branch’ sectors related to (but not strictly within) the 
government hierarchy, such as the courts, hospitals, clinics, schools, public 
utilities and accounting departments at the municipal and city levels. This term is 
not an official one. 
See also ADMINISTRATIVE CADRE and CADRE. 
 
shuòshìshēng 硕士生 (碩士生) 
It means master students. 
 
sònghóngbāo 送红包 (送紅包) 
The practice or custom of giving hóngbāo. The literal translation of this 
Putonghua (Mandarin) expression is ‘to deliver red packets.’ In Cantonese, it is 




See TÈ ZHǑNG HÁNG YÈ. 
 
tèzhǒng hángyè  特种行业 (特種行業) 
Literally, ‘special-nature trades.’ Usually translated as ‘special business,’ this 
term refers to those industries, businesses or trades whose business licences are 
issued on the basis of their having both ‘general industries’ and ‘special 
industries.’ Special businesses include hotels, tour agencies, fitness centres or 
salons, karaoke bars, massage parlours, sauna baths and various entertainment 
establishments. 
 
Theory of Productive Forces 
The term ‘Theory of Productive Forces’ is a widely used concept in communism 
and Marxism, but should not be confused with the Marxist ‘analysis of 
productive forces’ that is a cornerstone of Marxist theory. (The theory is 
sometimes referred to pejoratively by opponents as ‘productive force 
determinism.’) The Theory of Productive Forces places primary emphasis on 
achieving abundance in a nominally socialist economy before there can be any 
hope of achieving genuine communism (or genuine socialism). The concept has 
been used in all examples of state-supervised socialism to date. The most 
influential philosophical defence of this idea has been by Canadian-born Marxist 
political philosopher Gerald A. Cohen (1941-2005) in his 1978 book Karl 
Marx’s Theory of History: A Defence, in which Cohen defends an old-fashioned 
interpretation of Marx’s historical materialism often referred to as ‘economic 
determinism’ or ‘technological determinism’ by its critics. According to this 
view, technical change can bring about social change, i.e. changes in the means 
(and intensity) of production causes changes in relations of production. So 
changes in productive means causes changes in people’s ideology and culture, 
their relations with one another, and their social relationship to the wider world.  
 
In other words, actual socialism or communism (being based on the 
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‘redistribution of wealth’ to the most oppressed sectors of society) cannot come 
to pass until that society’s wealth is built up enough to satisfy whole populations. 
When using this theory as a basis for practical programmes, this means that 
communist theoreticians and leaders (while paying lip service to the primacy of 
ideological change in individuals to sustain a communist society) actually put 
productive forces first and ideological change second. The Theory of Productive 
Forces is behind Joseph Stalin’s five-year plans, Mao’s Great Leap Forward and 
most other socialist attempts around the world to refine communism in the 20th 
century. However, Maoism’s subsequent concept of the need for a Cultural 
Revolution did signal some limited steps away from relying on the theory. The 
philosophical perspective behind the modernising zeal of the Russian and 
Chinese communists seeking to industrialise their countries is perhaps best 
captured by this thought in Die Deutche Ideologie (‘The German Ideology,’ 
1932, originally April/May 1845) by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels.  
 
Marx and Engels never found a publisher for Die Deutche Ideologie, which they 
wrote in April or early May 1845. However, the work was later retrieved and 
published for the first time in 1932 by David Riazanov through the Marx-Engels 
Institute in Moscow. The multi-part book consists of many satirically written 
polemics against Bruno Bauer, other Young Hegelians and Max Stirner’s The 
Ego and Its Own (1844). Part I, however, is a work of exposition giving the 
appearance of being the work for which the ‘Theses on Feuerbach’ served as an 
outline. The work is a restatement of the theory of history Marx was beginning to 
call the ‘materialist conception of history.’ Since its first publication, Marxist 
scholars have found the work particularly valuable since it is perhaps the most 
comprehensive statement of Marx’s theory of history stated at such length and 
detail. 
 
tiěfànwǎn 铁饭碗 (鐵飯碗) 
iron rice bowl  
‘Iron rice bowl’ is a Chinese idiom referring to employment that offers very good 
or guaranteed job security, along with steady income, benefits and sometimes 
extra perks as well. In China, it refers to the system of guaranteed lifetime 
employment in state enterprises. Job security and wage levels are not related to 
job performance but adherence to organisational rules or party doctrine. The 
meaning derives from the traditional porcelain rice bowl, which breaks when 
dropped. An iron rice bowl can be dropped multiple times without fear of 
breakage, much like how employees in certain positions can make numerous 
mistakes before being fired. 
 
The idiom is widely used in both China and Taiwan to refer to employment with 
the government or military, and the idea of the iron rice bowl has spread to other 
nations with large Chinese communities. Traditionally, people considered to 
have iron rice bowls included military and civil service personnel as well as 
employees of various state-run enterprises (through the mechanism of the 
dānwèi). When Deng Xiaoping began labour reforms in China in the 1980s, the 
iron rice bowls of government jobs were some of the first to go. Almost 
overnight, fully one-third of China’s workforce was unemployed (although there 
are no authentic literary sources to confirm this). A large majority of these 
people became migratory workers, moving from job to job in great masses. The 
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effects of the labour reforms are still felt today in China. Shifts in China’s 
economy have changed the nature of jobs that were traditionally viewed as iron 
rice bowls, leading to instability and uncertainty for employees. 
 
Getting an iron rice bowl position is often a matter of working connections, and 
using help from family friends, former classmates and relatives to get in on the 
lower levels with the goal of being promoted to a higher-ranking position with 
better pay. This can make it challenging for Chinese without connections to get 
into positions with the government or to receive promotions when they do catch 
government jobs. Critics of iron rice bowls have pointed this out as another 
argument against the idea of being allowed to hold jobs for life. 
 
 Foreign investment in China has also threatened these traditional jobs for life, as 
many foreign companies prefer to hire and fire on the basis of merit, feeling that 
they are well within their rights to get rid of non-performing employees. This 
mindset is trickling over into Chinese society, especially among the young, 
undermining the traditional iron rice bowl. These positions are unlikely to 
disappear entirely, however, since they are backed by longstanding tradition and 
people already in iron rice bowl jobs wish to keep them.  
 
The pre-eminent symbol of the Chinese Communist Party’s economic policies 
has been an unbreakable iron rice bowl, standing for cradle-to-grave social 
security. But with Beijing unable to keep its state enterprises (behemoths that 
employ some 76 million workers) afloat, China is teetering between economic 
reform and social unrest. At last count, 15 million workers were officially 
estimated to be redundant, and the real number may be higher. Beijing must 
cushion their fall to avoid a second Tiananmen Square uprising. The iron rice 
bowl is cracking and may soon shatter. 
 (Sources: BBC 1999; Hughes 1998; Wisegeek.com 2009) 
 
tōudù 偷渡 
The act (and offence) of stowing away, that is, secreting oneself upon a ship and 
goes to sea. In Hong Kong and China, toudu is rebranded as ‘illegal 
immigration,’ usually involving mainlanders trying to enter into Hong Kong. 
Main-land stowaways to Hong Kong was very common in the 1960s, 1970s and 
1980s and usually accompanied by zǒusī. 
 
Tram guy 电车男 (電車男) 
[diànchēnán] 
It refers to those guys who always stay at home to play for computer game. The 
apparels of these guys are old-fashioned. They usually wear glasses and they are 
not good at social skills. They don’t know how to get along well with other 
people either.  
 
tǔgǎnjué 土感觉 (土感覺) 
It means ‘village provincialism.’ The undertone of being associated with a 
village or backwater community or upbringing or style that a person is perceived 
to have. It is arguably from the bad sense of dress that many mainland Chinese 
think they have in the eyes of foreigners. Those who have the money try to steer 
them-selves away from the air of provincialism by getting that quintessential 
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imported or foreign look. 
 
wōjū 蜗居 (蝸居) 或 huò guìwū 货柜屋 (貨櫃屋)  
It means the tiny house like a container. This is a very popular phenomenon in 
Guangdong province. Most of the university graduates either hardly get a job, or 
the job itself is low-paid. It is very difficult for them to maintain the high living 
standard in Guangdong. They rent the house called container house which costs 
around RMB ¥6 per day [less than £1].  
Details refer to ＜大陸底層工蟻抗漲深圳打工族「蝸居」＞ 18 March 2010 
http://www.cna.com.tw. Retrieved 21 April 2010. 
 
wŏyŏu yīshuāngshŏu; bùzài chéng lĭ  chī  xiánfàn 我有一双手，不在城里吃
闲饭 (我有一雙手，不在城裡吃閒飯) 
This is the slang used by some older generation of the Chinese new middle class. 
It means “I have my own hands. I can work and don’t want to wait for 
government subsidies. Everyone needs to work and find a job to make their own 
living. Everyone even doesn’t bother to bribe the supervisor to have free lunch.” 
The older generation preferred the egalitarian life in Mao China. They thought 
strong sense of integrity did exist in Mao China.  
 
WTO 
The World Trade Organisation. An international organisation designed by its 
founders to supervise and liberalise international trade. The WTO officially 
commenced on 1 January 1995 under the Marrakech Agreement, replacing the 
General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) that started in 1947. The 
WTO deals with regulation of trade between participating countries and 
provides a framework for negotiating and formalising trade agreements. It also 
provides a dispute resolution process aimed at enforcing adherence to WTO 
agreements by member states. 
 
Most of the issues that the WTO focuses on come from previous trade 
negotiations, especially from the Uruguay Round (1986-1994). The WTO is 
currently trying to continue with a trade negotiation called the Doha 
Development Agenda (or Doha Round), which was launched in 2001 to enhance 
equitable participation of poorer countries that represent a majority of the 
world’s population. However, the negotiation has been dogged by “disagreement 
between exporters of agricultural bulk commodities and countries with large 
numbers of subsistence farmers on the precise terms of a ‘special safeguard 
measure’ to protect farmers from surges in imports. At this time, the future of the 
Doha Round is uncertain.” 
 
The WTO has 153 members, representing more than 95% of total world trade 
and 30 observers, most of which are seeking membership. The WTO is governed 
by a ministerial conference that meets every two years; a general council that 
implements the conference’s policy decisions and is responsible for day-to-day 
administration; and a director-general, who is appointed by the ministerial 
conference. Headquarters is in Geneva, Switzerland. 
(Source: World Trade Organisation, Website: www.wto.int) 
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Wuliangye 五粮液 (五糧液)  
‘The Five Nights’ 
The top-selling brands of alcohol in China.  
 
xiàgǎng gōngrén 下岗工人 (下崗工人) 
The so-called lost generation of workers who were made jobless when many 
Chinese state enterprises closed down around the mid-1990s because of 
economic streamlining measures. 
 See also TVE. 
 
xiàhăi  下海 
It means ‘to dive into the sea’,  particularly in China, it means some of the 
regional cadres or Chinese working class in state enterprises switch to doing 
business. 
 
Xiaohutuxin 小葫涂仙 (小葫塗仙)  
‘Fairy of the Little Lake’ 
The top-selling brands of alcohol in China. 
 
xiéyì cuōshāng 协议磋商 (協議磋商) 
It means negotiation the price with the land developers through the whole 
process of land tendering.  
 
xíng zhèng gànbù 行政干部 (行政幹部) 
administrative cadre  
Cadres are in government bureaucracy at the municipal, village and township 
levels. For want of a better term, administrative cadres are civil servants or 
government employees. The term is not an official one. See also BUSINESS 
CADRE and CADRE. 
(Sources: In-depth interview 2008; Tan 2007). 
 
yìkǔ sī tián 益苦思甜 
It means ‘trying to come up sweet’ of the trauma literature. This so-called yìkǔ 
sītián is a good healing medicine to pacify my emotion. 
 
zhāo biāo 招标 (招標) 
It means public tender.  
 
zhòng diăn dà xué 重点大学 (重點大學) 
It means brand name university in China.  
 
zhòng diăn zhōng xué 重点中学 (重點中學) 
It means brand name secondary schools. 
 
zhōng nǚ 中女 or shèng nǚ 剩女 
This slang is very popular in China or even in Hong Kong. Those ladies who are 
over 30 are highly educated and economically independent, but they still not yet 
get married. They may be regarded as picky in choosing their boyfriend. They 
are also regarded as difficult to communicate and get along with other people, 
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men in particular.  
 
zhōngchăn, duō hăotīng de míngzì 中产，多好听的名字 (中產，多好聽的名
字) 
The name of middle class is something high sounding but nothing for the 
Chinese new middle class.  
 
zhōngliánbàn中联办 (中聯辦) 
China Liaison Office  
This is an organ of the PRC and its office is set up at Central of the HKSAR. It is 
responsible for People’s Liberation Army Hong Kong Garrison and the Office of 
the Commission of the Foreign Ministry in Hong Kong. It is also responsible for 
liaisons with Chinese companies in Hong Kong.  
 
Zhū Róngjī 朱镕基 (朱鎔基) 
Zhu became the vice-premier of the State Council in 1993-1998. He was 
promoted to the fifth Premier of the People's Republic of China from March 
1998 to March 2003. He was famous for being a strong, strict administrator, 
intolerant of nepotism and corruption. 
 
zhuān 专(專)  
It refers to expert, professional or technical knowledge. 
 
zìjǐrén 自己人 
Literally, ‘our own person,’ sometimes with the additional meaning of ‘you are 
among friends.’ Perhaps best translated into plain English as ‘one of our own’ or 
‘one of us’ or ‘those on our side.’ 
 
zìyóuháng 自由行 
IVS Individual Visit Scheme  
A travel control mechanism implemented by the Hong Kong government on 28 
July 2003 in cooperation with mainland Chinese authorities. The main reason for 
launching the IVS was to boost the economies of Hong Kong and Macau. 
Essentially, the IVS aims to increase cross-border visitor traffic by allowing 
mainland residents to visit Hong Kong on an individual basis through simplified 
visa application. Prior to IVS, mainland residents could only travel to Hong 
Kong on business visas or on group tours. Under the initial stage of the scheme, 
people of Beijing, Shanghai and eight Guangdong provincial cities (Dongguan, 
Foshan, Guangzhou, Hui-zhou, Jiangmen, Shenzhen, Zhongshan and Zhuhai) 
could apply for visas to visit Hong Kong individually. The scheme was extended 
in July 2004 to apply to all 21 cities of Guangdong plus nine other cities in 
Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Fujian provinces. Visas are issued by the Public Security 
Bureau in mainland China, valid for seven days and could be reapplied for on 
return from Hong Kong to the mainland. In first four months of the scheme’s 
implementation, more than 600,000 individuals in the mainland applied for visas, 
and 450,000 were issued. By 2004, visitors under the scheme reached two 
million. IVS is known in Hong Kong and Macau as 自由行 (zì yóu xíng, 
Cantonese: tsee yau heng, literally ‘free walking’). In mainland China, it is 
called ge ren yau 个人游 (個人遊 ‘individual travel’). 
Glossaries and abbreviations 
 325 
(Source: China Daily 2004) 
 
zǒusī  走私 
It means ‘smuggling’ but the Chinese meaning is wider than just ‘the offence of 
importing or exporting specified goods that are subject to customs or excise 
duties without having paid the duties’ (Oxford Dictionary of Law 1997). The 
Chinese meaning encompasses illegal or illicit activities that are not necessarily 
connected with the misappropriation or translocation of goods. Smuggling was 





Appendix 1: Research questions to interview the Chinese new middle class 
 
A. The interviewee 
A1. Occupation of the target interviewee 
A2. Background information 




A7. Means of travel 
A8. Accommodation or residence 
A9. Model of mobile phone, mp3, other electronic/electrical devices 
A10. Are you a frequent credit-card user? Which bank credit cards do you hold and why? 
A11. Electronic products, PDAs, hi-fi system, etc. 
A12. Engagements in investments, funds or real-estate dealings? 
A13. Purchases of investment portfolios for children 
A14. Plans or arrangements made for children’s education 
 
B. Places to go for shopping / Mode of consumption 
B1. What activities are you into after work or on a day off? 
B2. How do you spend your holidays? 
B3. What do you think about yourself? 
B4. Are you proud to be a middle class in China? 
B5. Do you think you are in any way superior or more privileged than others? 
B6. How do you teach or instruct your children? Do you buy more books for them or take them 
to the library? Have you ever thought of sending them to international schools? Have them 
study abroad? 
B7. In your opinion, what roles will your children play in China’s social mobility in future? 
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C.  Work partners 
C1. Who or what are your major work partners? 
C2. How do you keep in touch with your work partners? What factors do you find to 
contribute to your choices for work partners? 
C3. Do you have more social connections with businessmen and professionals because of 
your job needs? How often do you usually change your work partners? What are the 
reasons for changing? 
C4. How do you form the mutual trust relationships with others? What are those 
relationships based more on—schoolmates, fellow villagers, shared experiences, 
collective memories or academic qualifications? 
 
D. Changing work partners 
D1. How often do you change work partners? 
D2. How do you get new work partners? 
D3. How do you maintain your social connections with businessmen, professionals and 
self-employed individuals? By way of dinner gatherings? Entertainment activities? 
Have you had  these experiences before? 
D4. Regarding academic qualifications, what do you think are the advantages of 
outstanding academic achievements? 
D5. In the social context of China, are social connections and political capital more 
important than academic achievements? 
D6. What is the significance of social connections? 
D7. What is the significance of being a government official or cadre? 
D8. What about the significance of studying at school? 
D9. Out of various factors ranging from political, economic, academic and cultural factors, 
which one (and only one) do you think is more important than the rest? 
D10. What do you think about the current patterns of social mobility in China? Or what 
conclusion can you draw from your observation? 
 
E. Globalisation, economic reforms and WTO 
E1. To you, what is significant about globalisation, the economic reforms and China’s 
accession to the World Trade Organisation? 
E2. More opportunities? 
E3. Is there more or less convenience or ease for social mobility? 




E5. How do you pass social class onto the next generation? What are your strategic plans 
for the well-being of your children? 
E6. As a new middle class, what difficulties do you have in your daily life in China? What is 
your opinion about the government’s plans and arrangements on medical service, 
education, social welfare and retirement schemes? 
 
F. Parent children relationship 
F1. How to describe your relationship with your parents/children 
F2. How do you keep in touch with parents/children? 
F3. How to communicate with your parents/children? Indicators? Examples? 
 
G. Marriage pattern 
G1. What are the criteria for you to select your boyfriend/girlfriend? What are your 
 expectations?  
G2. Do you find it difficult to find boyfriend/girlfriend in Guangdong? 
G3. Do you think late marriage is serious in Guangdong? Will you have tendency to delay 
your marriage? 
G4. What do you think about the highly-educated men/women in Guangdong? Will you 
choose these women as your girlfriend? Why or Why not? 
G5. Do you think men and women have great different in marriage in today’s China? 
G6. Do you accept late marriage for some men/women?
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Appendix 2: Details profile of the Chinese new middle class  
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Sex Age35 Marital 
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¥5, 000  for 
his basic 










Total number of the old generation of regional cadres: 10 
 




Sex Age Marital 
status 




















Share and fund 
 
Total number of the young generation of regional cadre: 1
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Total number of the older generation of entrepreneurs: 21 
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Sex Age Marital 
status 





















































Chiu M 1970   
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Mark  M  1973 
35 
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Total number of the younger generation of entrepreneurs: 10 
 
Total no. of entrepreneurs: 31 
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Sex Age Marital 
status 





































































M  1968 
40 












Total numbers of the old generation of professionals are 4. 
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Sex Age Marital 
status 






















Engineer  Around  
¥7, 000  






M  1973 
35 











Betty F 1978 
30 




Dan M 1979 
29 




Share and fund 
 
































M  1978 
30 






sport trainer  
Around  
¥8, 000 
Share and fund 
Jiang M 1977 
31 
Married  PhD  Assistant 
Professor 
Student Around  
¥15,000  
Share 
Lily F 1978 
30 
Married  Senior high 









sport trainer  
Around  
¥8, 000 
Share and fund 
Mary  F 1983 
25 




¥9, 000  
Share and fund 
Melody  F 1980 
28 





















Engineer at one 
private 
company  








from his job   
Total numbers of the younger generation are 13 
Total of interviewees: 59 





Appendix 3: Casenotes of Chen Xitong (陈希同) 
 











Defendant was a city mayor and a well-connected Politburo member accused of corruption, 
embezzlement and dereliction of duty in an anti-corruption drive instigated by political rivals. 
His colleague, the vice-mayor, committed suicide in the wake of the corruption charges. D was 
sentenced to 16 years in prison but released after serving half the term. The small amount of 
money said to be involved in the embezzlement suggests that D political downfall and removal 
from public office may have been politically inspired. D downfall was not helped by his hardline 





(1) Chen Xitong (simplified Chinese: 陈希同 ; traditional Chinese: 陳希同; pinyin: Chén 
Xītóng), born June 1930, was a member of the Politburo of the Communist Party of China 
and the Mayor of Beijing until he was removed from office on charges of corruption in 1995. 
 
(2) In 1995, Chen was removed from mayoral office on charges of corruption and dereliction of 
duty. It was later revealed that Chen had embezzled RMB¥5,000,000 (renminbi five million 
yuan). 
 
(3) Details not known or unreported: arrest date, place of questioning, formal charges, 
prosecuting body, trial dates, trial court, prosecution, defence and judges/adjudicators. 
 
(4) In 1998, Chen was given a 16-year prison sentence. Place of incarceration are not known or 
unreported. 
 
(5) In 2006, Chen was released early from prison, officially on reasons of ill health, after 





(6) His son, Chen Xiaotong, was also charged and sentenced contemporaneously. 
 
(7) In the wake of the corruption charges, Beijing Vice Mayor Wang Baosen committed suicide. 
 
(8) A graduate of Peking University, Chen had close ties to Deng Xiaoping and his family. Chen 
was once considered a possible successor to Deng Xiaoping. 
 
(9) A onetime rival to Jiang Zemin, Chen’s downfall came in 1995 during an anti-corruption 
campaign led by Jiang’s Shanghai clique. Clique members Zeng Qinghong and Jia Qinglin 
played key roles in the campaign that eventually led to Chen’s arrest.  
 
(10) Some observers viewed Chen’s fall as a political struggle between him and Jiang because it 
was only revealed later that Chen had embezzled RMB¥5,000,000 (five million yuan). 
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Observers considered it to be a relatively small amount compared with the higher amounts 
of other corrupt cadres who were left unscathed in the anti-corruption campaign. 
 
(11) Beijing residents were apparently pleased to see Chen fall from grace. Chen was mayor of 
Beijing at the time of the Tiananmen protests. He was advocating use of force to quell 
protestors and was responsible for declaring martial law in the city that led to shootings of 
the protesters. 
 
(12) During the 1980s, Chen became a fan of American TV series Hunter when it first aired in 
China. In his speeches, Chen made various references to the TV series. 
 
(13) In December 1996, a fictionalised account of the case was published in novel form and 
quickly banned in China. It was written from the point of view of an investigator and many 
pirate copies were printed or available. 
 
“The Wrath of God: The Anti-Corruption Bureau in Action” 
[天怒 : 反貪局在行動 Tiān Nú: Fǎntãnjú Zài Xíngdòng] 
By Fang Wen [pseudonym] 
Published by Yuanfang Chubanshe of Hohhot, Inner Mongolia 
Year of publication: December 1996 
ISBN 7-80595-271-X/1 120 











Appendix 4: Casenotes of Ching Cheong(程翔)  











People’s Republic of China (Beijing People’s Procuratorate Branch No. 2) v. Ching Cheong (程
翔) [2005] 31 August 2006 Reuters (Financial Times) [Beijing Second Intermediate Court, 
Criminal Case No. 862] 
 
 
Defendant (D) was the first Hong Kong journalist to be detained by China for espionage since 
the Hong Kong sovereignty handover. D accused of receiving a manuscript containing secret 
memoirs of the country’s ex-president. Formally charged with passing state secrets to Taiwan for 
monetary reward over a five-year period. D alleged entrapment by authorities. Authorities 
regarded the Home Visit Permit on which D travelled into China was a form of Chinese 





1. Ching Cheong (Chinese: 程翔; pinyin: Chéng Xiáng) was a journalist and the Chief China 
Correspondent of The Straits Times of Singapore at the time of his arrest. 
 
2. In spring 2005, Ching entered mainland China on a Home Visit Permit to do research on 
former Chinese president Zhao Ziyang. Ching was going to receive or trying to obtain a 
manuscript that was believed to be memoirs of the ex-president based on secret interviews 
recorded by former Xinhua News Agency reporter Zong Fengming with the ex-president. 
 
3. On 22nd April 2005, Ching was arrested in Guangzhou, Guangdong, and charged with 
spying on behalf of a foreign intelligence agency. The Foreign Ministry later reported that 
Ching had confessed to the accusations. Ching became the first Hong Kong journalist to be 
charged with spying since the 1997 sovereignty transfer of Hong Kong. 
 
4. In June 2005, the Hong Kong Journalists Association and Reporters Without Borders 
organised and sent a petition of 13,000 signatures to President Hu Jintao calling for Ching’s 
immediate release from ‘unfair detention.’ 
 
5. The International Federation of Journalists and the Committee to Protect Journalists also 
protested Ching’s detention. 
 
6. The British government had also been asked to intervene as Ching held a British National 
(Overseas) passport. 
 
7. On 5th August 2005, formal charges were drawn up by the Beijing People’s Procuratorate 
Branch No. 2. The statute(s) under which the charges were filed were not known. The 
formal charges stated that Ching was passing state secrets to the Republic of China (Taiwan) 
over a period of five years in return for millions of dollars in reward and using funds 
provided by Taiwan to purchase political and military information.  
 
8. Ching’s wife (Mary Lau) said the charges were ludicrous and added that Ching had 




9. On 12th January 2006, thirty-five members of the Hong Kong Legislative Council signed an 
open letter to the Chinese authorities to release Ching unless there was sufficient evidence. 
Signatories to the open letter included ten pro-Beijing legislators, plus three from the Liberal 
Party, three from the DAB, one from the Alliance Party. 
 
10. On 22nd February 2006, the prosecutor in charge of the case returned the casefile back to the 
State Security Department for further investigation, thereby delaying trial hearings for at 
least one month. 
 
11. Trial hearings, in camera, were held in the Beijing Second Intermediate Court as Criminal 
Case No. 862. 
 
12. On 31st August 2006, court found Ching guilty of spying and sentenced him to five years’ 
imprisonment. Ching’s family issued a statement on the same day, claiming the verdict was 
extremely biased because the court took in evidence only from the Procuratorate while 
setting aside almost all defence arguments/evidence. 
 
13. On 1st September 2006, Ching said the verdict was “very unfair” and would appeal, 
according to a statement by Ching’s wife. 
 
14. On 5th February 2008, the Chinese government announced that it was releasing Ching from 
prison early, a few days before the Chinese New Year holidays, having spent around 1,000 




15. Ching was born in Guangzhou (then Kwangchow), China, on 3rd December 1949. He was 
educated at St. Paul’s College, Hong Kong, and graduated from the University of Hong 
Kong in 1973 with a bachelor’s degree in economics. 
 
16. In 1974, Ching joined the Wen Wei Po (文汇报), a pro-Beijing newspaper, of which he 
eventually became vice-editorial manager. After the Tiananmen Square shootings of 4th 
June 1989, Ching and around 40 other journalists resigned from the newspaper in protest. 
Ching, with Li Zhisong and others, founded Commentary, a magazine about China affairs. 
 
17. In 1996, Ching joined the Singapore-based newspaper The Straits Times, assigned at first to 
the Taiwan desk. While on the Taiwan desk, Ching’s articles showed a pro-unification 
stance and were collected in a book called Will Taiwan Break Away: The Rise of Taiwanese 
Nationalism. Ching was later named [Chief] China Correspondent of the newspaper. 
 
Casenote prepared on 1st September 2009  
 
 
